Florida Institute of Technology

Scholarship Repository @ Florida Tech
Theses and Dissertations
12-2019

Fool Me Once: Response to Trust Violation in Collaborative Dyads
Trevor Noah Fry

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.fit.edu/etd
Part of the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Commons

Fool Me Once:
Response to Trust Violation in Collaborative Dyads

by
Trevor Noah Fry

A dissertation submitted to the School of Psychology at
Florida Institute of Technology
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Industrial-Organizational Psychology

Melbourne, Florida
December, 2019

We the undersigned committee hereby approve the attached thesis, “Fool Me Once:
Response to Trust Violation in Collaborative Dyads,” by Trevor Noah Fry.

_________________________________________________
Jessica L. Wildman, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
School of Psychology

_________________________________________________
Pat D. Converse, Ph.D
Associate Professor
School of Psychology

_________________________________________________
Meredith Carroll, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
College of Aeronautics

__________________________________________________
Gary Burns, Ph.D.
Professor
School of Psychology

________________________________________________
Lisa A. Steelman, Ph.D.
Professor and Dean
College of Psychology and Liberal Arts

Abstract
Fool Me Once: Response to Trust Violation in Collaborative Dyads
Author: Trevor Noah Fry
Advisor: Jessica L. Wildman, Ph.D.
Much of what is known about trust violation in collaborative contexts has emerged in the
body of trust repair literature, broadly implicating that trust repair behaviors will be the
immediate response to follow a trust-related transgression. However, when trust is
violated in the workplace, it is possible that substantial time may pass before any
movements toward trust repair are attempted. During that time between a trust violation
experience and attempts to repair trust the trustor may experience a range of thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors in response to the violation. This dissertation aims to begin
unpacking that black box through systematic investigation of the cognitive, affective, and
behavioral responses to trust violation that individuals experience prior to engaging in
trust repair strategies. To this end, the current study addresses two overarching research
questions. First, what are the internal responses to trust violation that drive decreases in
trust? Second, how does that change in trust influence individual behaviors prior to
attempts at trust repair? The current study draws on two recently collected archival
datasets investigating the broader lifecycle of trust, an online survey and in-lab
experiment, to address several hypotheses surrounding these research questions. This
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research presents several novel findings regarding individual responses to trust violation
in collaborative relationships. First, it was found that primary appraisal perceptions of
trustees tend to decrease substantially following a violation, and those cognitive
perceptions are predictive of subsequent changes in levels of trust. Second, the findings
indicate that feeling upset is also a common response that predicts changes in trust. Third,
the overall findings extend on existing trust violation theory by suggesting a four-step
process involving a violation event, cognitive and affective reactions, changes in trust
attitudes, and distinct behavioral reactions. The implications of these findings for theory
and practice, and recommendations for future research are elaborated on.

Key words. Trust violation, cognitive appraisal, affective response, behavioral
response.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Statement of the problem
Trust is a critical aspect of effective collaboration in the workplace. As highlighted
in Covey and Link’s (2013) widely popular book for organizational leaders and
managers, “Without trust we don’t truly collaborate; we merely coordinate or, at
best, cooperate. It is trust that transforms a group of people into a team” (p. 47).
While trust has been identified as a critical driver of performance and other
beneficial outcomes across industries and domains (Costa, Fulmer, & Anderson,
2017), the importance of trust in collaborative relationships is considered even
more crucial in the context of those working in extreme circumstances (Driskell,
Salas, & Driskell, 2018), uncertain conditions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2011) and
ambiguous environments (Codreanu, 2016), such as emergency response (Currao,
2009), disaster relief (Kapucu, Augustin, & Garayev 2009; Power, 2018), space
exploration (Hadfield, 2015), and international military campaigns (Gill,
Thompson, & Febbraro, 2011). The body of extant research in the domain of trust
in the workplace illuminates a wealth of information and empirical evidence to
facilitate an understanding of how individuals develop and repair trust attitudes in
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collaborative contexts. Yet, while this body of literature provides a detailed
explanation of these dynamic trust building processes, relatively little research has
been conducted on how individuals respond to a violation of trust specifically, an
event that must occur between the stages of trust development and attempts to
repair broken trust.
Trust as an attitude is an important psychosocial phenomenon that has been
studied across individual, group, and systems levels of analysis in organizational
research, with a multitude of studies providing evidence to demonstrate its
importance in a variety of work contexts. As such, the interest surrounding trust in
the workplace has risen dramatically in recent decades (Schoorman, Mayer, &
Davis, 2007; Costa et al., 2017) and a broad range of insights have been gleaned
from this research. In more recent years this research has been extended from
interpersonal relationships, to team and organizational (i.e., systems) levels (Costa
et al., 2017; De Jong, Dirks, & Gillespie, 2016; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012),
however, we cannot begin to unravel the complexities of trust among networks of
individuals at higher levels of analysis until we have a more galvanized
understanding of the full trust life cycle within simple dyadic relationships,
including the process of trust violation and how people respond to experiencing
trust violation.
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As the majority of literature in this domain has focused on trust development and
trust repair, very little research has honed its focus on individuals' perceptions and
reactions to the experience of having their trust violated in a working context.
Exceptions include studies that have explored the effects of trust violation at the
organizational level (i.e., psychological contract breach) on individuals' trust in
their organization (e.g., Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Robinson & Wolfe
Morrison, 2000; Yan & Zhu, 2013). However, the manner in which individuals
respond to violation of trust by another individual is likely to differ considerably
from that of a breach of psychological contract by an organization (Yan & Zhu,
2013). In studies where interpersonal trust violation has been manipulated or
measured, the focus of the research questions have often been exclusively aimed at
how trust is repaired and not at better understanding the process of experiencing
trust violation (e.g., Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, &
Ferrin, 2006; Dirks, Kim, Ferrin, & Cooper, 2011; Haselhuhn, Kennedy, Kray,
Van Zant, & Schweitzer, 2015).
In the literature that has explored trust violation in organizational contexts the
focus has not been on the experience of the violation per se, but rather how the
violation leads to trust repair, often considering the trust repair process as an
immediate response to the violation (e.g., Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004;
Kim et al., 2006; Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 2008; Schweitzer,
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Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006; Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017). However, in real-world
scenarios trust repair could be a more distal process that, if it does occur, may take
place long after the violation event has occurred. Therefore, there remains to be a
vast gap in our understanding of how individuals experience, process, and respond
to the experience of a collaborator violating interpersonal trust.
Therefore, given the demonstrated importance of trust in organizations across
levels of analysis combined with a historical bias to focus on the trust
development and repair phases of the trust lifecycle, there is clear impetus for
research to begin exploring the dynamic intrapersonal and interpersonal processes
that stem from trust violation experiences. With a clearer understanding of how
individuals interpret and respond to trust violation exclusively, researchers can
begin to better identify the complex relationships between trust violation and trust
repair phases of the broader trust lifecycle in collaborative contexts.

Purpose of the current study
Past research has argued that trust is a linear function which begins low and must
be nurtured and built up over time (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996, Shapiro, Sheppard,
& Cheraskin, 1992). However, other research has argued that trust can begin at a
high level initially (Jones & George, 1998; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany,
1998) which has been supported in empirical studies (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, &
McCabe, 1995; Kramer, 1994). Consistent with more recent scholars, I contend
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that the practical issue should not be how to build trust, but rather how to maintain
it and avoid the erosion of trust between coworkers over time (Elangovan, AuerRizzi, & Szabo, 2007).
The overarching goal of this study is to begin unpackaging the black box that
exists in the process of moving from experiencing trust violation to engaging in
trust repair strategies. To this end, the purpose of the current study is two-fold.
First, this dissertation aims to further explore the affective and cognitive responses
to trust violation, and how those internal processes influence changes in levels of
trust between collaborators. Second, this study seeks to explore discrete behavioral
responses that follow these affective, cognitive, and attitudinal changes that follow
the experience of having trust violated in a collaborative context. Findings from
this study will aid organizations and future research by laying the foundation for a
more refined understanding of how people respond to having their trust violated in
working contexts.

Chapter 2
Literature Review
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Interpersonal trust in the workplace
The literature on interpersonal trust in the workplace began to gain foundational
momentum in the mid-1990s with the work of Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman
(1995), McAllister (1995), Lewicki and Bunker (1996), Jones and George (1998),
Rousseau and colleagues (1998), and Dirks (1999). The leading model of trust in
organizations, and perhaps the most widely cited in the field of organizational
science, is the integrative model of organizational trust put forward by Mayer et al.
(1995). Mayer and colleagues (1995) defined interpersonal trust as:
The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control
that other party. (p. 712)
There are two core elements embedded in this definition of trust, expectations of
others and risk. Although the term risk is not explicitly included in the definition,
the authors explain how there is inherent risk in the "behavioral manifestations of
the willingness to be vulnerable" (p. 724). In this way, the Mayer et al. (1995)
definition effectively distinguishes trust from similar topics including cooperation,

7
confidence, and predictability. This integrated model is also considered unique in
that it differentiates trust from the factors that contribute to the development of
trust. Furthermore, the authors distinguish between characteristics of trustors and
trustees in the manifestation of trust attitudes in an organizational context.
The primary characteristic of the trustor that drives the extent that trust attitudes
are manifested, is the trustor's propensity to trust. Mayer and colleagues (1995)
define this as, "the general willingness to trust others" (p. 715). In other words,
propensity to trust encapsulates an individual trait that determines whether or not
an individual trustor chooses to trust an individual trustee. Trust propensity is an
important factor for the development of trust in any working relationship and more
recent research conducted by the authors suggests that propensity to trust is
particularly critical in early stages of a relationship (Schoorman et al., 2007). Not
only is trust propensity of the trustor considered a predictor of trust, but it is also
viewed as a mediator of the relationship between trustee characteristics (i.e.,
trustworthiness) and trust. As such, trust propensity is thought to be a critical
underlying factor in all trust relationships (Schoorman et al., 2007).
In terms of trustee characteristics that drive the development of trust attitudes,
Mayer and colleagues (1995) identified three related factors that can explain
within-person variance in trust toward others, collectively referred to as
trustworthiness. These characteristics include perceptions of another’s ability,
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benevolence, and integrity. Mayer and colleagues (1995) defined ability as the
"group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have
influence within some specific domain" (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 717). By definition,
this dimension of trustworthiness aligns with other previous conceptualizations of
factors that contribute to trust including expertise (i.e., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley,
1953; Giffin, 1967) and competence (i.e., Butler, 1991; Mishra, 1996). As such,
this definition of ability highlights the task- and situation-specific nature of
interpersonal trust development in collaborative contexts, supporting past
arguments that trust is a domain-specific construct (Zand, 1972).
On the other hand, integrity refers to the extent that a trustee measures up to the
trustors subjective ethical and moral expectations. Integrity is defined in this
context as involving "the trustors perception that the trustee adheres to a set of
principles that the trustor finds acceptable" (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 719). Perceiving
that the other party demonstrates integrity suggests that they will fulfill promises
and joint agreements. In their later work the authors reiterated that both
perceptions of ability and integrity are likely to develop early-on in the working
relationship, whereas perceptions of benevolence may take more time to percolate
(Schoorman et al., 2007).
The third trustworthiness characteristic of trustees is labeled benevolence. While
this construct had been included as a trust antecedent in some previous trust
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models (e.g., Larzelere & Huston, 1980; Solomon, 1960; Strickland, 1958), Mayer
et al (1995) define benevolence as "the extent to which a trustee is believed to
want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive" (p. 718).
According to the authors, perceptions of benevolence are expected to take longer
to recognize than perceptions of ability and integrity (Schoorman et al., 2007). It is
also noted that distinguishing between integrity and benevolence may be difficult
or impossible in the early stages of a working relationship, but that over time these
trustworthiness dimensions are likely to become discrete factors that contribute to
the development and sustainment of trust attitudes.
Furthermore, Mayer and colleagues' (1995) model introduced the dynamic nature
of trust by proposing that there are feedback loops from outcomes of trusting
behaviors and the trustor's perceptions of another party’s trustworthiness
characteristics. Specifically, in terms of trust-related outcomes, the authors
proposed that trust results in behavioral consequences in the form of risk-takingrelationships (RTRs). In summary, the Mayer et al (1995) integrated model of trust
proposes that trust develops as a result of trustees demonstrating trustworthiness
characteristics in the forms of perceived ability, integrity, and benevolence. That
trust then leads to the development of RTRs which in turn influence the trustor's
perceptions of trustworthiness characteristics of the trustee and related trust
attitudes over time.
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The unidimensional model of trust put forth by Mayer and colleagues (1995) was
later supported through a comprehensive meta-analysis that aimed to explore
which of the trust antecedents has had the strongest relationship with trust and
whether trust would mediate the relationships between trust antecedents and
behavioral outcomes of trust including risk taking, task performance, citizenship
behaviors and counterproductive behaviors (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007).
While these authors did not find evidence that trust fully mediated the relationship
between antecedents and outcomes, the indirect effects were found to be
significant. Furthermore, the results established that no statistical differences
emerged between trust in leaders and trust in peers, indicating that both
relationships benefit from the development of trust attitudes. More interestingly,
Colquitt and colleagues (2007) demonstrated that affective commitment also
mediated the relationship between trust antecedents and outcomes, highlighting
the importance of an affective component involved in the development of trust
attitudes.
The Mayer et al (1995) framework was later tested to distinguish between trust in
coworkers and trust in organizations. Tan and Lim (2009) argued that trust in
coworkers is an important avenue of inquiry because it influences trust in
organizations which contributes to desired organizational outcomes (i.e.,
performance and organizational commitment). While the authors did not find
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support for ability as a predictor of trust at the coworker level, this may have been
due to their sample being comprised exclusively of Chinese insurance agents.
Nonetheless, the authors provided evidence that trust in the organization fully
mediated the relationship between trust in coworkers and the desired outcomes.
This suggests that the organizational outcomes are not directly derived from a
particular focus of trust but can be reached through various pathways. Although
findings such as these are limited in the extant body of literature, they provide a
clear indication that cultural background may have differential influences on how
trust attitudes are developed in collaborative contexts.
Other trust researchers during the mid-1990s distinguished between types of trust
in organizational settings. For instance, McAllister (1995) introduced the 2-factor
model of affect- and cognition-based trust. From this perspective, the two
interrelated forms of trust were hypothesized to manifest as a result of differential
antecedents. Cognition-based trust was proposed to be built on fulfilled
expectations of reliability and dependability including reliable performance,
cultural and ethnic similarity, and professional credentials. Affect-based trust on
the other hand, was thought to involve peoples' emotional ties that serve as the
foundation for trust development. McAllister (1995) proposed that antecedents of
affect-based trust include citizenship behavior, interaction frequency, and
cognition-based trust. Drawing on a sample of managers and professionals,
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focusing on interpersonal trust at the peer-level, McAllister (1995) provided
empirical support for the hypothesized antecedents of affect-based trust. Affectbased trust was found to be predictive of need-based monitoring and citizenship
behavior, which were subsequently predictive of both peer and manager
performance. Additionally, the author found support for the notion that cognitionbased trust can be a precursor for affect-based trust to emerge. In other words,
individuals in a collaborative context are likely to first develop a sense of
cognition-based trust which, combined with interaction frequency and
observations of peer citizenship behaviors, drive the emergence of affect-based
trust and subsequent behaviors that are linked to peer and manager performance.
The work of McAllister (1995) is notable as it provides clear implications of the
important role that emotions play in the development of trust.
Moving beyond affect- and cognition-based trust, other researchers further
distinguished types of trust to reflect stages of relationship development,
commonly referred to as transformational models of trust (Lewicki, Tomlinson, &
Gillespie, 2006). Building on previous research focused on trust in business
negotiations and across stages of romantic relationships (i.e., Boon & Holmes,
1991; Shapiro et al., 1992), Lewicki and Bunker (1996) presented a
transformational framework of trust that could be applied to professional
relationships that includes three distinct types of trust which are sequential and
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build over time, including calculus-based, knowledge-based, and identificationbased trust. Calculus-based trust is a form of trust that develops during the early
stages of professional relationships and involves a trustor’s mental calculations
regarding potential rewards and punishments involved with maintaining the
professional relationship. The motivation behind calculus-based trust is to avoid
unnecessary risks, and individuals make ongoing evaluations of trustworthy and
untrustworthy behaviors in others.
On the other hand, knowledge-based trust is rooted in behavioral predictability.
When a trustor is familiar enough with a given trustee, they are able to anticipate
behaviors, resulting in a set of implicit and explicit trustworthiness expectations
based on prior knowledge of the trustee. Thus, knowledge-based trust is built over
time as parties regularly interact and communicate with one another.
Finally, identification-based trust is a form of trust that may develop after the
relationship has had substantial time to build. It is compared to a deep level of
trust that is commonly experienced in long-term romantic relationships. In this
type of trust, trustors and trustees share a deep mutual awareness of each other's
wants and needs and make genuine efforts to act in the other parties' best interests.
At this stage the trustor and trustee are thought to develop a collective identity,
leading to joint outcomes which are greater than the sum of their parts. These three
forms of trust are thought to evolve over time as professional relationships move
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from one stage to the next. Furthermore, Lewicki and Bunker (1996) point out that
most professional relationships do progress beyond calculus-based trust, evolving
into knowledge-based trust, however the authors contest that very few
collaborative relationships will realize stable identification-based trust.
While trust in the workplace can take a variety of forms it is clear that trust
development begins at the dyadic level (Costa, Roe, Tallieu, 2001; Spector &
Jones, 2004), though more recently researchers have begun to take interest in how
trust emerges at the team and systems levels of analysis (Fulmer & Gelfand,
2012). Drawing on Mayer and colleagues (1995) definition of trust as a
willingness to accept vulnerability to another party, an individual can engage in a
risk-taking relationship with a group of individuals (Schoorman et al., 2007).
Likewise, risk-taking can be exhibited by a team allowing trust to develop in a
reciprocal fashion (Serva, Fuller, & Mayer, 2005). Risk taking behaviors are
therefore an outcome of trust and can include sharing information, delegating
tasks, or cooperating with teammates (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). Mayer and Davis
(1999) highlight another risk as voluntarily allowing others to have control, or
influence, over important issues. In other words, risk-taking behavior can involve
influencing others and accepting the influence of others in return. Therefore, an
individual can conceivable develop trust among a group of others simultaneously
as risk-taking behaviors are reciprocated within group. Other researchers in this
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field have made propositions to contest that the type of team is also an important
factor in how trust is developed. For example, Wildman and colleagues (2012)
presented a framework in which initial high levels of trust (i.e., swift trust) is
viewed as unique to temporary systems such as swift starting action teams
(STATs).
Consequently, intragroup trust at the team level can be conceived as a generalized
expectation that an individual's teammates are honest, competent, and benevolent
(Simmons & Peterson, 2000) and manifest as willingness to be vulnerable to the
team by engaging in risk taking. Fulmer and Gelfand (2012) contend that at higher
levels of analysis (i.e., group and organization levels) trust can be conceptualized
as direct consensus compositional models, which assume trust in a particular
referent is shared across the individuals who compose the team or organization.
Furthermore, those authors discuss how trust emerges as a function of the trust
referent (i.e., interpersonal, team, organization) and the level of analysis (i.e.,
individual, team, organization). Based on extant literature the authors present
specific antecedents and consequences of trust in each referent, and at each level
of analysis.
More recently Costa, Fulmer, and Anderson (2017) published a multilevel model
of trust in work teams that distinguishes between individual and team level
antecedents and outcomes of trust, while also including the recursive interaction
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between individual and team trust emergence. While these propositions provide
great insight into the dynamic nature of trust in the work context, it is clear that
conducting research on trust across levels of analysis can become exponentially
more complicated depending on the research questions being addressed, and the
type of team or organization being studied. To this end, the current study aims to
focus on interpersonal trust at the individual level of analysis.
At the individual level and interpersonal referent (i.e., individual trust in other
individuals) Fulmer and Gelfand (2012) highlight trust antecedents in trustees as:
perceptions of ability, integrity, and benevolence, voluntary help, individualized
support, rapport and loyalty, justice fairness, and ethical conduct, behavioral
integrity, participative and consulting decision-making, and leadership styles.
Consequences at this level and referent of analysis include knowledge sharing,
cooperation, communication, viability, and performance. Additionally, previous
studies have demonstrated individual level interpersonal trust to be predictive of
better adjustment in virtual work environments (Raghuram, Garud, Wiesenfeld, &
Gupta, 2001) and lower frequency of conflict (Raghuram & Wiesenfeld, 2004).
Other researchers in this domain have begun to put forth more integrated models
of trust in the workplace to better understand what some now refer to as the trust
lifecycle, including the process of developing trust and restoring trust after it has
been violated. For example, Hasel and Grover (2017) recently proposed an
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integrative model of trust and leadership. As the model aims primarily to inform
effective leadership practices, this theoretical framework highlights the complex
interactions between trust, leadership, and follower outcomes. Empirical support
notwithstanding, the authors put forth several propositions to aid in understanding
how both person- and role-oriented leadership behaviors interact with calculus-,
knowledge-, and identification-based trust (Hasel & Grover, 2017). While the
framework helps to parse out how different types of leadership behaviors influence
trust in different ways, the model lacks the inclusion of core trust phases,
including trust violation and trust repair.
As the majority of research has viewed trust as a static concept, relatively little
attention has been given to how trust changes over time, particularly after a
violation of trust occurs (Schweitzer et al., 2006). One recent model introduced by
Lewicki and Brinsfield (2017) attempts to provide insight into this persistent
limitation in the literature by presenting a 4-phase model of trust repair. The
authors depict the first stage as the pre-existing level of trust between parties prior
to the occurrence of a trust violation. After a violation has occurred, the second
phase involves the trustee’s recognition that their trust has been compromised.
Following this recognition, the third and fourth stages refer to short- and long-term
repair strategies, respectively (Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017). While this model does
suggest that the short- and long-term repair strategies that follow a trust violation
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may differ, this paper ultimately highlights in particular our lack of understanding
around the trust violation process. This lack of clarity feeds the impetus for the
current study to further explore the internal processes that individuals experience,
and the behaviors they engage in following trust violation, prior to any short- or
long-term attempts to repair trust.

Trust violation
It is a common idiom that trust is easier to break than to build, indicating that trust
is a fragile social construct (Schweitzer et al., 2006). The literature indicates broad
consensus regarding trust development and outcomes in organizational contexts,
however the outcomes and process of trust violation remains to be a more elusive
concept. While the early research on trust focused on defining the construct
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998), identifying the core dimensions of
trust (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995), differentiating types of trust
(Lewicki et al., 2006), and exploring factors that build trust (Lewicki & Bunker,
1996), later researchers have shifted their focus to more practical implications by
exploring the effectiveness of various trust repair strategies to understand how
trust can be restored following a breach (e.g., Tomlinson et al., 2004; Ferrin &
Dirks, 2003; Kim et al., 2006, Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017). According to
prominent trust repair researchers, "Of all the difficulties that have plagued
organizational life, perhaps the most conspicuous in recent years has been the

19
violation of trust" (Kim et al., 2006, p. 49). Yet, the field of organizational science
has seen relatively few studies to directly investigate the individual's response to
having their trust violated. Rather, the bulk of extant research discussing trust
violation has been conducted in the context of trust repair, giving little if any
attention to peoples' immediate internal and external responses to experiencing a
violation of trust.
While research on trust repair holds clear practical value and certainly merits
continued attention, and while many insights about trust violation can be drawn
from this literature, the rebuilding of trust is inherently more distal to the violation
experience than the individual's immediate internal processing and sense making
in response to having their trust violated and the behaviors that follow. This is
underscored by the research of Tomlinson and colleagues (2004) who tested
Lewicki and Bunker's (1996) model of trust repair. Most importantly, they were
able to demonstrate that trust violation is a more substantial experience than
simple transactional losses, as trust violations also pose a threat to the foundation
of the interpersonal relationship (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Furthermore,
Tomlinson et al. (2004) demonstrated that rebuilding trust must occur after the
violation has been reconciled. It could be presumed that in real-world examples, a
range of substantial time may pass between the instance of the violation and any
attempts to repair the trust between parties. Therefore, a major limitation of this
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body of literature is that the more temporally proximal affective, cognitive, and
behavioral responses that may occur after a trust violation, prior to the occurrence
of trust repair attempts, are rarely taken into consideration when research
questions are focused on the effectiveness of the trust repair strategies.
This has resulted in a theoretical black box that exists between the stages of trust
violation and trust repair in the context of working relationships, with few studies
proving insight into the individual processes that occur after experiencing a trust
violation and before either party attempts to repair trust. One thing is clear, trust is
likely to decrease following a violation and increase following successful repair
strategies (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Bies, Tripp, & Kramer, 1997; Bottom, Gibson,
Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Kim et al., 2004; 2006; Tomlinson et al., 2004;
Elangovan et al., 2007; Lount et al., 2008; Dirks et al., 2011). For example,
empirical research conducted by Kim and colleagues (2004, 2006) effectively
demonstrated that trust and perceptions of trustworthiness decreased following
trust violations. Research such as this also demonstrates that the extent to which
trust erodes and is reconciled depends on a combination of factors, particularly the
type of violation and the type of repair strategy used (Kim et al., 2004, 2006).
Additionally, much of the empirical trust research has been conducted in
experimental settings, using a modified prisoner's dilemma or economic games as
the experimental paradigm, and it is unclear how much time may transpire
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between trust violation and attempts to repair trust in real world settings. Thus,
individuals who have experienced a trust violation may process a plethora of
thoughts and feelings with subsequent behavioral responses prior to experiencing
any trust repair attempts. To this end, the current study aims to address the two
broad research questions:
(a) what internal responses to the trust violation drive decreases in trust?
and,
(b) how do changes in trust influence individual behaviors prior to
attempts at trust repair?

Definition of trust violation
Trust violations in collaborative settings occur when an individual's experience
does not align with their expectations of another person with whom they are
working with (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Elangovan et al., 2007).
Operationalizing trust violation can be a challenge for research because trust
violation is thought to be an entirely subjective experience (Robinson & Wolfe
Morrison, 2000). Some individuals may interpret the behavior of a coworker as a
clear violation of trustworthiness expectations, whereas another individual may
have a very similar experience and not register it as a violation of trust at all.
Therefore, it is important to consider the range of people’s expectations of others

22
when attempting to define trust violation as a construct. A popular definition of
trust violation provided by Elangovan and colleagues (2007) states that, "trust is
considered violated when the trustor perceives the trustee as acting in a way that
does not fulfill his/her expectations" (p. 6). This definition highlights the
subjective nature of trust violation on two levels. First, trust violation is based on
an individual's subjective perception of another's particular action(s). Second, that
perception is based on congruence with the individual's subjective expectations of
the other party. In other words, there are instances where the behavior of one party
may be perceived as a violation of trust, where a different individual in the exact
same circumstances may not perceive the other parties' actions as a violation of
their trust in that person. There are many factors that influence an individual's
perception of trust violation including: poor individual job performance, poor
organizational performance, lack of formal socialization processes, lack of
interaction with other members of the organization, experiencing previous
violations of trust in the workplace, and having multiple employment alternative at
the time of hire (Robinson & Wolfe Morrison, 2000).
A more robust definition of trust violation to emerge from the literature review is
that proposed by Tomlinson and colleagues (2004) which states, "A trust violation
occurs when evidence disconfirms the confident positive expectations regarding
another’s conduct and redefines the nature of the relationship in the mind of the
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injured party" (p. 167). This definition also underscores the subjective nature of
perceiving an event or behavior as a violation of trust. In addition, the second part
of the definition highlights that the subjective nature of the relationship is
redefined as a result of the violation. This is a critical element to operationalizing
trust violation as it must be perceived as a breach of trustworthiness expectations
that impacts the level of trust between parties. For the purpose of the current study,
I adopt this definition provided by Tomlinson and colleagues (2004).
The psychological experience of trust violation has historically been explained
through a combination of social exchange theory (Blau, 2017) and psychological
contract theory (Rousseau, 1989). Both social exchange theory and psychological
contract theory propose that exchanges and contracts between parties can manifest
as economic or social (Rousseau, 1989). As trust is based on expectations of
behavior in terms of ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995),
violations of trust are likely to occur when either normative expectations are not
met, or the psychological contract is breached by another party (Cropanzano &
Mitchell, 2005).
Social exchange theory posits that relationships are subjective and characterized
by exchange norms. These exchange norms can also be interpreted as the
expectations of how others will behave (Blau, 2017), therefore in the context of
collaborative trust such norms might be defined by an individuals’ trustworthiness
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expectations. According to social exchange theory individuals can embrace
general and specific expectations that serve to stabilize exchange relationships.
General expectations are typically those rooted in societal norms, such as arriving
to the job on time, receiving fair treatment, and understanding legal protections.
More specific expectations for individuals tend to be based on past experiences,
perceptions of others, and the state of the relationship with another individual
(Blau, 2017).
Similarly, psychological contracts represent the inherent beliefs about reciprocal
obligations between two parties and have been argued to be at the foundation for
employee-organization relationships (Robinson & Wolfe Morrison, 2000). In other
words, psychological contracts also imply particular expectations of one party’s
behavior toward another. An important aspect of this perspective is again the
subjective nature of the event. According to research presented by Robinson and
Wolfe Morrison (2000), a breach of the psychological contract in and of itself does
not necessarily constitute a violation. Rather, the breach of contract serves as an
event that the individual must process and interpret internally before concluding
that a violation has occurred. The individual must consider causal attributions and
their perception of fairness regarding the breach in order to perceive a breach of
their psychological contract as a true violation (Robinson & Wolfe Morrison,
2000). Therefore, a perceived violation is in part the result of a dynamic sense-
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making process that individuals undergo following the experience of a breach of
expectations.
Extending on this theoretical groundwork, Lewicki and Bunker (1996) put forth a
seminal framework to guide our understanding of how individuals can sustain trust
in the workplace after a violation of trust has occurred. In this model, a violation
of trust prompts the trustor to assess the situation on both emotional and cognitive
levels. Cognitively, the trustor will assess the damage incurred by the violation,
speculate why and how the violation occurred, and consider what steps to take as
they move forward in the relationship. The emotional responses experienced can
include a range of negative affect (NA) including confusion, anger, hurt, fear, or
bitterness. The authors suggest that based on these reactions and assessments
which occur after the violation event, the relationship between the trustor and
trustee can be ruptured, recalibrated, or restored (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).
Further building on the Lewicki and Bunker (1996) framework, Lewicki and
Wiethoff (2006) later distinguished between calculus-based trust (CBT), calculusbased distrust (CBD), identification-based trust (IBT), and identification-based
distrust (IBD), detailing examples of relationships for each unique combination of
being high versus low on these dimensions of trust and distrust. Although, it is
noted that in the workplace CBT/CBD are much more common because IBT/IBD
can take significant time to develop. This process can be distinguished in 2 parts; a
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trigger event, and an assessment of that event and the individual(s) involved
(Elangovan et al., 2007). In cases where the trigger event is perceived as a breach
of the existing trust between parties, trust is likely to decrease while distrust tends
to increase (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2006).
Extant theory and research clearly illustrate the negative impact that trust violation
can have on trust in working relationships, however, exactly how and to what
extent trust erodes remains unclear. Elangovan and colleagues (2007) attempted to
bridge this gap in understanding by systematically exploring the dynamics of trust
erosion in cognition-based trust following multiple violations. This research is
important as it began to unravel the 2-part process of interpreting trust violation in
the workplace (i.e., trigger and assessment). In this process, the authors discuss
how the individual who experiences violation is prompted to assess the event
emotionally and cognitively, previously referred to as initial cognitions (i.e., Bies
& Tripp, 1996). Emotionally, the individual is likely to experience a range of
negative affective reactions that may include confusion, anger, hurt, and bitterness.
Whereas on a cognitive level, the violated party must assess the damage incurred,
why and how the event transpired, and what steps they might take moving
forward. A decision of whether or not to continue trusting the violating party is
also included as part of this cognitive appraisal process (Elangovan et al., 2007).
However, not all trust violations are created equal, and therefore the type of
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violation experienced, and its perceived severity are critical components of how an
individual assesses an experience of having their trust violated in the work context.

Types of violation in the workplace
Because trust violation is defined as an entirely subjective phenomena, perceptions
of violation can materialize in a variety of forms and ranging severity. A few
researchers have attempted to classify types of trust violations and that work has
garnered considerable agreement among management scholars. This work
primarily draws on the trustworthiness framework put forth by Mayer and
colleagues (1995), indicating that trust can be violated when a trustor’s
anticipations about a trustee's ability, integrity, and benevolence are disconfirmed
(Bies & Tripp, 1996; Elangovan et al., 2007). In other words, an individual’s trust
can be violated as a result of another party failing to meet those existing
trustworthiness expectations.
According to dominant researchers in this area, the time in which perceptions of
ability, benevolence, and integrity of a coworker develop can vary across
individuals and contexts. Specifically, Schoorman and colleagues (2007) note that
judgments regarding ability and integrity can develop relatively quickly, whereas
perceptions of benevolence may take more time and interaction to surface. This is
said to explain why previous experimental studies have observed high correlations
between benevolence and integrity (Schoorman et al., 2007). To this end, the vast
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majority of experimental studies identified in the literature review have narrowed
their focus to primarily examine violations in expectations of ability (i.e.,
competence) and integrity.
Competence (i.e., ability) has been defined as the extent that an individual
possesses the technical and interpersonal skills needed to carry out a given job
(Butler & Cantrell, 1984). Whereas integrity can be defined as the extent that an
individual complies to a set of acceptable principles (Mayer et al., 1995).
Elangovan and colleagues (2007) drew on these definitions from the Mayer et al.
framework to distinguish two broad types of trust violation that occur in the work
context; “couldn’t” (i.e., competence violation) and “didn’t want to” (i.e., integrity
violation). Therefore, an individual who engages in an act that demonstrates lack
of ability may trigger a violation of competence-based expectations, while an
individual who intentionally demonstrates a lack of fair or ethical behaviors may
trigger a violation of integrity-based expectations in others.
The study by Elangovan and colleagues (2007) presents a number of interesting
findings regarding the effect of competence-, and integrity-based trust violations.
First, the researchers found that integrity violations were perceived as more severe
than competence violations as indicated by greater decreases in trust after the
violation occurred. Second, it was found that trustors were willing to tolerate
between one and two violations before their trust in the other party decreased
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significantly. Third, trustors who were more forgiving (i.e., higher trust
propensity) were less likely to report decreases in trust after a violation, as were
younger and less experienced employees. These findings are however limited in
terms of sample specificity and experimental methodology, as the study involved a
sample of Austrian and German participants, primarily male, from a range of
different industries, and at various levels of employment within their respective
organizations, and used a narrative vignette approach to manipulate trust violation.
In sum, when competency and integrity violations occur in collaborative contexts,
and are perceived as such, a range of undesirable consequences are likely to
follow. The current study aims to expand on previous findings such as those of
Elangovan and colleagues (2007) by implementing a higher fidelity simulated task
where the breach of trust is actively manipulated, opposed to a hypothetical or
retrospective trust violation scenario. Understanding these drivers of trust violation
are important for exploring the internal processing and behaviors that manifest
after the violation occurs.

Consequences of trust violation
The experience of trust violation in collaborative contexts is an important topic
because there are many substantial consequences that can follow. Throughout the
literature there are numerous illustrations of ways in which experiences of trust
violation can have negative consequences for individuals, groups, and
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organizations at large. To synthesize this body of research, there is clear consensus
that trust violations have negative consequences in the work context, leading to
reductions in trust and cooperation (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Kramer & Tyler,
1995). Specifically, research conducted by Bies and colleagues has demonstrated
that trust violations reduce information sharing and mutual support, and can result
in revenge behaviors (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Bies et al., 1997). A study by Robinson
(1996) also showed that trust violations lead to decreases in occupational
citizenship behaviors (OCBs) and job performance, with a follow up study
showing that violations of the workplace psychological contract result in lower
employee trust in their employers (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). Later research
has found further evidence that trust violation can result in decreased cooperation
(Bottom et al., 2002; Lount et al., 2008), and can have negative impacts on
bargaining outcomes (Croson, Boles, & Murnighan, 2003). Trust violation has
also been shown to have ripple effects throughout organizations, decreasing
employee morale and having negative influences on employee relationships with
customers (Berry, 1999).
Furthermore, these trust-related phenomena are widely recognized by
organizational leadership. The 2016 global CEO survey conducted by
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2016) found that approximately 55% of CEOs believe
that lack of trust is a threat to their organization's growth. In more recent years,
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researchers have begun to investigate the complex neurological mechanisms that
drive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors related to trust in the workplace. Feelings
of trust have been found to stimulate the release of oxytocin, which when
combined with a sense of purpose in their occupation, tends to result in a variety
of positive outcomes (Zak, 2017). For example, compared to individuals working
in low trust organizations, those working in high trust organizations have been
found to experience less stress, fewer sick days, less burnout, more energy, more
engagement, higher productivity, and greater levels of life satisfaction (Zak,
2017).
Unfortunately, the bulk of extant research on trust in collaborative contexts that
centers on the development of trust between individuals and how trust can be
repaired following trust violation, rather than working to understand the
psychological processes that individuals experience after the violation event, how
those experiences change perceptions of trust, and how it may influence behaviors
prior to attempts at repair trust. However, some exceptions were found in the
literature review and provide meaningful insight to the current research questions.
For instance, early research exploring revenge behavior suggested that there are
two categories of harm that can result from trust violations. When rules and
procedures are violated, or social expectations and obligations go unmet, such
violations can result in harm to civic order. On the other hand, violations that are
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in concurrence with an attack on the trustor or that challenge the trustor's social
identity or reputation can result in damaged identity (Bies & Tripp, 1996).
Drawing on an in-depth content analysis of open response surveys, Bies and Tripp
(1996) synthesized and outlined a range of possible responses to trust violation.
These include seven overarching categories: doing nothing, social withdrawal,
feuding, identity restoration, confronting in private, forgiveness, and revenge
fantasies (Bies & Tripp, 1996). This is helpful in beginning to understand how
people respond to having trust violated, however the framework presents a very
broad array of thoughts and behaviors that provide little predictive insight.
As this body of research highlights a variety of potential consequences of trust
violation in the workplace, perhaps none are more salient than the effect that
violations have on perceived trust between parties. When disconfirming
information about competency and/or integrity expectations is severe enough, or
occurs often enough, people tend to adjust their perceptions of trust in that
relationship (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2006). There is clear consensus in extant
literature that trust violations lead to significant reductions in subsequent trust and
cooperation (Deutsch, 1977; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Kramer & Tyler, 1995).
For example, employee trust in their employers has been found to be negatively
impacted by violations of workplace psychological contracts (Morrison &
Robinson, 1997). In their research investigating the effectiveness of trust repair
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strategies, Bottom and colleagues (2002) conducted an experiment using game
theory and a computer simulated prisoner's dilemma paradigm. The authors found
empirical evidence that trust decreased as a result of violated expectations (Bottom
et al., 2002). However, the extent that trust is eroded after a violation occurs
depends on a number of contextual factors, including the type of violation
experienced (Kim et al., 2004).
More recent research has found that outcomes of trust violation, particularly
whether or not trust is repaired, depends on the type of trust violation perceived
and the information that is available to the trustor (Kim et al., 2004). Specifically,
Kim and colleagues (2004) found that trust was more likely to be repaired when a
violator apologized for competence violation but denied violations of integrity.
These findings provide insight to the current study on two counts. First, it provides
further evidence that how people respond to a violation of trust depends on the
type of trust violation perceived. The findings of Kim et al (2004) also indicate
that people tend to weigh positive information about competence more strongly
than negative information, and they weigh negative information about integrity
higher than positive information. Further findings from Kim and colleagues (2004)
show that a single dishonest behavior is enough to be a reliable signal of low
integrity, although that was not the case for competency violations, particularly
when individuals demonstrated competence prior to violating expectations.
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A major limitation of these findings is that the studies which implemented an
experimental design to study responses to trust violation have relied almost
exclusively on variations of either prisoner’s dilemma paradigms (e.g., Croson et
al., 2003), bargaining games (e.g., Bottom et al., 2002; Lount et al., 2008), or
hypothetical vignettes (e.g., Kim et al., 2004). While these approaches are useful
for isolating target decisions and behaviors by studying how participants exchange
currencies or make very finite decisions, these highly transactional parameters do
not accurately reflect the dynamic and complex nature of true collaborative
relationships in the workplace. The current study addresses this methodological
gap by drawing on an experimental procedure designed to more accurately mirror
the true nature of collaborative dyadic relationships.
Nonetheless, the findings identified in my review of the literature generally align
with the framework provided by Bies and Tripp (1996) and the work of Elangovan
and colleagues (2007) such that competence violations are likely to result in trust
decreases due to the violation of civic order and norms, whereas integrity
violations are more damaging to trust due to the impact they have on the trustor’s
social identity, which is inherently more severe as a threat to IBT compared to
CBT (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2006). I aim to replicate and extend these findings in
the current study by first testing the hypothesis:
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H1a: Decreases in trust will be significantly greater following integrity
violations compared to competency violations.
Several studies have also presented evidence that people's propensity to trust can
influence behaviors in both the short- and long-term as well as the likelihood that
trust will be lost after a violation (Schweitzer et al., 2006; Elangovan et al., 2007).
For instance, Schweitzer and colleagues (2006) conducted an experiment through
a series of simple decision-based trust games with computerized partners. As it
was found that the use of deception caused significant and lasting damage to trust,
those higher in trust propensity were found to be more trusting in later rounds of
the game and recovered trust more quickly. This finding provides clear indication
that an individual’s baseline degree of trust in others is likely to impact the extent
that trust is harmed by a violation. Therefore, propensity to trust will be included
as a control variable in testing the hypotheses.
Another factor that may have a significant impact on trust decreases following a
violation is the gender of the trustor. Relatively little research has been conducted
on how gender may impact changes in trust following a trust violation, with the
exception of a recent study by Haselhuhn and colleagues (2015). Across a series of
3 experiments using economic trust games the authors found that women were
more resilient to changes in trust following a violation transgression than men.
Specifically, Haselhuhn and colleagues (2015) found that after a violation
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occurred women were more likely to (a) maintain trust levels, (b) regain trust with
an untrustworthy partner, and (c) the effects were mediated by levels of women’s
relational investment. These findings provide support for the argument that
women may be more resilient to change perceptions of trust following an
untrustworthy transgression. This could be because women are typically more
relationship oriented than men, demonstrating stronger motivations to maintain
relationships (Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008), and tend to have higher
social expectations to present themselves as warm and agreeable (Bowles,
Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). Therefore, it is predicted
that the effect of trust violation on change in trust will be moderated by gender.
Specifically, it is expected that changes in trust following a violation will be
stronger in males compared to females. As the research by Haselhuhn et al (2015)
is the only study found to empirically test the effect of gender on changes in trust,
this study will attempt to replicate these findings in a more complex,
interdependent task that extends beyond simple economic trust games:
H1b: Decreases in trust following a violation will be significantly greater
for males compared to females.
Furthermore, should gender be revealed as a significant predictor of changes in
trust, it will be included as a control variable in subsequent analyses. To shed light
on the internal mechanisms that drive these changes in trust after a violation, this
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study will also explore the extent that cognitive and affective responses to the
violation may also account for changes in trust beyond the type of violation
experienced.

Cognitive responses to trust violation
The process of evaluating trust can be partly understood through the cognitive
processes that people enact to make sense of the state of the trusting relationship.
This may best be framed through the lens of attribution theory (Weiner, 1985),
suggesting that trust can increase or decrease as a result of attributional processes
made by the trustor regarding the actions of the trustee. The literature review
found a few studies which have explored the impact trust violation can have on
individuals' cognitive appraisal processes. For instance, cognitive processes have
been shown to play a prominent and mediating role in revenge behaviors that
follow trust violation (Bies & Tripp, 1996).
Bies and Tripp (1996) discussed the critical role of attributional processes in
manifestations of revenge following a trust violation. The authors highlight three
attributions of responsibility that a trustor can make in response to experiencing a
violation. The first is act responsibility, where the trustor attributes the violation to
personalistic (i.e., selfishness, malevolence) or non-personalistic factors, where
personalistic attributions were found to be more likely to result in revenge motives
(Bies & Tripp, 1996). The second is role responsibility attribution, where the
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cause of the violation is tied to expectations of support regarding the violator's
organizational role. The third type of responsibility attribution is system
responsibility, which places responsibility for the violation on the organization.
Bies and Tripp (1996) note that system responsibility attributions are typically
associated with feelings and thoughts of paranoia.
That early research on the topic of revenge also describes a two-step cognitive
process which occurs following a trust violation, which involves (a) initial
cognitions followed by (b) retrospective cognitions (Bies & Tripp, 1996). These
initial cognitions are referred to as "hot and hypersonic" (p. 254) thoughts and
emotions that are experienced immediately after the violating action.
Retrospective cognitions were said to occur much later, involving a ruminative
process whereby the trustor replays the events in their mind, searching for
additional facts and evidence that may have been overlooked during the time of
the violation. These retrospective cognitions can be cognitive or emotional in
nature and rumination can occur socially in addition to psychologically, where
victims receive ongoing social support that reinforces their resentment toward the
trustee (Bies & Tripp, 1996).
In their later chapter, Bies and colleagues (1997) went on to discuss the patterns of
social perception involved when trustors process violation experiences. They
identified three primary cognitive patterns of misattribution or over-attribution that
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individuals make, including: (a) overly personalistic attribution, (b) biased
punctuation of conflict, and (c) exaggerated perception of conspiracy (Bies, Tripp,
& Kramer, 1997). The latter, exaggerated perception of conspiracy, refers to
paranoid cognitions and the tendency for a trustor to consider the actions of others
as being more tightly connected than they are. Biased punctuation of conflict is
more nuanced and subjective in nature. When two parties experience a series of
interactions where violation of norms or expectations occurs, there can be a
tendency for the violating party to attribute the victim's response to their previous
violation, as a violation itself. Therefore, in the case of biased punctuation of
conflict, both trustor and trustee may view their own actions as entirely defensive
and in response to the other's actions. The third and perhaps most salient pattern of
social perception in response to trust violation are overly personalistic attributions
of the trust violator (i.e., the trustee). Bies and colleagues (1997) recognized two
potential motives for people making such overly personalistic attributions:
selfishness and malevolence. In either case, it appears that when trust is violated
victims of the violation may show a tendency to exaggerate the extent that they
attribute the violation to the trustee on a personal level. These initial cognitions
then feed more distal thought patterns such as hypervigilance and rumination (Bies
et al., 1997).
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More recent work by Ferrin and Dirks (2003) argued that trust levels can fluctuate
based on the attribution process, where the trustor gathers information through
observations and makes inferences about the trustee. According to attribution
theory, several core processes may explain the process of restoring trust after a
violation including social perceptions, self-perceptions, and attributional biases.
Ferrin and Dirks (2003) found support for all three types of attribution processes
having influence on trust in a simulated wilderness survival game, indicating that
numerous attributions may occur in concert, or in sequence, to influence trust
following collaborative interactions.
To this end, how the trustor attributes responsibility for the violation has a strong
influence on the extent that trust will decrease. The study by Elangovan and
colleagues (2007) provides direct support for this notion as they found trust to
decrease to a greater degree when trustors attributed the violation to the trustee not
wanting to meet expectations, compared to when the violation was attributed to
not being able to meet expectations. These findings indicate that trustors take the
trustee’s motivation into consideration when making cognitive attributions about
the violation observed. Furthermore, Lewicki and Brinsfield (2017) recently
argued that cognitive responses are likely to be more salient in the event of
competence compared to integrity violations.
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Researchers in other fields studying complex human processes who have faced
similar dilemmas in synthesizing empirical findings on such varieties of cognitive
attributions (i.e., epidemiology and the study of addictive behavior) have called for
future research to investigate broader cognitive attributions as an alternate way of
conceptualizing cognitive attributions (Guo, Rupp, Weiss, & Trougakos, 2011).
This approach of contextualizing a broader attribution framework has been
advocated by earlier researchers focused on exploring causal attribution processes
(Kelley, 1983). Through this approach researchers can begin to distinguish
between simple attributions that involve a single cause-effect relationship, and
complex attributions that involve multiple interdependent cause-effect
relationships, as has been achieved in the study of health behaviors (Sensky,
1997). Given that the existing body of literature exploring cognitive attributions of
trust violation has produced numerous and disconnected findings of multiple types
of interdependent cause-effect relationships (i.e., Bies & Tripp, 1996; Ferrin &
Dirks, 2003), it is currently not possible to synthesize the findings in a meaningful
way. Rather than continuing to investigate multiple attributional processes
simultaneously, these collectively inconsistent results provide impetus to first
understand the higher-level cognitive attributions that victims of trust violation
engage in prior to conducting further research on more granular cognitive
processes.
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This approach also aligns with Lazarus’ (2006) work on cognitive appraisal
theory, in which he differentiates primary and secondary appraisal processes.
Primary cognitive appraisals assess the broader context of a stressor, whereas
secondary appraisals involve thoughts surrounding targeted options to deal with or
cope with the stressful event (Lazarus, 2006). By these definitions, the vast
majority of work on cognitive responses to trust violation have focused
exclusively on secondary cognitive appraisals, such as immediate and
retrospective appraisals of the violators behavior and motives (Bies & Tripp, 1996;
Elangovan et al., 2007), yet no studies were found in the literature review to
include measures of primary cognitive appraisals, such as an appraisal of
responsibility or costs of the violation to the violator themselves.
Taken together, the range of mixed findings regarding cognitive responses to trust
violation has resulted in a lack of clarity on how, or which, cognitive processes
drive changes in trust following a violation. Rather than attempting to isolate
specific cognitive processes from a virtually endless list of possibilities, I contest
that the lack of clarity provides incentive to explore more global cognitive
processes as a starting point, such as the primary appraisal of the trust violator.
Based on this logic and the findings of previous research (i.e., Ferrin & Dirks,
2003; Elangovan et al., 2007), I predict that (a) a trustor's changes in cognitive
appraisal of the trustee following a violation will be greater following
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competency-based trust violations compared to integrity-based violations, (b)
decreases in cognitive appraisal after a violation will predict decreases in trust, and
(c) the relationship between change in cognitive appraisal and change in trust will
be stronger after competence violations compared to integrity violations. While
evidence to support the latter prediction have been presented in previous research
(e.g., Elangovan et al., 2007), the current study seeks to replicate this finding by
extending the hypothesis test in a novel experimental paradigm. Support for these
hypotheses will help to synthesize past research by observing more generalizable
cognitive effects on trust.
H2a: Primary cognitive appraisal of the trustee will decrease following a
trust violation.
H2b: Decreases in primary cognitive appraisal of trustees following trust
violation will predict subsequent decreases in trust.
H2c: The relationship between change in primary cognitive appraisal and
change in trust will be moderated by type of violation, such that the relationship
will be significantly stronger with competence violations than with integrity
violations.
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Affective responses to trust violation
In addition to cognitive responses to trust violation, in the current study I also aim
to explore the trustor’s affective response to having their trust violated in a
collaborative context. Although relatively few studies have explored the direct
affective responses to trust violation in the workplace, to date there has been a
wealth of research that has looked at how emotions influence peoples' formation of
various attitudes. To understand how affective responses (i.e., emotions) to trust
violation influence trust attitudes of trustor to trustee, I draw on one of the more
common theories used to explain attitude formation, Weiss and Cropanzano’s
(1996) Affective Events Theory (AET).
The AET framework provides an excellent framework for understanding how trust
attitudes can change following the experience of a trust violation. The purpose of
AET is to help explain how employee attitudes and behavior emerge in the
workplace. According to the theory, affect-laden events at work can influence
affective reactions of which the perceived valence and intensity are influenced by
dispositional characteristics such as attributional biases or personality traits. Those
affective reactions then drive the development of work-related attitudes (Weiss &
Cropanzano, 1996).
The experience of trust violation in collaborative dyads can easily be applied to
this framework. The trust violation itself, whether a competence or integrity
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violation, serves as the affective work event to which the trustor experiences some
negative affective reactions. Such reactions may range from slight annoyance to
extreme anger and hostility (Bies & Tripp, 1996), and the extent of this reaction
may also be influenced by stable affective personality traits such as trait affect
(dispositional characteristics; Watson & Walker, 1996). Those negative emotions
may then cause the trustor to reevaluate their trust in the trustee (work attitude),
potentially resulting in a trust decrease if the violation is perceived to have caused
significant damage to the work and/or the work relationship.
Another framework for helping to understand the affective process involved in
trust violation is affect as information theory (AIT; Schwarz & Clore, 2003).
Broadly, AIT posits that the experience of emotional reactions serves as
information that influences individuals’ cognitive valuations and judgment driven
decisions (Schwarz, 2011). The affective reaction serves as a cue to reevaluate the
target of attention and source of the emotions. To the extent that decisions are
made determining how much an individual is trusted, this aligns with the
experience of trust violation such that following a violation trustors are likely to
reevaluate the extent that they trust the trustee (Elangovan et al., 2007; Sels,
Janssens, & Van Den Brande, 2004).
More specifically, the affective processing principle of AIT states that when an
individual is task oriented, the individual will use affective reactions to either
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confirm or deny accessible information, which leads to changes in expectations,
beliefs, and inclinations (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994). As previously
discussed that trust is built on expectations of trustees, it is presumable that
affective reactions to the experience of trust violation would also provide a trustor
with inconsistent expectations about the trustee, in turn leading the trustor to place
less reliance on their expectations of the trustee (Mayer et al., 1995). Furthermore,
AIT has proven to be an effective framework for studying complex behavior such
as how experiencing emotion (e.g., guilt) can influence social interaction (e.g.,
cooperation) in bargaining experiments (Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003).
Although affective responses to trust violation have received considerably less
attention in the literature, previous research has found that trust violation has an
impact on the trustor's emotional responses as well (Bies & Tripp, 1996).
Although Bies and Tripp’s (1996) theory did not distinguish well between
cognitive and emotional responses, the authors clearly identified numerous
negative emotional responses to trust violation including anger and confusion
(defined as initial cognitions) and affective rumination (defined as retrospective
cognition). The two-step trust violation process proposed by Elangovan and
colleagues (2007) further supports the idea in that the second step, assessment,
involves the consideration of the violation (the trigger event) on both cognitive
and emotional levels.
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Affective responses are more likely to surface when a trustor perceives a trustee to
demonstrate a failure to meet benevolence and integrity expectations than
expectations regarding abilities and competence (Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017).
This may be due to people’s tendency to weigh negative information more heavily
in cases of integrity violations (Kim et al., 2006). Furthermore, research exploring
how the attributional weight of observing immoral behaviors is influenced by
affect suggests that integrity violations should arouse greater levels of NA than
competence violations (Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017; Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay,
& Ketelaar, 2005).
Additional evidence can be drawn from the research of Robinson and Wolfe
Morrison (2000) who examined whether perceptions of psychological contract
breach (violation of expectations) resulted in cognitive sense-making process
which then led to emotional reactions. While providing support for this hypothesis
the researchers also demonstrated that negative feelings following a violation were
more intense when violations were a result of reneging on an agreement, or when
victims perceive that fundamental standards of fairness had been violated
(Robinson & Wolfe Morrison, 2000). Further, the study by Bottom and colleagues
(2002) also demonstrated that negative emotions outweighed positive emotions
after trust had been violated in a computer simulated prisoner's dilemma
experiment.
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Some research has suggested that affective responses to trust violation may depend
on the extent of the trusting relationship (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2006). These
researchers suggest emotional investment is likely stronger in IBT relationships
than in CBT relationships. Because violations in CBT relationships are likely
viewed as an annoyance, the associated costs of the violation could be perceived
as emotionally troubling in the short-term. On the other hand, IBT relationships
are considered high in emotional investment and therefore violations in IBT
challenge the trustor's core beliefs and have a more significant affective impact
such as being more likely to feel upset, angry, violated, or foolish. In either case,
the authors point out that affective responses occur as an internal response to
experiencing a trust violation, although the extent and severity of the emotions
experienced depend on the foundational context of the relationship (Lewicki &
Weithoff, 2006). From an experimental perspective, these results stress the
importance of accurately manipulating or controlling for research subjects’ level
of IBT and CBT relationships to fully understand affective reactions to trust
violation.
In all, the literature provides a number of indications and clear examples of how
violations to trust expectations may result in increased negative affective
responses in the workplace. There is also evidence to suggest that these affective
responses will have a direct influence on perceptions of trust. Synthesizing this
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evidence against the AET framework, I predict that integrity violations will have a
greater impact on negative affect than competence violations and those changes in
negative affect will be predictive of trust decreases.
H3a: Increases in negative affect will be greater for individuals who
experience integrity- versus competence-based violations.
H3b: Increases in negative affect following trust violation will predict
decreases in trust.
Additionally, as NA combines a number of negative emotions into one broad
construct, the conceptual literature regarding trust violation and revenge has
typically referred to feeling angry and upset as the characteristic emotions
associated with breaches of trust expectations (Bies & Tripp, 1996, 2002;
Elangovan et al., 2007; Tripp et al., 2007; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Other
negative emotions that are commonly included in composite NA measures such as
fear, shame, and nervousness have not been discussed in the previous literature as
they appear less likely to be related to the experience of trust violation in the
workplace. For instance, a trustor is likely to place some degree of blame on the
trustee for violating trust (Tripp et al., 2007) and therefore would be unlikely that a
sense of shame might accompany that. Fear and nervousness may be relevant in
some trust violation contexts where risk and consequences for failure are
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particularly high (Driskell et al., 2018), however, those discrete emotions are
likely to be tied more directly to the situational context than the actual violation of
trust. Therefore, it is probable that the experience of specific discrete negative
emotions (i.e., upset, hostility) in response to trust violation may be the true
catalysts for changes in trust attitudes, opposed to a more general change in state
NA.
To further support this prediction, I will also test the relative value of discrete
emotions in predicting changes in trust. Understanding which specific emotions
are more likely to lead to more serious erosion of trust could be a helpful finding
to inform future research of potential intervention points in the overall trust
lifecycle. While the literature review did not provide evidence to support a clear
hypothesis that any particular emotion should be more strongly related to changes
in trust following a violation than others, some past research indicates that feeling
upset may be a universally common response to trust violation across contexts
(e.g., Bies & Tripp, 1996; Elangovan et al., 2007; Tomlinson et al., 2004).
Hostility also seems intuitively tied to some types of trust violation, however
hostility is considered to be a more extreme emotion (Beck, 1999) and may only
be relevant in cases where a trustor experiences a violation of higher intensity or
consequence (Tripp et al., 2007). Therefore, I will conduct a relative weights
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analysis to test the relative importance of feeling upset as a discrete emotion
predictive of damaged trust.
H3c: Increases in upset and hostile emotions will predict variance in trust
changes to a greater extent than other discrete negative emotions.
H3d: Feeling upset will have a significantly higher relative weight than
other discrete negative emotions in predicting decreases in trust following
violation.
Furthermore, as AET also suggests that dispositional characteristics are likely to
influence affective reactions and the relationship between work events (i.e., trust
violation) and affective reactions, I also expect the relationship between changes
in these discrete negative emotions and changes in trust will be stronger for
individuals high in trait NA. This is supported by previous research demonstrating
the broad negative impact of high trait negative affect on workplace outcomes
(Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Kaplan, Bradley, Luchman, & Haynes, 2009).
Individuals who are high in trait negative affect tend to see the world through a
negative lens and are thus thought to be more reactive to additional negative
stimuli and more prone to react to changes in state negative affect (Wilkowski &
Robinson, 2008). For example, research has shown that individuals high in trait
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negative affect demonstrate stronger relationships between negative emotions and
perceptions of supervisor injustice (Yang & Diefendorff, 2009).
H3e: The relationship between upset and hostile emotions and change in
trust will be moderated by trait negative affect, such that the relationship will be
significantly stronger when trait negative affect is high.

Cultural differences in cognitive and affective responses
How people view the world will influence their appraisals of situations and
experiences (De Leersnyder, Boiger, & Mesquita, 2013), and among current trends
in the trust literature is the study of potential cultural influences on the experience
of trust development, violation, and repair (Dietz, Gillespie, & Chao, 2010;
Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998; Wildman, Pagan, Fry, & Nyein, 2018). Drawing
from extant literature on the study of cultural logics and results of ongoing
research gives motivation to explore the differential effects of individual cultural
orientations on the experience of trust, including individuals’ affective and
cognitive reactions to trust violation. Due to the vast variation observed in
individual differences both within and across cultures (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001),
Leung and Cohen (2011) elaborated on the importance of recognizing that
different cultures are organized by different logics. In other words, cultures differ
in how individual traits and dispositions are organized, interpreted, and enacted
(Kuwabara, Vogt, Watabe, & Komiya, 2014). This domain of cultural inquiry is
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ripe for exploration, particularly regarding effects of trust violation, in what Leung
and Cohen (2011) referred to as the logics of dignity, face, and honor cultures.
Individuals who endorse the logic of an honor culture assess their value through
their own perspective, as well as that of society (Leung & Cohen, 2011). A very
strong sense of reciprocity, both positive and negative, resides in such cultures. An
honorable individual is likely to view themselves as trustworthy and able to be
relied on to repay their debts, demands the respect of others, and is willing to seek
justice through punishing those who have wronged them (Leung & Cohen, 2011;
Miller, 1993). The behaviors of those who endorse honor values are guided
primarily by shame (Leung & Cohen, 2011) and aggression (Saucier, Miller,
Martens, O’Dea, & Jones, 2018), and violations committed by another person
require direct retribution by the victim (as opposed to involving a third party or a
system of laws).
To demonstrate, past research has found that individuals from honor cultures have
a strong proclivity to defend themselves using physical violence in response to
perceived insults and threats (Brown, 2016). Other previous studies that have
investigated responses to threats and insults in the context of honor cultures have
found high rates of aggressive thoughts, emotions, and attitudes (Vandello, Cohen,
& Ransom, 2008). Therefore, when an individual who endorses the logic of an
honor culture experiences a trust violation they will be more likely to respond in
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an aggressive manner to defend their honor and may be more likely to report
stronger negative changes in how they appraise the individual who violated their
trust.
The logic of face cultures is similar to honor cultures in that the sentiments of
others are extremely important and there is a strong sense of reciprocity (Leung &
Cohen, 2011). Differences in face and honor logic lay in the settings and role
expectations of those cultures. For example, honor cultures can be portrayed as
highly competitive environments where individuals are considered roughly equal,
whereas face cultures reside in established hierarchies that require cooperation. All
members of the hierarchy in face cultures can have some degree of face, although
those in higher positions will inherently have higher face. In this sense, individuals
can gain face by advancing up the hierarchical ladder, though the major focus in
these cultures is on not losing face rather (Hamamura, Meijer, Heine, Kamaya, &
Hori, 2009).
Furthermore, a previous retrospective investigation of trust development, trust
violation, and trust repair in collaborative contexts across cultures found that some
differential exceptions to the general thematic patterns of cognitive and affective
responses to trust violation may include particular responses that are more
common in some cultures than in others. Specifically, findings from a diverse
sample of individuals revealed that those of Middle Eastern origin recalled a
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number of negative cognitive and affective reactions that did not emerge among
other cultural groups (Wildman et al., 2018). It was proposed that these additional
negative reactions to a trust violation may be due to Middle Eastern individuals
endorsing stronger honor values (Aslani et al., 2016), indicating that violations of
trust reflect a more serious violation of honor that requires a stauncher response.
On the other hand, individuals of Chinese origin (i.e., face culture) tended to recall
less intense responses to having their trust violated. It was proposed that those less
intense responses to trust violation align with the values of those expected among
face cultures, where individuals demonstrate more emotionally controlled
responses in attempt to maintain face and in-group harmony (Wildman et al.,
2018).
H4a: Following a trust violation, individuals with higher levels of honor
logic will have significantly greater decreases in cognitive appraisal of trustees.
Other research has argued that due to cultures that promote face values having the
goal of maintaining harmony, individuals in honor cultures are more likely to
experience an up-regulation of anger-related situations, compared to face cultures
that are more likely to experience shame-eliciting situations (De Leersnyder et al.,
2013). In other words, individuals who endorse the logic of honor cultures will be
more likely to experience externalized negative emotions and aggressive thought
patterns compared to individuals endorsing face cultures who are likely to
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internalize negative emotions. Such findings also align with the recent qualitative
findings of Wildman and colleagues (2018) who proposed that individuals from
face cultures will experience less negative affect in response to trust violations,
whereas individuals from honor cultures will experience negative affect to a
greater extent.
Those who endorse the logic of dignity cultures ascribe that everyone has intrinsic
value regardless of the evaluations of others (Ayers, 1984). This is said to be the
logic of Western cultures where self-respect and personal achievements are central
(Günsoy, Cross, Uskul, & Gercek-Swing, 2019) and unlike honor cultures, the
logic of dignity does not require the appraisal of others (Leung & Cohen, 2011). In
dignity cultures, guilt is the primary internal driver of self-control, and behaviors
are guided by an effective system of laws (external). Therefore, individuals who
impute the logic of dignity cultures are likely to be more impervious to the threats
of other individuals. This has been demonstrated by recent research that showed
individuals from honor cultures reported stronger feelings of anger, shame, and
helplessness in response to threats, whereas those reported by individuals from
dignity cultures were significantly smaller or non-existent (Günsoy et al., 2019).
Thus, in the context of experiencing a trust violation, those endorsing the logic of
dignity cultures are likely to experience less severe changes in their associated
affective responses.
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H4b: Following a trust violation, individuals with higher levels of honor
logic will experience significantly greater increases in hostile affect.
H4c: Following a trust violation, individuals with higher levels of face
logic will experience significantly greater increases in shame.
H4d: Following a trust violation, individuals with higher levels of dignity
logic will experience smaller increases in negative emotions.

Behavioral responses to trust violation
In addition to exploring the cognitive and affective reactions to trust violation and
how they influence changes in trust, I am also interested in exploring the more
proximal behavioral responses that victims of violation engage in prior to any
attempts at reconciliation or trust repair (more distal behaviors). Following the
logic of AET, where the attitude resulting from the affective reaction drives
judgment driven behaviors (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), such behaviors could
possibly be attempts to reconcile or repair trust (e.g., Tomlinson et al., 2004).
More recent research has attempted to differentiate short-term (e.g., apologies,
compensation, denial) and long-term repair strategies (e.g., reframing, structural
arrangements, forgiveness) recognizing that various repair-related behaviors that
follow a violation can occur (Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017). Individuals may also
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engage in revenge, reticence, or a range of other behaviors following a trust
violation (Bies & Tripp, 1996; see Table 1).
Unfortunately, much of the literature discussing behavioral responses to trust
violation has relied on inferences based on behavioral intentions, rather than
observations of actual behaviors. For example, a study investigating trustors’
willingness to forgive a trustee following trust violation found that trustee
behavior that was consistent with apologies was more likely to result in trustor
forgiveness than when behaviors were inconsistent with the apology (Hui, Lau,
Tsang, & Pak, 2011). While these results are interesting and provide valuable
practical implications the primary limitation of these findings is that the
researchers measured forgiveness as a behavioral intention, rather than observing
the actual behavior of forgiving. This has been a common limitation throughout
the body of literature as actual behaviors are inherently more challenging to
capture within the parameters of basic research, even though prominent
researchers in the field have made calls for future research to measure actual
behaviors in response to trust violation instead of behavioral intentions for over a
decade (Elangovan et al., 2007). Thus, studies that measure actual behaviors,
opposed to behavioral intentions, are critical for advancing this stream of research.
In addition to a lack of attention given to measuring actual behaviors, little
research has been conducted to explore the range of possible behaviors that
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individuals engage in following a trust violation, with the bulk of existing research
focused on only a few focal behaviors. One exception is the earlier study by
Robinson (1996) who found that trustor job performance and engagement in
occupational citizenship behaviors were likely to decrease following a
psychological contract breach. However, this may not explain how trustors
respond to trust violation incidents in a collaborative context, as the referent of
trust violation in Robinson’s (1996) study was the employer. It is likely that
trustors may respond differently when the violating party is a peer or coworker
compared to an organization at large (e.g., Bies, Barclay, Tripp, & Aquino, 2015).
The majority of research identified in the literature review focused on behavioral
strategies to repair trust, primarily apologies (made by the trustee) and forgiveness
(made by the trustor). For instance, much of this research has focused on the
behaviors of the trustee responsible for committing the trust violation, and the
subsequent trust of the trustor that follows (i.e., Brühl, Basel, & Kury, 2018; Dirks
et al., 2011; Haselhuhn et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2004, 2006; Lount et al., 2008;
Schweitzer et al., 2006; Tomlinson et al., 2004). Evidence across these studies
indicate that trust is repaired to a greater extent when violations occur in the form
of failure to meet competency expectations (e.g., Kim et al., 2004), when the
trustee provides a meaningful apology (e.g., Tomlinson et al., 2004), and when
trustors are female (e.g., Haselhuhn et al., 2015). Similarly, the longitudinal study
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by Serva and colleagues (2005) measured risk taking behaviors of trustors in
response to trust repair strategies, which may be considered a proxy for behavioral
trust as defined by the works of Mayer et al (1995) and McAllister (1995).
However, these findings provide little insight into the likely behaviors of those
who have had their trust violated independent of trust repair attempts by the
trustee.
A study by Ferrin and colleagues (2007) took this a step further by conducting an
experiment to investigate factors that differentially predict trustor trust following
trustee apologies, denial, and reticence. The authors concluded that trustee
reticence (i.e., reserved behavior) had the least impact on trustor levels of trust
following a violation and that apologies and denials were both effective depending
on the context of the violation and whether or not the trustee could be proven
guilty of the behaviors that violated trust. While these findings do not aid in
understanding the explicit behaviors of the trustor following violation, they further
reinforce the importance of the dynamic nature of the trusting relationship, such
that trustee behaviors have a strong influence on trustor perceptions and trust
attitudes.
Turning to the explicit behaviors of the trustor, two papers were found discussing
cooperative behavior (i.e., behavioral trust, McAllister, 1995) in response to trust
violation (Bottom et al., 2002; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Bottom and colleagues
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(2002) used a computer simulated repeated prisoners dilemma paradigm where
participants were paired with a fictitious partner (computer agent) and tasked with
making a series of cooperative or uncooperative choices. The computer agent was
programed to consistently make several cooperative choices and manipulated to
make an uncooperative choice after a set duration. Participants were presented
with attempts to repair trust in the form of a preset message sent from the
computer agent. This design allowed the experimenters to study trustor responses
to apologies and denial, and the extent that trustors engaged in cooperative
behaviors following the trust repair attempts. In sum, the researchers demonstrated
that apologies and simple explanations following trust violation predicted
cooperative behavior on the part of the trustor. More interestingly, it was found
that trustee acknowledgement of the violation led to greater trustor cooperation in
short interaction, whereas trustee denials led to more effective cooperation in
longer interaction (Bottom et al., 2002). In addition to shedding light on
cooperative behavior following trust violation, these findings further underline the
importance of considering time when studying individual responses to trust
violation.
To make matters more complicated, Lewicki and colleagues (2006) theorized that
the extent to which trustors engage in cooperative behavior is a function of their
individual motivational dispositions to behave cooperatively or competitively.
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This line of thinking highlights the importance of considering individual
differences in studying behavioral responses in trusting relationships.
Additionally, the authors argued that more research is needed to understand trustor
behaviors in the face of simple and complex trust. Following, Tomlinson and
Mayer (2009) drew on attribution theory to argue that the extent to which
cooperation is restored after a breach of trust depends heavily on the cognitive
attributions and emotional responses of the trustor. In other words, understanding
the dynamic relationships between individual differences, cognitive attributions,
and emotional responses may be needed to fully understand individual behaviors
in response to trust-related transgressions in the workplace. Unfortunately, such
complexities paired with ambiguity in identifying relevant trustor behaviors has
persisted throughout the body of literature, providing little clarity on explicit
behaviors for future research to focus on.

Table 1 – Summary of behavioral responses to trust violation

Reference

Method

Behaviors in Response to
Trust Violation

Bies & Tripp (1996)

Qualitative study

Revenge, private
confrontation, identity
restoration, social
withdrawal, feuding,
forgiveness

Bies, Tripp, & Kramer

Review/ Theoretical

Destructive/antisocial
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(1997)

revenge,
constructive/prosocial
revenge, forgiveness

Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, &
Murnighan (2002)

Lab experiment

Cooperative behavior

Brühl, Basel, & Kury (2018)

Online experiment

Trust repair strategies

Cianci, Reichert, Sedatole, &
Tsakumis (2018)

Lab experiment

Cooperative behavior,
trust repair strategies

Croson, Boles, & Murnighan
(2003)

Lab experiment

Bargaining decisions

Dirks, Kim, Ferrin, &
Cooper (2011)

Lab experiment

Trust repair strategies

Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro,
& Hannon (2002)

Lab experiment

Forgiveness, Revenge

Haselhuhn, Kennedy, Kray,
Van Zant, & Schweitzer
(2015)

Lab experiment

Trust repair strategies

Kim, Dirks, Cooper, &
Ferrin (2006)

Lab experiment

Trust repair strategies

Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, &
Dirks (2004)

Lab experiment

Trust repair strategies

Lewicki, Tomlinson, &
Gillespie (2006)

Review/ Theoretical

Cooperative behavior,
competitive behavior

Lount Jr, Zhong, Sivanathan,
& Murnighan (2008)

Lab experiment

Trust repair strategies

Robinson (1996)

Longitudinal field study

Organizational
citizenship behavior

Serva, Fuller, & Mayer
(2005)

Longitudinal field study

Risk taking behaviors

Schweitzer, Hershey, &
Bradlow (2006)

Lab Experiment

Trust repair strategies

Tomlinson & Mayer (2009)

Review/ Theoretical

Cooperative behavior

Tomlinson, Dineen, &
Lewicki (2004)

Field survey

Reconciliation, trust
repair strategies
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The early work of Bies and Tripp (1996) on revenge in the workplace provide
initial insights into the range of behavioral responses to experiencing trust
violation in organizations. Although their work focused primarily on revenge
behavior specifically, the authors offered a more exhaustive list of potential
behavioral responses based on a series of qualitative interviews conducted with
working professionals. They identified seven categories of responses to trust
violation including revenge fantasies, doing nothing, private confrontation,
identity restoration, social withdrawal, feuding, and forgiveness (Bies & Tripp,
1996). More recently, Wildman and colleagues (2018) conducted a qualitative
study of trust development, trust violation, and trust repair across cultures, which
resulted in a more concise list of trustor behavioral responses to trust violation.
Those identified behaviors included confronting the trustee, involving an outside
party, carrying out another’s work for them (picking up slack), or doing nothing at
all. Interestingly, Wildman et al. (2018) identified only one instance of revenge as
a response to trust violation across 123 open-ended interviews.
As indicated by previous research, the role of time is also a likely factor of
importance when considering behavioral responses to trust violation (e.g.,
Schweitzer et al., 2006). While the literature review did not find any field studies
that directly measured the amount of time to repair trust, the early theorizing by
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) suggest that trust repair is a process that may take
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considerable investments of time and energy to be effective. Beyond the
organization and management literature, some insights can be drawn from the
published materials of therapists, social workers, and marriage counselors, all of
whom echo that rebuilding trust with another person can be a very long process
(e.g., Direnfeld, 2016; Rider, 2011). This absence of attention to the immediate
behaviors that follow trust violation in collaborative settings serve as impetus for
research to explore this aspect of trust violation.
Taken together these findings highlight a primary gap found in the literature
review, as many research studies have taken a cross-sectional approach to consider
revenge, cooperation, and trust repair strategies as the immediate behaviors that
follow trust violation, and often relied on behavioral intentions as a proxy for
measuring actual behaviors. Additionally, attempts at restoring trust in the
workplace may take significant time to occur, resulting in post-violation behaviors
which are not necessarily related to trust repair, and that positively or negatively
affect the ongoing collaborative relationship and the effectiveness of that
relationship (e.g., Bottom et al., 2002).
Notwithstanding, human behaviors are notably complex and challenging to
predict. To help explain the behavioral responses to trust violation that follow
internal processing of the violation in the present study, I draw on Ajzen's (1991)
theory of planned behavior. The theory of planned behavior posits that people's
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behaviors are influenced through intentions by a combination of attitudes,
subjective norms, and the perception of one's ability to regulate behaviors (Ajzen,
1991). It is noted that the influence of these antecedents on people’s intentions and
subsequent behaviors may vary across individuals, populations, and
circumstances. However, the inclusion of perceived behavioral control in the
model as an independent antecedent raises the importance of considering this
phenomenon when attempting to predict peoples' behaviors. This type of
perceived behavioral self-regulation is considered to be a combination of
perceived self-efficacy and controllability. Interestingly, Ajzen (1991, 2005)
distinguishes between the influence that an individual's perceived behavioral
control has on behavioral intentions, as well as actual behaviors as mediated
through behavioral intentions. For this reason, analyses to predict behavioral
responses to trust violation in the present study will include a measure of selfcontrol as a model covariate.
The theory of planned behavior has been widely cited throughout the literature and
supported by meta-analytic findings (Armitage & Conner, 2001). It has also been
leveraged to provide insights into a variety of human actions including class
attendance (Ajzen & Madden, 1986), engaging in leisure activities (Ajzen &
Driver, 1992), investing in stocks (East, 1993), physical exercise (Courneya,
1995), college retention (Davis, Ajzen, Saunders, & Williams, 2002), use of
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instant messaging and social networking technology (Lu, Zhou, & Wang, 2009;
Pelling & White, 2009), and cyberloafing behavior (Askew et al., 2014).
While the present study is focused on trust as the primary attitude of interest, it is
important to distinguish changes in trust as an antecedent of the behaviors that
follow trust violation (Bies & Tripp, 1996). Additionally, the theory of planned
behavior postulates that people's perceived ability to regulate their behaviors is
also likely to have a strong influence on those behavioral outcomes (Ajzen, 1991).
Thus, applied to the experience of trust violation, it is expected that individual
behaviors toward a trustee following a violation would be driven by a combination
of their attitude toward the violation (i.e., changes in perception of trust) and their
ability to regulate their behaviors. Therefore, I predict that peoples' reported
changes in trust, controlling for perceptions of trait self-regulation, will predict
individual decisions to engage in behavioral responses to the experience of trust
violation. Such that greater decreases in trust will predict a greater likelihood to
engage in a behavioral response to the event (e.g., picking up slack, confronting
the other party, involving a third party, or retaliation) opposed to the choice to do
nothing in response.
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H5a: Decreases in trust following a violation will predict the trustor’s
likelihood to engage in actual behaviors in direct response to the trust violation.
Furthermore, it is expected that the predictive relationship between changes in
trust and discrete behavioral actions may depend on the type of violation
experienced. Reiterating the findings of previous researchers that integrity
violations will typically be perceived as more severe than competence violations
(e.g., Elangovan et al., 2007; Tomlinson et al., 2004), the theory of planned
behavior would suggest that more severe changes in attitudes may result in more
severe behaviors (Ajzen, 2005), such as revenge. Research on revenge behavior
has also shown that individuals are more likely to endorse vengeance or avoidance
behaviors depending on the type of transgression (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006).
Ajzen (2005) discussed the intensity of attitudes in predicting behaviors, stating
that "… although the intensity of a general attitude or personality trait cannot
predict whether or not a particular behavior will be performed, it can predict the
strength of the behavioral tendency" (p. 81). Therefore, it is possible that the
strength of trust change may be predictive of the strength of an individual's
behavioral response to violation. Based on the presumption that changes in trust
will be greater for violations of integrity expectations compared to competency
expectations (Elangovan et al., 2007; Tomlinson et al., 2004), it is expected that
the type of violation experienced may also influence trustor behaviors toward the
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violating party (trustee) as a function of perceptions of severity. To further explore
the nature of this dynamic attitude-behavior relationship, I will draw on existing
theory and research to test whether specific combinations of violation type,
proceeded by cognitive and affective changes and associated changes in levels of
trust, may be predictive of specific behavioral actions. While it is not feasible to
predict all possible behaviors, the combination of extant literature, previous
research findings, and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) provide some
insights into possible causal sequences.
For example, an individual who reports no change in trust following a violation
may not see a need, or have little motivation, to address the violation with the
other party and instead choose to ignore it over engaging in more involved
behaviors such as confronting the violator or involving a third party (Aquino et al.,
2006). On the other hand, an individual who experiences a very strong change in
trust may be more likely to engage in a more intense behavioral response (Ajzen,
2005) such as retaliation against the violator than less extreme behaviors such as
confronting the person or ignoring the situation (Bies et al., 1997). As Bies and
Tripp (1996) argued that revenge is often tied to a sense of justice, retaliation
behaviors may result from more drastic changes in trust attitudes in attempt to
bring justice to the violating party. However, it is important to also consider the
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antecedents of the trust change to uncover the chain of causal effects that lead to
post-violation behavior.
As revenge and retaliation have been the primary behavioral response that
researchers in this field have given attention to, and given the relatively mixed
findings regarding revenge in direct response to trust violation (Tripp, Bies, &
Aquino, 2007), an exploration of the patterns of violation type, cognitive
appraisal, affective response, and changes in trust that truly drive revenge seeking
and other unique behavioral responses to trust violation is warranted.
Understanding the drivers of retaliation responses may be best framed in
combination with the vigilante model of justice put forth by Tripp and colleagues
(2007). This model theorizes a combination of individual and situational factors
that fuel people’s decisions to engage in retaliatory and reconciliatory behaviors.
Specifically, the authors described how hierarchical status and perceptions of
procedural justice significantly predicted individual reports of revenge and
forgiveness in the workplace (Aquino et al., 2006; Tripp et al., 2007). While these
findings do not shed light on predicting the range of possible behavioral responses,
they help to clarify how individuals come to enact these opposing behaviors. The
present study will attempt to extend on these findings by bridging previous
predictions to identify causal sequences of situational and intrapersonal effects on
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post-violation behaviors, specifically revenge, picking up slack, and confronting
the trustee behaviors.
In the case of revenge, Aquino and colleagues (2006) demonstrated that
individuals are more likely to seek revenge when the trust violation is experienced
in the form of a rule violation or derogatory offense (e.g., integrity violations)
compared to violations that obstruct goal achievement (e.g., competence
violations). Yet the effects observed by Aquino and colleagues (2006) were
relatively small (η2 = .04) indicating that there are clearly other factors influencing
those post-violation behaviors. It is possible that those other factors may include
the internal processes that trustors engage in following a violation that result in
trust decreases, such as a experiencing a strong emotional reaction like hostility.
As previously discussed, individuals are more likely to experience negative
emotional reactions to integrity-based trust violations compared to competencebased violations (Kim et al., 2006; Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017; Robinson &
Wolfe Morrison, 2000; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009), followed by decreases in
perceptions of trust (Elangovan et al., 2007; Sels et al., 2004). As those changes in
trust attitudes increase, Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior would propose
that can result in more intense behavioral responses. Research has also inferred
that individuals are more likely to engage in revenge behaviors following strong
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initial emotions in response to integrity-based violations (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Bies
et al., 2015).
While the intensity of discrete negative emotions should be expected to vary based
on the context and trigger of the emotion (Brans & Verduyn, 2014), research on
the valence and arousal of discrete emotions helps to shed some light onto
understanding which negative emotions are likely to carry greater weight than
others. Specifically, hostility has been defined as a discrete emotion high in
negative valence and high in arousal (Barrett, 1998) and has been found to be the
emotional response most strongly associated with perceived threats (Kraus,
Horberg, Goetz, & Keltner, 2011). Additionally, previous research has
operationalized hostility as a discrete emotional state comprising of several more
intense negative moods including anger, anxiety, and fear (Weiss et al., 2005).
Further, it has been argued that the experience of such intense emotional reactions
can fuel a trustor’s motivation to respond to trust violation by seeking revenge
(Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005). Pulling these propositions together, I
predict that the sequence of experiencing an integrity-based trust violation
followed by increased hostility as a discrete emotional response, and greater
decreases in trust, will be predictive of revenge behaviors.
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H5b: Individuals who experience an integrity-based violation, followed by
high changes in feelings of hostility and decreases in trust, will be more likely to
engage in retaliatory behavior (i.e., revenge).
On the other hand, some people will expectedly respond to trust violation in more
constructive ways, such as engaging in organizational citizenship behaviors (e.g.,
Robinson, 1996), picking up slack to sustain progress toward goal achievement, or
confronting the violator to discourage further transgression (e.g., Bies & Tripp,
1996; Wildman et al., 2018). These are forms of proactive behavior, defined as
“self-directed and future-focused actions whereby employees aim to bring about
change” (Bal, Chiaburu, & Diaz, 2011, p. 723). Though more than simply task
striving, these proactive behaviors may also work to begin reconciling the
collaborative relationship as well (Williams & Belkin, 2016). Such responses to
trust violation may be partially explained by propensity to forgive others or by
situational context (Bies et al., 2015; Koutsos, Wertheim, & Kornblum, 2008;
Tangney, Fee, Reinsmith, Boone, & Lee, 1999). For example, Ahadi (2009)
conducted a study which evidenced moderate negative relationships between a
dispositional propensity to forgive others and intentions to engage in revenge and
avoidance behaviors. However, there are likely many other salient factors that
drive individuals to deal with trust violation more proactively than seeking
revenge or simply doing nothing at all. Accordingly, those antecedents to
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proactive behavioral responses are likely to be much different from those that
predict revenge behavior.
Beginning with the type of violation, I draw from the extant stream of trust repair
literature demonstrating that individuals are more likely to repair trust and
experience smaller decreases in trust when the trustor experiences a competencebased violation (Elangovan et al., 2007; Tomlinson et al., 2004). By demonstrating
forgiveness to the trustee, the trustor is engaging in a type of proactive behavior,
although this is generally triggered by the trustee initiating trust repair strategies
(e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2006). Yet research has shown that when individuals place
less blame on the perpetrator following trust violation, they are less likely to
engage in reactive behaviors (such as revenge) and more likely to seek to reconcile
the relationship (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001). In the event of a relatively small
change in negative cognitive appraisal of the trustee, it is possible that an
individual likely to be receptive to trust repair attempts may be similarly more
likely to engage in proactive behaviors on their own accord, particularly in the
event of competence-based violations which are expected to have a lesser impact
on emotional reactions (Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017) and subsequent changes in
trust (Elangovan et al., 2007). This may be explained by a process of perspective
taking, in which the cognitive response to trust violation inspires the trustor to
behave in ways that might alleviate potential challenges to their trust attitudes
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(Williams & Belkin, 2016). In other words, the trust violation has enough of a
negative impact that it is recognized and requires action, but subsequent internal
processing and changes in trust are not negative enough to trigger retaliatory
behavior, instead prompting more cooperative responses. This would indicate a
curvilinear relationship, in which minor but noticeable changes in cognitive
appraisals and trust attitudes motivate the trustor to maintain the collaborative
nature of the relationship.
Drawing on Parker and colleagues’ (2010) theory of proactive motivation, which
identifies proactive behavior as a goal-driven process, may also help to explain
why individuals may choose proactive behaviors in response to a competencebased trust violation. According to this theory, one way that individuals can be
prompted to engage in proactive behavior is what the authors term energized to
motivation (Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). This form of proactive motivation is
driven by the activation of positive affective states and is proposed to have a more
proximal effect on behaviors than other forms of proactive motivation (can do
motivation and reason to motivation) which are thought to have more distal
influences on goal setting and related behaviors (Parker et al., 2010). In other
words, the motivation stemming from positive affect can have a direct path for
influencing the individual’s behavior (Bindl & Parker, 2010). This also overlaps
with the AET perspective which posits that affective reactions can be an
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antecedent to affect-driven behavior without necessarily having an impact on
attitudes (such as trust; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Thus, based on this logic
people who experience more positive affect following a competence-based
violation may be more motivated to engage in proactive behaviors toward
reconciling the relationship, so long as the shift in primary appraisal is not too
dramatic.
Moreover, determined is an adjective associated with positive affect that is
commonly measured in emotions studies (Thompson, 2007). This facet of positive
affect has also been associated with higher approach motivation, similar to
negative affective states such as anger. For instance, in a study that sought to
compare the similarities in associated approach-avoidance motivations between
discrete negative emotions (i.e., anger) and positive affect, Harmon-Jones and
colleagues (2010) put forth evidence that emotions of opposite valence can have
similar motivational direction. Meaning that people can have arousal responses to
positive affect just as strong as responses to stimuli that activate negative moods
and emotions. Though no studies were found that measured the relationship
between determined affect and proactive behavior directly, researchers who have
focused their studies around self-determination theory have found numerous
positive correlations between individual proactivity and ratings of self-
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determination (Bakker & Oerlemans, 2019; Greguras & Diefendorff, 2010;
Seibert, Crant, & Kramer, 1999; Strauss & Parker, 2014).
Taken together, the co-occurrence of moderately negative cognitive appraisal and
higher positive affective factors should facilitate a stronger propensity for an
individual to remain proactive in the collaborative relationship following a
competence-based trust violation. For example, the lack of intense negative
cognitive attributions, and relatively high feelings of determination, may enable
the trustor to remain focused on actively adapting and coordinating their efforts
with the trustee to achieve their goals (Fiore, Salas, Cuevas, & Bowers, 2003).
Rather than seeking retribution or punishment for the trustee, the trustor may use
the motivation they draw from feeling a sense of determination to confront the
trustee to address or attempt resolving the situation (Dirks et al., 2011). Similarly,
they may engage in more monitoring and/or back-up behavior to keep the
collaboration from being derailed by the violation (De Jong & Elfring, 2010).
Connecting these presumptions, I hypothesize that individuals who experience a
competence-based trust violation followed by lower levels of primary cognitive
appraisal of the trustee, and higher levels of determination (i.e., discrete positive
affect), will be predictive of more proactive behaviors (i.e., confronting the trustee
and picking up slack) compared to reactive behaviors (i.e., revenge or involving a
third party) or absence of behavior (i.e., doing nothing).
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H5c: Individuals who experience a competence-based trust violation,
followed by a moderately negative primary cognitive appraisal of the trustee and
higher levels of determined affect, will be more likely to engage in proactive
behaviors (i.e., picking up slack or confronting the trustee).
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Table 2 – Summary of hypotheses

H1a:

Decreases in trust will be significantly greater following integrity
violations compared to competency violations.

H1b:

Decreases in trust following a violation will be significantly greater for
males compared to females.

H2a:

Primary cognitive appraisal of trustee will decrease following a trust
violation.

H2b:

Decreases in primary cognitive appraisal of trustees following trust
violation will predict subsequent decreases in trust.

H2c:

The relationship between change in primary cognitive appraisal and
change in trust will be moderated by type of violation, such that the
relationship will be significantly stronger with competence violations than
with integrity violations.

H3a:

Increases in negative affect will be greater for individuals who experience
integrity- versus competence-based violations.

H3b:

Increases in negative affect following trust violation will predict decreases
in trust.

H3c:

Increases in upset and hostile emotions will predict variance in trust
changes to a greater extent than other discrete negative emotions.

H3d:

Feeling upset will have a significantly higher relative weight than other
discrete negative emotions in predicting decreases in trust following
violation.

H3e:

The relationship between upset and hostile emotions and change in trust
will be moderated by trait negative affect, such that the relationship will
be significantly stronger when trait negative affect is high.

H4a:

Following a trust violation, individuals with higher levels of honor logic
will have significantly greater decreases in cognitive appraisal of trustees.

H4b:

Following a trust violation, individuals with higher levels of honor logic
will experience significantly greater increases in hostile affect.

H4c:

Following a trust violation, individuals with higher levels of face logic
will experience significantly greater increases in shame.

H4d:

Following a trust violation, individuals with higher levels of dignity logic
will experience smaller increases in negative emotions.
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H5a:

Decreases in trust following a violation will predict the trustor’s
likelihood to engage in actual behaviors in direct response to the trust
violation.

H5b:

Individuals who experience an integrity-based violation, followed by
high changes in feelings of hostility and decreases in trust, will be more
likely to engage in retaliatory behavior (i.e., revenge).

H5c:

Individuals who experience a competence-based trust violation,
followed by a moderately negative primary cognitive appraisal of the
trustee and higher levels of determination, will be more likely to engage
in proactive behaviors (i.e, picking up slack or confronting the trustee).
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This dissertation will draw on archival data from two recently conducted studies to
test hypotheses: an online survey and an in-lab experiment. Both studies served as
follow up investigations to an initial qualitative, grounded theory building study
exploring the lifecycle of trust across cultures. The online survey was designed to
test a culturally embedded process model of trust development, violation, and
repair in a working adult sample. Survey items were developed to elicit
retrospective evaluations of trust related experiences in the workplace with
additional probing questions to understand how participants interpreted and
responded to those experiences. The experiment used a game-based simulation to
manipulate the experience of trust violation in a novel multiphasic task and
included measures to capture participants’ cognitive, affective, and behavioral
responses before and after the occurrence of trust violation.

Study 1 design
The online survey involved a cross-sectional design where qualifying participants
were asked to respond to a number of item types, including Likert type rating
scales, rank ordering, and open-ended responses. The survey was comprised of 72
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questions in total. Qualifying participants who successfully completed the survey
were compensated with an Amazon gift card for their time and effort.

Study 1 Participants
Participants were recruited using the Qualtrics Purchased Respondents service.
This service allowed for several qualifications that participants were required to
meet in order to complete the survey. Qualifiers for participation in the study
required that respondents were (a) at least 18 years old, (b) resided in the United
States, (c) had current or past work experience, and (d) had at least one example of
someone developing, losing, or regaining trust at work. Participants were also
required to correctly mark several attention check items embedded throughout the
survey (i.e., Select “Strongly Agree”). The final sample included 200 working
adult respondents, 98 native U.S. workers and 102 expatriate workers. The
inclusion of both native and expatriate workers was intended to increase cultural
diversity, including the variance in scores related to individuals’ endorsement of
honor, dignity, and face logic. In the final sample of native workers (N = 98) 47
individuals identified as male and 51 identified as female, with an average age of
42.63 (SD = 13.40) years old. The final sample of expatriate workers (N = 102)
included 44 individuals who identified as male, 52 identified as female, 4
identified as non-binary, and 2 individuals preferred not to report their gender,
with an average age of 40.16 (SD = 11.77) years old.
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Study 1 Measures
While the online survey in its entirety included numerous questions regarding the
development, violation, and repair of trust in the workplace, the present study will
leverage a subset of measures from the demographics, individual differences, and
trust violation critical incidents sections. The trust violation critical incidents
section of the survey required participants to describe an experience of trust
violation in the workplace through open ended response, proceeded by a number
of follow up questions to the self-reported trust violation incident. Only data from
measures relevant to the present research questions will be exported for analysis in
this study.
Demographics. Participants responded to numerous demographic items including
gender, age, ethnicity, academic background, and employment status. Options for
describing gender included male, female, non-binary/ third gender, self-described,
and prefer not to say.
Honor-Dignity-Face. The cultural values, honor, dignity, and face (HDF), were
measured using Smith and colleagues’ (2017) HDF measure, rated on a 5-point
Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree). The scale included 18
items such as, "People should make decisions based on their own opinions and not
based on what others think." (dignity), "It is important to maintain harmony within
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one's group." (face), and, "It is important to promote oneself to others." (honor).
See Appendix A for the full scale.
Negative affect. Cognitive and affective responses were measured in a manner
similar to the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Thompson, 2007).
In total, the scale consisted of 17 adjectives reflecting negative affect (NA; e.g.,
upset, angry, frustrated, disappointed, and betrayed). Participants were posed with
the stem, “To what extent did him/her violating your trust make you feel…”, and
then rated each of the NA adjectives on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all to 5 =
A great deal). See Appendix B for the full scale.
Trust. Participants were asked to rate the extent that they trusted the violating
party before and after the violation occurred. These items were rated on a 5-point
Likert scale (1 = Not at all to 5 = A great deal). To this end, change in trust
following the violation will be calculated by computing the difference between the
two trust ratings.
Behavioral response. Participants were asked, “How did you react to the trust
violation?” and had the option to select yes or no from a list of eight behavioral
response options drawn from the previous qualitative study. The behavioral
response options included: (a) "No response: you did and said nothing in response
to the violation", (b) "Second chance: you made the deliberate decision to give this
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person one more chance, you gave the 'benefit of the doubt' that one time, (c)
"Confrontation: you initiated direct communication about the violation such as
asking why it happened, requesting an explanation, expressing your concerns,
etc.", (d) "Pick up slack: you completed the part of the collaborative project that
this person failed to complete, did someone else's work for them", (e) "Retaliation:
you sought revenge or retribution for the violation", (f) "Involve third party: you
involved someone else, such as a supervisor or teammate, in the conflict", (g)
"Contagion: you stopped trusting people other than the violator because of you
were afraid they may also violate your trust", and (h) "Defend self: the violation
resulted in false information or negative perceptions about you that you had to
correct".

Study 1 Procedure
Qualifying participants completed the online survey between December 2018 and
May 2019 using the Qualtrics survey platform. Average time to complete the 72question survey was approximately 40 minutes.

Study 2 design
The experiment focused on the manipulation of one independent variable, trust
violation, and its relevant effects on subsequent internal experiences and discrete
behavioral outcomes in a collaborative computer simulation task. The computer
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game used, Materials Allocation and Retrieval System (MARS): Cooperative
Online Game, involved a two-person task to pick up and deliver critical resources
to mining outposts on Mars. Each round of the game consisted of a square grid
with various elements distributed throughout for players to either cross or avoid in
their paths to the Martian outpost. Blind to both the participants and
experimenters, participants were randomly assigned to one of two trust violation
conditions: competence violation or integrity violation. The study took
approximately one hour to complete, for which participants were compensated
with an Amazon gift card.

Study 2 Participants
Participants were recruited from a diverse sample of college students at a private
Southeastern university. While data collection is ongoing, the current sample (N =
91) include 51 individuals exposed to a mistake condition (i.e., competency
violation) and 40 exposed to a bribe condition (i.e. integrity violation). The sample
of those in the mistake condition consists of 31 males and 20 females with an
average age of 20.86 (SD = 4.60) years old. The sample of those in the bribe
condition consists of 30 males, nine females, and one non-binary individual, with
an average age of 20.10 (SD = 2.38) years old. All participants were compensated
with an Amazon gift card for their time.
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Study 2 Measures
Participants completed several surveys before, during, and at the end of the
experiment. A survey including various individual differences measures was
delivered to participants online and completed prior to attending the experiment.
Then, after each round of the game participants completed a brief process survey
to assess their experience during the simulation. Finally, after completing the last
process survey participants completes a series of demographic questions.
Trust propensity. Propensity to trust was measured in the individual differences
survey using Mayer and Davis' (1999) Propensity to Trust measure, rated on a 5point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree). The scale included
eight items such as, "One should always be cautious with strangers.", and, "Most
people can be counted on to do what they say they will do." See Appendix C for
the full scale.
Self-regulation. Trait self-regulation was measured in the individual differences
survey using Ford and Collins' (2013) self-regulation measure. The scale included
four items measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 5 =
Strongly agree). Example items include, "Overall I felt like I had a lot of will
power today.", and, "I found it difficult to focus or concentrate today." See
Appendix D for the full scale.
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Honor-Dignity-Face. The cultural values, honor, dignity, and face (HDF), were
measured using Smith and colleagues (2017) HDF measure, rated on a 5-point
Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree). The scale included 18
items such as, "People should make decisions based on their own opinions and not
based on what others think." (dignity), "It is important to maintain harmony within
one's group." (face), and, "It is important to promote oneself to others." (honor).
See Appendix A for the full scale.
Affect. Participant affect was measured using the International Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule - Short Form (PANAS SF; Thompson, 2007). In total,
the scale consisted of ten adjectives reflecting positive affect (PA; e.g., alert,
inspired, determined, attentive, active) and NA (e.g., upset, hostile, ashamed,
nervous, afraid). Trait NA was measured using the PANAS SF in the individual
differences survey (i.e., "Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to
what extent do you generally feel:"), with items rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 =
Never to 5 = Always). State NA was similarly measured after each round of the
simulation (i.e., "During the previous round of the game, to what extent did you
feel:") on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all to 5 = A great deal). Changes in NA
will be calculated by computing the difference between ratings before and after the
violation incident. See Appendix E for the full scale.
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Cognitive appraisal. A single item was used to measure participants' cognitive
appraisal of their partner ("After the previous round of the game, what is your
perception of your partner?"). This item was also measured on a 5-point Likert
scale (1 = Very negative to 5 = Very positive). Participants responded to this item
after each round of the game. Changes in cognitive appraisal will be calculated by
computing the difference between ratings before and after the violation incident.
Trust. General trust was measured using a single item, "To what extent do you
trust your partner?" The item was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Distrust very
much to 5 = Trust very much). Participants also responded to this item after each
round of the game. Changes in trust will be calculated by computing the difference
between ratings before and after the violation incident.
Trust-Distrust. Trust and distrust were measured after each round of the game
using the Trust/Distrust scale (Wildman, Fiore, & Salas, 2009). The scale included
eight items to measure trust and eight items to measure distrust, measured on a 5point Likert scale (1 = Not at all to 5 = A great deal). Sample items include, "Faith
that your partner can do the task at hand?", and, "Afraid that your partner will
make a mistake?" Changes in trust will be calculated by computing the difference
between ratings before and after the violation incident. See Appendix F for the full
scale.
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Demographics. Participants completed a brief demographic survey at the end of
the experiment including items such as age, gender, ethnicity, academic
background, and employment status.
Behavioral response. Participants were given the opportunity to choose from a
list of five behavioral responses to trust violation within the MARS game. In the
round following the manipulated trust violation, participants were presented with
either the question, “In the last round, your teammate accepted a bribe. How
would you like to respond to your partner’s actions?” or, “In the last round, your
teammate forgot to pick up their resources. How would you like to respond to your
partner’s actions?” The five behavioral response options included: (a) “Forfeit 20
of your gold coins to make up for the missing resource” (pick up slack), (b) “Send
your partner a message” (confront partner), (c) “Ignore this incident and move on”
(ignore), (d) “Retaliate by taking 100 fuel from your teammate” (retaliate), and (e)
“Request the experimenter to remind your teammate of their objectives” (involve
third party).

Study 2 Procedure
Participants first completed an online survey to measure the various individual
difference variables of interest. After completing the individual differences survey,
participants then used an online registration program to sign up to participate in
the study. After arriving to the lab, participants provided written consent to
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participate and were told that they would be paired with another research
participant at a partnering university. Specifically, participants were led to believe
that they were working with another student participant at a partnering research
institute, the University of Akron, however, in reality the role of the partner was
filled by an autonomous computer agent scripted into the MARS game. To
develop a sense of rapport, they completed a brief one-page ice-breaker activity in
which they were informed that they shared a number of common interests with
their partner.
Next, participants engaged in a brief interactive training module that effectively
prepared them to complete the simulation. This training lasted approximately 10
minutes and included a brief quiz at the end to ensure that all participants had a
clear understanding of the task and their role in the game. After completing the
training, participants began the simulation.
The game was designed to simulate a two-person team task which involved the
pickup and delivery of resources in a fictitious mining outpost route on Mars using
a modified version of the computer game Colored Trails (Grosz et al., 2004).
Players were tasked to cooperate with their partner to pick up and deliver
resources while moving from the start tile to the end tile on the game grid.
Participants were tasked with setting individual goals, sharing unique information
about elements in the game environment, and transporting themselves across a
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game board in as few moves as possible while gathering required resources in
route to their destination. Computer actions were set on timers that varied from
stage to stage to give the sense that the scripted non-player character (NPC) is
another person playing the game.
At the end of each stage participants were directed to complete a short survey
measuring their PA and NA, cognitive appraisal of their partner, and the extent to
which they trust their partner. This sequence of task stage followed by post-task
survey was repeated for seven iterations of the simulation, with each stage of the
task differing only in placement of items within the game. During the fourth stage
of the task, participants were informed that their partner had either failed to
complete their assigned goal (competence violation; an action that negatively
impacts the team’s success), or that they had accepted a bribe from another
character in the game (integrity violation; an action that negatively impacts the
team's success, but provides an individual advantage to the NPC). This served as
the trust violation manipulation, which was randomized across participants.
After the fifth stage, participants were given the option to provide a behavioral
response to the trust violation. Specifically, participants were given the options to
(a) retaliate against their partner, (b) do nothing, (c) pick up slack for the team, (d)
confront their partner by sending them a direct message, or (e) involve a third
party by asking the experimenter to confront the partner. The final survey
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(following stage 7) also included a list of demographic measures that will be used
to qualify responses. After participants completed the final survey they were
debriefed and compensated for their time.

Analysis
This study sought to explore how psychological processes drive individual trust
attitudes and subsequent behaviors following a trust violation. The hypotheses
specified targeted pathways to elaborate on existing theoretical models, not
necessarily to test overall fit of the models themselves. All hypotheses were tested
using data from Study 2 and some hypotheses were also tested using available data
from Study 1. Specifically, data from the online survey (Study 1) was used to add
additional support to the experimental (Study 2) findings. As such, a series of
analyses were conducted to test each hypothesis and explore the overarching
research questions in an iterative fashion. A summary of the hypotheses, relevant
data source, and analytic procedures are included in Table 3, highlighting the
source of data and specific variables included for each hypothesis test.
The majority of hypotheses were tested using a combination of non-parametric
statistics (i.e., Wilcoxon rank sum test), multiple regression techniques (Keith,
2015), and moderated multiple regression (Hayes, 2018). Mediated logistic
regression (Hayes, 2018; Hilbe, 2009) was conducted to test hypotheses aimed at
predicting behavioral outcomes (i.e., categorical dependent variables). Also, a
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polynomial term was used in testing Hypothesis 5c to look for the curvilinear
effect of primary appraisal (Keith, 2015). To test the hypotheses predicting
changes in trust following a violation, I implemented the naïve method for latent
change score analysis using latent difference scores (Kenny, 2013). Finally,
relative weights analysis (RWA; Tonidandel & LeBreton, 2015) was leveraged to
test the relative importance of discrete emotions on changes in trust. To better
isolate the hypothesized effects, significant covariates were included as model
control variables when relevant. Control variables included age (Elangovan et al.,
2007), trust propensity (Mayer et al., 1995), gender (Haselhuhn et al., 2015), trait
negative affect (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008), and trait self-control (Ajzen,
2005). All analyses were conducted using R Studio (RStudio Team, 2016) or the
PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2018).

Table 3 – Summary of Analyses

H1a:

Analysis

Decreases in trust will be significantly
greater following integrity violations
compared to competency violations.

Wilcoxon rank
sum test;
ANCOVA;
discontinuous
growth model

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.

Wilcoxon rank
sum test;
ANCOVA;
discontinuous
growth model

Study 1

1. Gender (IV)
2. Trust change (DV)
3. Age (Cov)

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.

Gender (IV)
Trust change (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov)
Age (Cov)

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Time (IV)
Cognitive appraisal (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

H1b: Decreases in trust following a violation will
be significantly greater for males compared
to females.

H2a:

Data
Source

Hypothesis

Primary cognitive appraisal of the trustee
will decrease following a trust violation.

Wilcoxon rank
sum test;
ANCOVA

Variables

Violation type (IV)
Trust change (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov)
Age (Cov)
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H2b: Decreases in primary cognitive appraisal of
trustees following trust violation will predict
subsequent decreases in trust.

Latent change
score analysis

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Change in cognitive appraisal (IV)
Change in trust (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

Moderated
regression

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Change in cognitive appraisal (IV)
Change in trust (DV)
Violation type (W)
Trust propensity (Cov)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

H2c:

The relationship between change in primary
cognitive appraisal and change in trust will
be moderated by type of violation, such that
the relationship will be significantly stronger
with competence violations than with
integrity violations.

H3a:

Increases in negative affect will be greater
for individuals who experience integrityversus competence-based violations.

Wilcoxon rank
sum test;
ANCOVA;
discontinuous
growth model

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Violation type (IV)
Change in NA (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

H3b: Increases in negative affect following trust
violation will predict decreases in trust.

Latent change
score analysis

Study 1

1.
2.
3.
4.

Post-violation NA (IV)
Change in trust (DV)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Change in NA (IV)
Change in trust (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)
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H3c:

Increases in upset and hostile emotions will
predict variance in trust changes to a greater
extent than other discrete negative emotions.

H3d: Feeling upset will have a significantly higher
relative weight than other discrete negative
emotions in predicting decreases in trust
following violation.

Multiple
regression

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Relative
weights analysis

Study 1

1. Upset (IV1)
2. Angry (IV2)
3. Frustrated (IV3)
4. Disappointed (IV4)
5. Sad (IV5)
6. Fearful (IV6)
7. Guilty (IV7)
8. Ashamed (IV8)
9. Regretful (IV9)
10.Betrayed (IV10)
11.Confused (IV11)
12.Helpless (IV12)
13.Stressed (IV13)
14.Apathetic (IV14)
15.Worried (IV15)
16.Critical of violator (IV16)
17.Sense of injustice (IV17)
18.Change in trust (DV)
19.Age (Cov)
20.Gender (Cov)

Change in upset (IV1)
Change in hostile (IV2)
Change in ashamed (IV3)
Change in nervous (IV4)
Change in afraid (IV5)
Change in trust (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)
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Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Upset (IV1)
Hostile (IV2)
Ashamed (IV3)
Nervous (IV4)
Afraid (IV5)
Change in trust (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

H3e:

The relationship between upset and hostile
emotions and change in trust will be
moderated by trait negative affect, such that
the relationship will be significantly stronger
when trait negative affect is high.

Moderated
multiple
regression

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Change in feeling upset (IV1)
Change in feeling hostile (IV2)
Trait NA (W)
Change in trust (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

H4a:

Following a trust violation, individuals with
higher levels of honor logic will have
significantly greater decreases in cognitive
appraisal of trustees.

Multiple
regression

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.

Honor (IV1)
Face (IV2)
Dignity (IV3)
Change in cognitive appraisal
(DV)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

5.
6.
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H4b: Following a trust violation, individuals with
higher levels of honor logic will experience
significantly greater increases in hostile
affect.

Multiple
regression

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Honor (IV1)
Face (IV2)
Dignity (IV3)
Change in hostile (DV)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

H4c:

Multiple
regression

Study1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Honor (IV1)
Face (IV2)
Dignity (IV3)
Ahamed (DV)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

Multiple
regression

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Honor (IV1)
Face (IV2)
Dignity (IV3)
Change in ashamed (DV)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

Multiple
regression

Study 1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Honor (IV1)
Face (IV2)
Dignity (IV3)
NA (DV)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

Following a trust violation, individuals with
higher levels of face logic will experience
significantly greater increases in shame.

H4d: Following a trust violation, individuals with
higher levels of dignity logic will experience
smaller increases in negative emotions.

100

H5a:

Decreases in trust following a violation will
predict the trustor’s likelihood to engage in
actual behaviors in direct response to the
trust violation.

H5b: Individuals who experience an integritybased violation, followed by high changes in
feelings of hostility and decreases in trust,
will be more likely to engage in retaliatory
behavior (i.e., revenge).

Logistic
regression

Mediated
logistic
regression

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Study 1

1. Change in trust (IV)
2. Behavioral response (DV)
3. Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
4.

Change in trust (IV)
Behavioral response (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)
Trait self-regulation (Cov)

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Violation type (IV)
Change in hostile (M1)
Change in trust (M2)
Revenge behavior (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)
Trait self-regulation (Cov)

Honor (IV1)
Face (IV2)
Dignity (IV3)
Change in NA (DV)
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)
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H5c:

Individuals who experience a competencebased trust violation, followed by a
moderately negative primary cognitive
appraisal of the trustee and higher levels of
determination, will be more likely to engage
in proactive behaviors.

Mediated
logistic
regression with
polynomial term

Study 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Violation type (IV)
Cognitive appraisal2 (M1)
Determined (M2)
Pick up slack and confrontation
behaviors (DV)
Trust propensity (Cov
Age (Cov)
Gender (Cov)
Trait self-regulation (Cov)
Cognitive appraisal (Cov)

Note: IV = independent variable, DV = dependent variable, Cov = covariate, M = mediator, W = moderator.
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Chapter 4
Results
Study 2 Manipulation Check
As Study 2 included measures of trust (single-item and composite), primary
appraisal, and negative affect across multiple timepoints, three measures prior to
the violation manipulation and two following, a discontinuous growth model
(Bliese & Lang, 2016; Bliese & Ployhart, 2002) was used to test for significant
changes in the slopes of these measures after participants experienced the trust
violation manipulation (at time four). Figure 2 provides a visualization of the
expected pattern for each variable of interest across the five time points. In
general, it appeared that measures of trust, primary appraisal, and negative affect
were relatively consistent over the first three time points. Then at the fourth time
point, trust and primary appraisal scores decreased while negative affect scores
increased slightly. At the fifth time point, scores appeared to be trending back
toward the levels observed prior to violation. Therefore, discontinuous growth
models were used to model these dynamic effects over time. The basic
discontinuous growth model is an augmentation of the linear growth model that
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includes a dummy coded measure of time to represent the impact of a change
event (Bliese & Lang, 2016).

Figure 2 – Mean values of trust, primary appraisal and negative affect over time (Study 2).

A series of four discontinuous growth models were developed to test for changes
in the slopes of single-item trust, composite trust, primary appraisal, and negative
affect that aligned with the timing of the violation event (time four). Analyses
were conducted using the Multilevel (Bliese, 2013, 2016) and Nonlinear and
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Linear Mixed Effects (nlme; Pinheiro et al., 2018) packages for the R open-source
statistical computing environment (R Core Development Team, 2019). In each
model the data was first converted to univariate format. As part of this data
preparation process, measures of time (the sequence of measurements), transition
(dummy coded variable to isolate the timing of the violation event), and recovery
variables (dummy coded variable to isolate time points following the violation
event) were computed to be used as predictors of the score trajectories (Bliese &
Lang, 2016). The discontinuous growth models then produced both relative and
absolute parameter estimates of the mixed effects of time, transition, and recovery.
Measures from times six and seven were not included as those stages were
expected to reflect an additional transition event due to trust repair manipulations,
which fall beyond the scope of the present research questions.
Bliese and Lang (2016) detail the differences between the relative and absolute
values produced by discontinuous growth models and contend that the choice to
report relative versus absolute change should be informed by the nature of the
discontinuous event (i.e., event of trust violation). For instance, if the transition
event is expected to curb or exacerbate the slope of an existing trajectory, such as
an intervention that would reflect a less pronounced negative slope relative to the
pre-intervention trajectory. When the transition event is expected to produce an
abrupt change in the trajectory of a linear relationship, it is argued that absolute
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values of the slope are likely to be more meaningful (Bliese & Lang, 2016).
Mathematically, absolute values represent the slope of a relationship relative to
zero and are arguably easier to interpret when all variables are standardized or
measured on the same scale. Whereas relative values represent the change in slope
as a function of the pre-transition slope. Given that violations of trust in a scenario
where trust is not already eroding are expected to produce an abrupt change in the
trajectory of trust attitudes, absolute values for the model intercepts and effects of
time, transition, and recovery are reported.
The absolute intercept values of the following discontinuous growth models
represent the estimated mean values at the time of the first measurement. Then
looking to the model predictors, the absolute values of time represent the average
change in slope across each stage of the pre-transition phase, in this case times two
and three (prior to trust violation). The absolute value of the transition variable
represents the change in slope immediately after the trust violation event occurred.
Finally, the absolute value of the recovery variable reflects the average change in
slope from time four to time five (post-transition event). Thus, the following
absolute values reported from the discontinuous growth models allow for a clear
depiction of how the mean values of trust, primary appraisal, and negative affect
changed as a function of the timing of the trust violation manipulation.

Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics for Trust, Primary Appraisal, and Negative Affect Over Time
Time 1

Time 2

Time 3

Time 4

Time 5

Variable

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

Trust (Single-Item)
Trust (Composite)
Primary Appraisal
Negative Affect

4.03(0.77)
3.81(0.68)
4.08(0.76)
1.46(0.59)

4.13(0.76)
3.80(0.81)
4.00(0.82)
1.33(0.48)

4.20(0.72)
3.91(0.86)
4.19(0.79)
1.25(0.43)

2.98(1.11)
2.93(1.01)
2.97(1.11)
1.56(0.51)

3.16(1.03)
2.95(1.01)
3.26(0.98)
1.45(0.50)
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Trust scores over time. The first discontinuous growth model included singleitem trust scores across times one through five of Study 2. Results of the model
showed that after the first round of the experiment participants reported a mean
trust score of approximately 4.04 (SE = 0.09, p < .001). The significant effect of
the time coefficient indicated that single-item trust scores increased by 0.08 (SE =
0.05, p = .009) through time three (pre-transition phase). In other words, singleitem trust scores increased from a mean of 4.04 (time one) to 4.13 (time two), and
4.20 (time three). After experiencing the violation manipulation at time four, trust
scores decreased by an average of -1.23 (SE = 0.09, p < .001) to a mean of 2.98, as
indicated by the significant effect of the transition coefficient. Finally, the
significant effect of the recovery coefficient following the violation event through
time five revealed that the slope of trust then increased by 0.18 (SE = 0.10, p =
.007) to a mean of 3.16.
Table 5 – Parameter Estimates for Discontinuous Growth Model of Single-Item Trust Scores

Value

SE

df

t Value

p Value

(Intercept)

4.04

0.09

357

44.87

< .001

Time

0.08

0.05

357

1.69

.009

Transition

-1.23

0.09

357

-12.99

< .001

Recovery

0.18

0.10

357

1.80

.007
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A comparable discontinuous growth model that included composite trust scores
across times one through five revealed a similar pattern of results. Participants
reported a mean composite trust score of approximately 3.79 (SE = 0.09, p < .001)
after the first round of the experiment. The significant time coefficient revealed
that composite trust ratings increased by 0.05 (SE = 0.04, p = .025) at each time
through the pre-transition phase. Mean composite trust scores increased to 3.80 at
time two and 3.91 at time three. Again, the significant effect of the transition
coefficient showed that following the violation manipulation trust scores decreased
by an average of -0.96 (SE = 0.08, p < .001) to a mean value of 2.93. The recovery
coefficient was also found to be marginally significant, indicating that following
the violation event, prior to trust repair attempts, the slope of trust then increased
by 0.02 (SE = 0.08, p = .080) to a mean of 2.95.
Table 6 – Parameter Estimates for Discontinuous Growth Model of Composite Trust Scores

Value

SE

df

t Value

p Value

(Intercept)

3.79

0.09

357

41.82

< .001

Time

0.05

0.04

357

1.15

.025

Transition

-0.96

0.08

357

-12.36

< .001

Recovery

0.02

0.08

357

0.26

.080

Primary appraisal scores over time. A third discontinuous growth model that
included primary appraisal scores across times one through five revealed a pattern
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of results analogous to the single-item and composite trust ratings. The intercept
coefficient showed that after the first round of the experiment participants reported
a mean primary appraisal score of approximately 4.03 (SE = 0.09, p < .001). The
time coefficient was significant, indicating that primary appraisal ratings of
trustees increased by 0.06 (SE = 0.05, p = .028) through times two (M = 4.00) and
three (M = 4.19). The significant effect of the transition coefficient showed that
following the violation manipulation primary appraisal scores decreased by an
average of –1.17 (SE = 0.10, p < .001) to a mean value of 2.97. The recovery
coefficient in this model was also found to be statistically significant, indicating
that following the violation event the slope of primary appraisal then increased by
0.29 (SE = 0.10, p < .001) to a mean of 3.26.
Table 7 – Parameter Estimates for Discontinuous Growth Model of Primary Appraisal
Scores

Value

SE

df

t Value

p Value

(Intercept)

4.03

0.09

357

44.27

< .001

Time

0.06

0.05

357

1.09

.028

Transition

-1.17

0.10

357

-12.10

< .001

Recovery

0.29

0.10

357

2.84

< .001

Negative affect scores over time. A final basic discontinuous growth model that
included negative affect scores across times one through five suggested an inverse
pattern of results compared to the previous models. The significant intercept
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coefficient showed that after the first round of the experiment participants reported
relatively low negative affect scores with a mean of approximately 1.45 (SE =
0.05, p < .001). The significant time coefficient indicated that negative affect
decreased by -0.10 (SE = 0.02, p < .001) through each time leading up to the
violation manipulation (pre-transition phase). Thus, mean primary appraisal
ratings decreased to 1.33 at time two and 1.25 at time three. The significant
transition coefficient showed that negative affect then increased by an average of
0.31 (SE = 0.05, p < .001) following the violation manipulation to a mean of 1.56.
The recovery coefficient was also found to be significantly different from zero,
indicating that following the violation event the slope of negative affect began to
decrease by -0.10 (SE = 0.05, p = .003) with a mean negative affect score of 1.45
at time five.
Table 8 – Parameter Estimates for Discontinuous Growth Model of Negative Affect Scores

Value

SE

df

1.45

0.05

357

28.00

< .001

-0.10

0.02

357

-4.25

< .001

Transition

0.31

0.05

357

6.72

< .001

Recovery

-0.10

0.05

357

-2.12

.003

(Intercept)
Time

t Value

p Value

Taken together, the results of the discontinuous growth models support the use of
the Study 2 experimental paradigm for studying trust development and violation in

112
a controlled simulation. The data indicated that the experiment successfully
simulated the development of trust over the first three stages of the experiment,
followed by significant influence of the trust violation manipulation on the
trajectories of various measures of interest (i.e., trust, primary appraisal, and
negative affect).

Hypothesis 1 analyses
Hypothesis 1a, Study 2. A combination of Wilcoxon rank sum tests, ANCOVAs,
and discontinuous growth models were conducted using data from Study 2 to test
Hypothesis 1a, which predicted that decreases in trust will be significantly greater
following integrity violations compared to competency violations. Single-item and
composite trust change scores from Study 2 were included as DVs.
Because the single-item trust change scores failed to meet the assumption of
normality in both the competency violation (W = 0.855, p < .001) and integrity
violation (W = 0.855, p < .001) conditions, a Wilcoxon rank sum test was
conducted to test the difference on changes in trust scores (single item) between
then integrity violation (M = -1.28, SD = 1.05) and competency violation
conditions (M = -1.18, SD = 1.11). While trust scores decreased by slightly more
than one scale point in both conditions, the results of the nonparametric test failed
to meet significance, W = 935, p = .307 (one-tailed).
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To account for individual differences in age (M = 20.53, SD = 3.80) and
propensity to trust (M = 2.62, SD = 0.47) an ANCOVA was conducted to test the
difference in single item trust decreases between competence violation (M = -1.18,
SD = 1.11) and integrity violation (M = -1.28, SD = 1.05) conditions, including
age and trust propensity as covariates. However, results of the ANCOVA were not
significant, F(1,85) = 0.186, p = .667. Trust propensity was found to be a
marginally significant covariate, F(1,85) = 3.072, p = .083, however, age (p =
.518) did not have a significant effect.
Table 9 – ANCOVA Results of the Effect of Violation Type on Change in Trust (Single-Item)

Source

SS

df

MS

F

Between

4.17

3

Age

0.48

1

0.48

0.42

Trust Propensity

3.48

1

3.48

3.07

Violation Type

0.21

1

0.21

0.19

Within

96.19

85

1.13

Total

100.36

88

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
In order to further test whether violation type had an impact on trust over time, an
extension of the previous discontinuous growth model with violation type included
as a level two predictor was run in order to test Hypothesis 1a while considering
the changing trajectory of single-item trust scores before and after the violation.
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Mean trust scores were slightly lower over time for participants in the integrity
violation condition (see Figure 3). However, the effect of violation type was not
found be a predictor of changes in trust corresponding to the violation event (0.05, SE = 0.19, p = .789), nor was it found to have a significant interaction with
time (-0.10, SE = 0.10, p = .321), transition (0.02, SE = 0.23, p = .941), or
recovery coefficients (-0.16, SE = 0.21, p = .456).
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Figure 3 – Single-item trust scores over time between violation types.
Table 10 – Parameter Estimates for Discontinuous Growth Model with Violation Type as
Predictor

Value

SE

df

t Value

p Value

(Intercept)

4.06

0.12

354

33.12

< .001

Time

0.13

0.07

354

1.89

.059

Transition

-1.31

0.15

354

-8.83

< .001

Recovery

0.16

0.14

354

1.16

.246

Violation Type

-0.05

0.19

88

-0.27

.789

Time:Violation Type

-0.10

0.10

354

-0.99

.321

Transition:Violation Type

0.02

0.23

354

0.07

.941

Recovery:Violation Type

-0.16

0.21

354

-0.75

.456

In sum, results from the discontinuous growth model, ANCOVA, and
nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test failed to provide support for hypothesis 1a.
While trust was found to decrease significantly after the violation manipulation,
there was essentially no difference observed between the integrity and competency
violation types. It is possible that this could be a limitation of the single item trust
measure, which is presumed to capture an overall perception of trust opposed to
more specific types of trust that can be measured using a multi-item scale (e.g.,
Wildman et al., 2012). In other words, the type of trust violation (e.g., competence
violation) may influence different referents of trust (e.g., trust in another’s ability)
in methodically dissimilar ways. In a similar vein, this could also reflect a
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limitation of previous experimental paradigms where the development and
violation of trust was more transactional in nature.
Again, because the composite trust change scores failed to meet the assumption of
normality in both the competency violation (W = 0.935, p = .009) and integrity
violation (W = 0.843, p < .001) conditions, a similar Wilcoxon rank sum test was
conducted. One outlier was removed from the data for being an extreme outlier on
the trust change index. Results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test were found to be
significant, W = 1230, p = .035. However, the effect was in the opposite direction
expected with greater decreases in trust in the competence violation condition (M
= -1.18, SD = 0.956) than in the integrity violation condition (M = -0.779, SD =
0.814).
To account for individual differences in age (M = 20.55, SD = 3.82) and
propensity to trust (M = 2.61, SD = 0.46) an ANCOVA was conducted to test the
difference in composite trust decreases between violation conditions, including
age and trust propensity as covariates. One case was removed from the data for
being an extreme outlier on the trust change index and two were removed due to
missingness. Results of the ANCOVA were significant, F(1,84) = 6.354, p = .014.
However, the effect was in the opposite direction expected with greater decreases
in trust observed in the competency violation condition (M = -1.18, SD = 0.956)
compared to the integrity violation condition (M = -0.779, SD = 0.814). Neither
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the age (p = .596) nor propensity to trust (p = .127) covariates had a significant
effect on decreases in trust scores.
Table 11 – ANCOVA Results of the Effect of Violation Type on Change in Trust (Composite)

Source

SS

df

MS

F

Between

6.62

3

Age

0.21

1

0.21

0.28

Trust Propensity

1.74

1

1.74

2.37

Violation Type

4.67

1

4.67

6.35*

Within

61.78

84

0.74

Total

68.40

87

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Similar to the follow-up test for single-item trust scores, a discontinuous growth
model with violation type included as a level two predictor was run in order to test
Hypothesis 1a while considering the changing trajectory of composite trust scores
before and after the violation. Although decreases in trust scores were greater in
the competence violation condition, mean trust scores were slightly lower over
time for participants in the integrity violation condition (see Figure 3). Although
violation type was not found be a significant predictor of trust scores (-0.19, SE =
0.18, p = .293), it exhibited a significant interaction with time (-0.19, SE = 0.08, p
= .024) and transition coefficients (0.56, SE = 0.19, p = .003), but not with the
recovery coefficient (-0.10, SE = 0.17, p = .552). These results suggested that
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experiencing a competence violation is associated with a steeper decrease in trust
attitudes than integrity violation.

Figure 4 – Composite trust scores over time between violation types.
Table 12 – Parameter Estimates for Discontinuous Growth Model with Violation Type as
Predictor

Value

(Intercept)

3.88

SE

0.12

df

354

t Value

32.30

p Value

< .001
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Time

0.13

0.05

354

2.33

.020

Transition

-1.26

0.12

354

-10.15

< .001

Recovery

0.02

0.11

354

0.20

.843

Violation Type

-0.19

0.18

88

-1.06

.293

Time:Violation Type

-0.19

0.08

354

-2.26

.024

Transition:Violation Type

0.56

0.19

354

2.98

.003

Recovery:Violation Type

-0.10

0.17

354

-0.60

.552

One possible explanation for why the effect of violation type on decreases in trust
was in the opposite direction than predicted could be due to the multivariate
structure of the composite trust scale. After splitting the data to reflect changes in
competence-based trust (M = -0.95, SD = 1.01) and changes in integrity-based
trust (M = -0.98, SD = 0.98) two additional Wilcoxon rank sum tests were
conducted to check for differences in the two subdimensions of trust between
violation types. Results found that decreases in competence-based trust were
significantly greater in the competence violation condition (M = -1.15, SD = 1.06)
than in the integrity violation condition (M = -0.74, SD = 0.89), W = 1261, p =
.029. However, decreases in integrity-based trust in the competence violation
condition (M = -1.10, SD = 1.08) were not significantly different than decreases in
the integrity violation condition (M = -0.81, SD = 0.82), W = 1157, p = .184. Thus,
this unintuitive finding could be due to the combination of the multivariate
structure of the trust scale and the nature of the collaborative task in the
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experiment, such that perceptions of competence may have been perceived as
more important for succeeding that perceptions of integrity.
Taken together these results fail to support hypothesis 1a, though they do provide
impetus for further inquiry into how and why different types of trust violations
could systematically impact more granular changes in trust attitudes.
Hypothesis 1b. A combination of Wilcoxon rank sum tests, ANCOVAs, and
discontinuous growth models were conducted using data from Study 1 and Study 2
to test hypothesis 1b, which predicted that decreases in trust following a violation
would be significantly greater for males compared to females. Trust change scores
from Study 1, along with single-item, and composite trust change scores from
Study 2 were used as DVs.
Hypothesis 1b, Study 1. Mean decreases in trust change scores from Study 1
were slightly greater for males (M = -2.088, SD = 1.07) than for females (M = 2.029, SD = 1.07). Six cases were removed from the analysis to restrict to male
and female genders. Because the data failed to meet the assumption of normality
in both gender groups, a Wilcoxon rank sum test was conducted though failed to
meet statistical significance, W = 4628, p = .438 (one-tailed).
Including Age (M = 41.69, SD = 12.59) as a covariate, an ANCOVA testing the
difference in trust changes between genders was also not statistically significant,
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F(1,192) = 0.295, p = .588. However, age was found to have a statistically
significant effect on trust decreases, F(1,191) = 14.836, p < .001.
Table 13 – ANCOVA Results of the Effect of Gender on Change in Trust

Source

SS

df

MS

F

Between

16.18

2

Age

15.86

1

15.86

14.84***

Gender

0.32

1

0.32

0.59

Within

204.20

191

1.07

Total

220.38

193

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
The results of the nonparametric test and ANCOVA from Study 1 failed to
provide support for hypothesis 1b.
Hypothesis 1b, Study 2. Because the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality revealed
that single-item change in trust scores from Study 2 failed to meet the assumption
of normality in both the male (W = 0.87, p < .001) and female (W = 0.83, p < .001)
groups, a Wilcoxon rank sum test drawing on data from Study 2 was conducted
test the differences in trust changes between genders. One case was removed from
the analysis to restrict to male and female genders. Contrary to prediction mean
decreases were slightly greater for females (M = -1.24, SD = 1.09) than males (M
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= -1.18, SD = 1.07), however the difference was not statistically significant, W =
853.5, p = .221 (one-tailed).
Including age (M = 20.54, SD = 3.82) and trust propensity (M = 2.62, SD = 0.47)
as covariates, results of an ANCOVA testing the difference in trust decreases
(single item) between genders was not significant, F(1,84) = 0.003, p = .957. One
case was removed from the analysis to restrict to male and female genders.
Contrary to prediction mean decreases were slightly greater for females (M = 1.24, SD = 1.09) than males (M = -1.18, SD = 1.07). Neither covariate was
significant.
Table 14 – ANCOVA Results of the Effect of Gender on Change in Trust (Single-Item)

Source

SS

df

MS

F

Between

4.51

3

Age

0.51

1

0.51

0.46

Trust Propensity

3.68

1

3.68

3.33

Gender

0.32

1

0.32

0.003

Within

92.90

84

1.12

Total

97.41

87

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
To further test whether gender had an impact on trust ratings across time, a
discontinuous growth model with gender included as a level two predictor was
used to test Hypothesis 1b while considering the changing trajectory of single-item
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trust scores. Mean trust scores were slightly lower over time for males than
females (see Figure 5). However, the effect of gender was not found be a predictor
of single-item trust ratings (0.07, SE = 0.20, p = .731), nor was it found to have a
significant interaction with time (0.10, SE = 0.11, p = .335), transition (-0.06, SE =
0.18, p = .749), or recovery coefficients (-0.06, SE = 0.18, p = .734). Thus, the
series of results using single-item trust scores failed to provide support for
hypothesis 1b.

.
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Figure 5 – Single-item trust scores over time between genders.
Table 15 – Parameter Estimates for Discontinuous Growth Model with Gender as Predictor

Value

SE

df

t Value

p Value

(Intercept)

4.00

0.11

350

34.99

< .001

Time

0.05

0.06

350

0.80

.422

Transition

-1.19

0.10

350

-11.44

< .001

Recovery

0.20

0.10

350

1.91

.056

Gender

0.07

0.20

87

0.34

.731

Time:Gender

0.11

0.11

350

0.97

.335

Transition:Gender

-0.06

0.18

350

-0.32

.749

Recovery:Gender

-0.06

0.18

350

-0.34

.734

Again because the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality revealed that the change in
composite trust scores from Study 2 failed to meet the assumption of normality in
both the male (W = 0.90, p < .001) and female (W = 0.89, p = .005) groups, a
Wilcoxon rank sum test was conducted test the differences in composite trust
score changes between genders. One case was removed from the analysis to
restrict to male and female genders and another case was removed due for being
an extreme outlier on the changes in trust score. Contrary to prediction mean
decreases were slightly greater for females (M = -1.05, SD = 1.05) than males (M
= -0.96, SD = 0.90), however the difference was not statistically significant, W =
888.5, p = .773.
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An ANCOVA was conducted to test the effect of gender on changes in composite
trust scores while controlling for age (M = 20.54, SD = 3.82) and propensity to
trust (M = 2.62, SD = 0.47). One case was removed from the analysis to restrict to
male and female genders and another case was removed due for being an extreme
outlier on the changes in trust score. Results of the ANCOVA revealed that gender
did not have a significant effect on changes in trust scores, F(1,83) = 0.232, p =
.632. The covariates age (p = .598) and trust propensity (p = .150) also did not
have significant influences on changes in trust scores.
Table 16 – ANCOVA Results of the Effect of Gender on Change in Trust (Composite)

Source

SS

df

MS

F

Between

2.06

3

Age

0.22

1

0.22

0.28

Trust Propensity

1.66

1

1.66

2.11

Gender

0.18

1

0.18

0.23

Within

65.37

83

0.79

Total

67.43

86

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Another discontinuous growth model with gender included as a level two predictor
demonstrated a similar pattern of results when using composite trust scores.
Again, mean trust scores were slightly lower over time for males than females (see
Figure 3). The effect of gender was also not found be a significant predictor of
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composite trust ratings (0.34, SE = 0.19, p = .074), nor was it found to have a
significant interaction with time (0.09, SE = 0.09, p = .300), transition (-0.09, SE =
0.15, p = .525), or recovery coefficients (< .001, SE = 0.15, p = .996). Thus, the
series of results using composite trust scores also failed to provide support for
hypothesis 1b.
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Figure 6 – Composite trust scores over time between genders.
Table 17 – Parameter Estimates for Discontinuous Growth Model with Gender as Predictor

Value

SE

df

t Value

p Value

(Intercept)

3.67

0.11

350

33.42

< .001

Time

0.02

0.05

350

0.32

.746

Transition

-0.95

0.09

350

-10.94

< .001

Recovery

0.04

0.09

350

0.51

.613

Gender

0.35

0.19

87

1.81

.074

Time:Gender

0.09

0.09

350

1.04

.301

Transition:Gender

-0.10

0.15

350

-0.64

.525

Recovery:Gender

< 0.001

0.15

350

0.004

.996

Altogether the nonparametric, ANCOVA, and discontinuous growth model results
using both single-item and composite trust scores failed to find support for
hypothesis 1b, that males would report greater decreases in trust following a
violation compared to females. Although, the mean trust scores for female
participants were slightly higher than for male participants, aligning with existing
theory that women may be more trusting because of relational expectations
(Haselhuhn et al., 2015). Future research is needed to determine what types of
trust violation, and in what contexts, could be expected to result in systematic
differences between genders on perception of trust following a violation.
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Hypothesis 2 analyses
Hypothesis 2a, Study 2. A combination of the Wilcoxon rank sum test and
ANCOVA were conducted using data from Study 2 to test hypothesis 2a, which
predicted that primary cognitive appraisal of the trustee would decrease following
a trust violation.
Because the primary appraisal scores failed to meet the assumption of normality
both before (W = 0.81, p < .001) and after the violation (W = 0.90, p < .001), a
Wilcoxon paired rank sum test was conducted to test whether primary appraisal
ratings were significantly higher before a trust violation (M = 4.18, SD = 0.80)
compared to after (M = 2.97, SD = 1.11). Results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test
were significant, V = 2426.5, p < .001.
Including age (M = 20.53, SD = 3.80) and trust propensity (M = 2.62, SD = 0.47)
as covariates, a repeated measures ANCOVA to test the difference between
primary appraisal ratings before (M = 4.176, SD = 0.80) and after trust violation
(M = 2.967, SD = 1.11) was found to be significant, F(1,86) = 14.426, p < .001.
However, neither the age (p = .922) nor trust propensity (p = .264) covariates were
significant.
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Table 18 – Repeated Measures ANCOVA Results of the Effect of Violation Type on Primary
Appraisal

Source

SS

df

MS

F

Between

2.06

3

Age

0.01

1

0.01

0.01

Trust Propensity

1.33

1

1.33

1.27

15.18

1

15.18

1

15.18

14.43***

Residuals

90.47

86

1.05

Total

107.71

89

Within
Primary Appraisal (T3)

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Taken together the nonparametric and ANCOVA results provide evidence to
support hypothesis 2a, that primary appraisal of the trustee was significantly lower
after experience a trust violation.
Hypothesis 2b, Study 2. Two latent change score analyses (Kenny, 2013) were
conducted using data from Study 2 to test hypothesis 2b, which predicted that
Decreases in primary cognitive appraisal of trustees following trust violation will
predict subsequent decreases in trust.
The first latent change score analysis (naïve method; Kenny, 2013) was conducted
to test the predictive value of changes in primary appraisal (M = -1.21, SD = 1.07)
on changes in single-item trust scores (M = -1.22, SD = 1.08). Results revealed

130
that the model was significant, R2 = .421, F(1,88) = 64.04, p < .001, and changes
in primary appraisal significantly predicted variance in single item change in trust
scores, β = .655, p < .001. Change in primary appraisal accounted for
approximately 42% of variance observed in single item trust change scores.
Table 19 – Summary of Latent Change Score Analysis on Primary Appraisal

R

Model 1

.65

R2

.42

Trust Change (Single-Item)

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

0.83
0.66

0.08

8.00***

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
A second, similar latent change score analysis (naïve method; Kenny, 2013) was
conducted to test the predictive value of changes in primary appraisal (M = -1.22,
SD = 1.07) on changes in composite trust scores (M = -1.01, SD = 0.91). One
participant was excluded from the analysis due to being an extreme outlier on the
composite change in trust score. Results revealed that the model was significant,
R2 = .113, F(1,87) = 11.02, p = .001, and changes in primary appraisal
significantly predicted variance in composite change in trust scores, β = .287, p =
.001. Change in primary appraisal accounted for approximately 11% of variance
observed in composite trust change scores.
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Table 20 – Summary of Latent Change Score Analysis on Primary Appraisal

R

Model 1

.34

Trust Change (Composite)

R2

.11

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

0.87
0.29

0.09

3.32**

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Taken together the results of the latent change score analyses on single-item and
composite trust scores provide support for hypothesis 2b, that following a trust
violation changes in primary appraisal would predict changes in trust attitudes.
Hypothesis 2c, Study 2. Two moderated multiple regression analyses were
conducted using data from Study 2 to test hypothesis 2c, which predicted that the
relationship between change in primary cognitive appraisal and change in trust
would be moderated by type of violation, such that the relationship will be
significantly stronger with competence violations than with integrity violations.
The first moderated regression analysis was conducted to test for significant
differences between violation conditions in the relationship between changes in
primary cognitive appraisal (M = -1.21, SD = 1.07) and changes in single item
trust (M = -1.22, SD = 1.08), controlling for trust propensity scores (M = 2.62, SD
= 0.47). The model was found to be significant, R2 = .46, F(4,86) = 18.44, p <
.001, and propensity to trust was found to have a significant effect, β = .13, p =
.012. The results showed that violation type had a significant interaction effect
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with change in cognitive appraisal on the relationship with change in trust, β = .12,
p = .013. A closer look at the interaction indicates that the integrity violation was
more detrimental to changes in trust when cognitive reactions were minimal, but
as those reactions became more negative the impact of competence violation had a
more damaging effect on trust (see Figure 7). In other words, when changes in
cognitive appraisal were absent or slightly positive, individuals who experienced
an integrity violation had greater decreases in trust than those who experienced the
competency violation. But as change in primary appraisal continued to decrease,
individuals who experienced the competency violation began to report greater
decreases in trust than individuals in the integrity violation.
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Figure 7 – Moderating effect of violation type on primary appraisal – single-item trust
change.

A similar moderated regression analysis was conducted to test for significant
differences between violation conditions in the relationship between changes in
primary cognitive appraisal (M = -1.22, SD = 1.07) and changes in composite trust
scores (M = -1.01, SD = 0.91), controlling for trust propensity scores (M = 2.61,
SD = 0.46). One participant was excluded from the analysis due to being an
extreme outlier on the multi-item trust change index. The model was found to be
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significant, R2 = .23, F(4,85) = 6.36, p < .001, though propensity to trust was not
found to have a significant effect, β = .15, p = .130. The results showed that
violation type had a significant interaction effect with change in cognitive
appraisal on the relationship with change in trust, β = .25, p = .009. When changes
in cognitive appraisal were absent or slightly positive, individuals who
experienced an integrity violation had greater decreases in trust than those who
experienced the competency violation. But as change in primary appraisal
continued to decrease, individuals who experienced the competency violation
began to report greater decreases in trust than individuals in the integrity violation
(see Figure 8).
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Figure 8 – Moderating effect of violation type on primary appraisal – composite trust change.

Taken together the moderated regression results using both single item and
composite trust scores support hypothesis 2c, that the relationship between
changes in primary appraisal and changes in trust would be stronger in
competency violations than integrity violations.
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Hypothesis 3 analyses
Hypothesis 3a, Study 2. A combination of the Wilcoxon rank sum test and
ANCOVA were conducted using data from Study 2 to test hypothesis 3a, which
predicted that increases in negative affect would be greater for individuals who
experience integrity- versus competence-based violations.
As predicted, mean increases in negative affect were slightly greater for
individuals who experienced an integrity violation (M = 0.34, SD = 0.40) than
individuals who experienced a competency violation (M = 0.31, SD = 0.36).
Because the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality revealed that the data failed to meet
the assumption of normality in both the integrity violation (W = 0.94, p = .043)
and competency violation (W = 0.89, p < .001) conditions, a Wilcoxon rank sum
test was conducted test the differences in changes overall negative affect between
the trust violation types. Two cases were removed from the analysis to restrict due
to being extreme outliers on the composite negative affect index. However, results
of the Wilcoxon rank sum test revealed that the difference in increases in negative
affect between violation types was not statistically significant, W = 1022, p = .639
(one-tailed).
Including age (M = 20.33, SD = 3.22) and trust propensity (M = 2.60, SD = 0.46)
as covariates, an ANCOVA was conducted to test the difference in increases in
negative affect between trust violation types. Two cases were removed from the
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analysis to restrict due to being extreme outliers on the composite negative affect
index. Contrary to prediction, results of the ANCOVA were not significant,
F(1,84) = 0.103, p = .742.
Table 21 – ANCOVA Results of the Effect of Violation Type on Increase in Negative Affect

Source

SS

df

MS

F

Between

0.60

3

Age

0.56

1

0.56

4.04*

Trust Propensity

0.02

1

0.02

0.12

Violation Type

0.02

1

0.02

0.11

Within

11.73

84

0.14

Total

12.33

86

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
In a similar fashion to the follow up tests for Hypothesis 1a and 1b, a
discontinuous growth model with violation type included as a level two predictor
was used to test for differences in the negative affect trajectories between
competence and integrity violations. Negative affect on average was slightly
higher over time for participants in the integrity violation condition (see Figure 9).
However, the effect of violation type was not found be a significant predictor of
negative affect ratings (0.15, SE = 0.11, p = .162), nor was it found to have a
significant interaction with time (-0.07, SE = 0.05, p = .175), transition (0.07, SE =
0.08, p = .377), or recovery coefficients (0.16, SE = 0.08, p = .055).
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Figure 9 – Composite trust scores over time between violation types.
Table 22 – Parameter Estimates for Discontinuous Growth Model with Violation Type as
Predictor

Value

(Intercept)

SE

df

t Value

p Value

1.39

0.07

354

19.43

< .001

-0.07

0.03

354

-2.19

.029

Transition

0.27

0.05

354

5.06

< .001

Recovery

-0.17

0.05

354

-3.13

.002

0.15

0.11

88

1.41

.162

Time

Violation Type

Time:Violation Type
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.175

-0.07

0.05

354

-1.36

Transition:Violation Type

0.07

0.08

354

0.88

.376

Recovery:Violation Type

0.16

0.08

354

1.92

.056

Although mean increases in overall negative affect were slightly greater for those
experiencing an integrity violation, taken together the nonparametric, ANCOVA,
and discontinuous growth model results failed to provide support for hypothesis
3a.
Hypothesis 3b. Three latent change score analyses (Kenny, 2013) were conducted
to test hypothesis 3b, which predicted that increases in negative affect following
trust violation would predict decreases in trust. One analysis was conducted using
data from Study 1 and two analyses used data from Study 2.
Hypothesis 3b, Study 1. The first latent change score analysis was conducted
using data from Study 1 to test the predictive value of post-violation negative
affect scores (M = 3.08, SD = 0.74) on changes in trust (M = -2.07, SD = 1.07).
One participant was excluded from the analysis for being an extreme outlier on the
composite negative affect index. Controlling for age (M = 41.42, SD = 12.63, β = 0.024, p < .001) and gender (p = .381), the model was statistically significant, R2 =
.10, F(3,195) = 7.22, p < .001. Post-violation negative affect significantly
predicted variance in trust change scores, β = -0.25, p = .011. The series of
predictors accounted for approximately 10% of variance observed in trust
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decreases. These results from Study 1 provide support for hypothesis 3b, that
negative affect following a violation would predict decreases in trust.
Table 23 – Summary of Latent Change Score Analysis on Change in Trust

R

Model 1

.32

R2

.10

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

1.02

Negative Affect

-0.25 0.10

-2.56*

Age

-0.02 0.01

-4.15***

Gender

-0.10 0.12

-0.88

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Hypothesis 3b, Study 2. Drawing on data from Study 2, a similar latent change
score analysis was conducted to test the predictive value of increases in negative
affect (M = 0.33, SD = 0.38) on changes in in single-item trust decreases (M = 1.22, SD = 1.07). Two participants were excluded from the analysis for being
extreme outliers on the composite negative affect index. Controlling for age (M =
20.33, SD = 3.22, β = -0.024, p < .001), propensity to trust (M = 2.60, SD = 0.46, β
= 0.43, p = .075) and gender (β = 0.13, p = .621), the model approached statistical
significance, R2 = .11, F(5,81) = 2.01, p = .085. The predictive value of increases
in negative affect was found to be marginally significant, β = -0.55, p = .086. The
series of predictors accounted for approximately 11% of variance observed in trust
decreases.
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Table 24 – Summary of Latent Change Score Analysis on Change in Trust (Single-Item)

R

Model 1

.33

R2

.11

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

1.03

Change in Negative Affect

-0.55 0.31

-1.74

Trust Propensity

0.43

0.24

1.80

Age

0.01

0.04

0.26

Gender

0.12

0.26

0.50

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
This finding is interesting in that even small changes in negative affect appear to
be predictive of decreases in trust. Given that changes in primary appraisal
accounted for about 42% of the variance observed in the decreases in single-item
trust scores, it is valuable to know whether or not changes in negative affect
provide incremental validity. However, a hierarchical multiple regression
including change in primary appraisal in the first step and change in negative
affect in the second step, found that increases in negative affect did not
significantly predict incremental variance in decreases in trust beyond decreases in
primary appraisal, R2 = .004, F(1,86) = 0.58, p = .449. This suggests that changes
in primary appraisal may be the true driver of decreases in trust following
violation in a collaborative task.
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A third latent change score analysis was conducted to test the predictive value of
increases in negative affect (M = 0.33, SD = 0.38) on changes in composite trust
decreases (M = -0.38, SD = 0.91). Again, two participants were excluded from the
analysis for being extreme outliers on the composite negative affect index.
Controlling for age (M = 20.33, SD = 3.22, β = 0.05, p = .146), propensity to trust
(M = 2.60, SD = 0.46, β = 0.33, p = .108) and gender (β = 0.19, p = .397), the
model did not reach statistical significance, R2 = .09, F(5,81) = 1058, p = .175.
Additionally, the predictive value of increases in negative affect was not a
significant predictor of changes in composite trust scores, β = -0.29, p = .275.
Table 25 – Summary of Latent Change Score Analysis on Change in Trust (Composite)

R

Model 1

.33

R2

.11

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

1.03

Change in Negative Affect

-0.55 0.31

-1.74

Trust Propensity

0.43

0.24

1.80

Age

0.01

0.04

0.26

Gender

0.12

0.26

0.50

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Taken together the latent change score results from Studies 1 and 2 provide partial
support for hypothesis 3b, that increases in negative affect following a violation
would predict decreases in trust.

143
Hypothesis 3c, Study 2. Two multiple regression models were conducted using
data from Study 2 to test hypothesis 3c, that increases in upset and hostile
emotions would predict variance in trust changes to a greater extent than other
discrete negative emotions.
The first multiple regression was conducted to test the predictive value of
increases in discrete negative emotions on decreases in single-item trust scores.
Decreases in single-item trust scores (M = -1.22, SD = 1.08) was included as the
DV, with changes in upset (M = 0.93, SD = 0.94), hostile (M = 0.36, SD = 0.86),
ashamed (M = 0.14, SD = 0.78), nervous (M = -0.01, SD = 0.67), and afraid (M =
0.07, SD = 0.49) emotions included as predictors. One participant was excluded
from the analysis for being an extreme outlier on change in hostile scores. After
controlling for propensity to trust (M = 2.62, SD = 0.47, β = 0.45, p = .048), age
(M = 20.75, SD = 3.80, β = -0.02, p = .475), and gender (β = -0.01, p = .971), the
model was found to be statistically significant, R2 = .26, F(9,79) = 3.18, p = .002.
Increases in upset (β = -0.44, p < .001) and decreases in nervous (β = .36, p =
.041) were found to be the only discrete emotions that significantly predicted
changes in trust. Together the series of discrete emotions predicted approximately
26% of variance observed in decreases in single-item trust scores.
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Table 26 – Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Change in Trust (Single-Item)

R

Model 1

.51

R2

.26

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

0.97

Change in Upset

-0.44

0.13

-3.50***

Change in Hostile

-0.12

0.15

-0.85

Change in Ashamed

0.10

0.13

0.74

Change in Nervous

0.36

0.18

2.05*

Change in Afraid

0.29

0.23

1.27

Trust Propensity

0.45

0.23

2.00*

Age

-0.02

0.03

-0.73

Gender

-0.003 0.25

-0.02

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
While change in feeling nervous was found to be a significant predictor of change
in trust, the direction of the relationship was found to be positive, which was
counterintuitive to the expected direction. Although further probing indicated that
the change in feeling nervous produced a relatively small effect size with a
squared semi-partial correlation of 0.04. It is possible that participants who
experienced an increase in feeling nervous may have an increased motivation to
pursue their goals (Seo, Bartunek, & Barrett, 2010), and as a result felt a need to
continue trusting their partner in order to avoid further task derailment.
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A second, similar multiple regression was conducted to test the predictive value of
increases in discrete negative emotions on decreases in composite trust scores.
Decreases in composite trust scores (M = -0.98, SD = 0.95) was included as the
DV, with changes in upset (M = 0.93, SD = 0.94), hostile (M = 0.36, SD = 0.86),
ashamed (M = 0.14, SD = 0.78), nervous (M = -0.01, SD = 0.67), and afraid (M =
0.07, SD = 0.49) emotions included as predictors. One participant was excluded
from the analysis for being an extreme outlier on change in hostile and change in
composite trust scores. After controlling for propensity to trust (M = 2.62, SD =
0.47, β = 0.38, p = .071), age (M = 20.75, SD = 3.80, β = 0.01, p = .767), and
gender (β = 0.18, p = .440), the model was found to be marginally significant, R2 =
.18, F(9,79) = 1.88, p = .068. Increases in upset (β = -0.26, p = .026) was found to
be the only discrete emotion that significantly predicted changes in trust. Together
the series of discrete emotions predicted approximately 18% of variance observed
in decreases in composite trust scores.
Table 27 – Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Change in Trust (Composite)

R

Model 1

.37

R2

.14

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

0.87

Change in Upset

-0.26

0.11

-2.29*

Change in Hostile

0.03

0.13

0.22

Change in Ashamed

-0.06

0.12

-0.50
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Change in Nervous

0.17

0.16

1.08

Change in Afraid

0.34

0.20

1.66

Trust Propensity

0.33

0.20

1.61

Age

0.01

0.03

0.48

Gender

0.13

0.22

0.59

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Taken together the multiple regression results using both single-item and
composite trust scores provide partial support hypothesis 3c, as changes in upset
predicted changes in trust to a greater extent than other discrete negative emotions
on both trust change metrics. However, increases in hostile emotion was not
related to changes in trust and increases in nervous was related to changes in
single item trust scores.
Hypothesis 3d. Three relative weights analyses (Lebreton, 2015) were conducted
to test hypothesis 3d, which predicted that feeling upset would have a significantly
higher relative weight than other discrete negative emotions in predicting
decreases in trust following violation. One analysis was conducted using data from
Study 1 and two analyses used data from Study 2.
Hypothesis 3d, Study 1. Drawing on data from Study 1, a relative weights
analysis was conducted using Lebreton's (2015) RWA Web application with ten
thousand bootstrapped replications to test hypothesis 3d. All discrete emotions
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were entered into the equation along with age, change in trust was entered as the
criterion. Age was found to have the highest rescaled relative weight (19.41),
followed by disappointed (14.92), betrayed (10.34), sad (10.12), critical (6.98),
fearful (6.61), guilty (5.47), angry (3.93), confused (3.61), upset (2.93), ashamed
(2.67), apathetic (2.56), helpless (2.41), worried (2.31), injustice (2.21), frustrated
(1.25), regretful (1.19), and stressed (1.03). Predictors with statistically significant
weights, as indicated by a lack of 0 in the distribution of bootstrapped confidence
intervals, included disappointed, sad, betrayed, and age. The weight of upset was
only significantly different from age as a predictor. Together, the series of
predictors accounted for approximately 26% of the variance observed in trust
change scores.
Table 28 – Summary of Relative Weights Analysis on Change in Trust
Raw Relative
Weight

Rescaled Relative
Weight

LLCL

ULCL

Age

0.051

19.41

0.011

0.121

Disappointed

0.039

14.92

0.005

0.097

Betrayed

0.027

10.34

0.002

0.071

Sad

0.026

10.12

0.002

0.078

Critical

0.018

6.98

-0.002

0.061

Fearful

0.017

6.61

0.000

0.060

Guilty

0.014

5.47

-0.003

0.071

Angry

0.010

3.94

-0.003

0.041

Predictor
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Confused

0.009

3.61

-0.004

0.053

Upset

0.008

2.94

-0.007

0.031

Ashamed

0.007

2.68

-0.007

0.039

Apathetic

0.007

2.56

-0.005

0.047

Helpless

0.006

2.41

-0.005

0.038

Worried

0.006

2.31

-0.005

0.037

Injustice

0.006

2.22

-0.007

0.036

Frustrated

0.003

1.25

-0.019

0.014

Regretful

0.003

1.19

-0.011

0.022

Stressed

0.003

1.04

-0.018

0.013

Note. Model R2 = .26
Hypothesis 3d, Study 2. Drawing on data from Study 2, a similar relative weights
analysis was conducted using Lebreton's (2015) RWA Web application with ten
thousand bootstrapped replications and decreases in single-item trust scores as the
DV. All discrete emotions were entered into the equation along with age and trust
propensity as covariates. Change in upset scores were found to have the highest
rescaled relative weight (45.07), followed by change in nervous (19.12), trust
propensity (14.95), change in hostile (10.40), change in afraid (5.60), age (3.57),
and change in ashamed (1.28). However, change in upset was not found to be a
significantly better predictor than any of the others included in the model.
Together, the series of predictors accounted for approximately 23% of the variance
observed in trust change scores.
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Table 29 – Summary of Relative Weights Analysis on Change in Trust (Single-Item)
Raw Relative
Weight

Rescaled Relative
Weight

LLCL

ULCL

Change in Upset

0.104

45.07

-0.064

0.198

Change in Nervous

0.044

19.12

-0.140

0.105

Trust Propensity

0.035

14.95

-0.156

0.084

Change in Hostile

0.024

10.40

-0.162

0.036

Change in Afraid

0.013

5.60

-0.181

0.018

Age

0.008

3.57

-0.184

0.020

Change in Ashamed

0.003

1.28

-0.186

0.007

Predictor

Note. Model R2 = .23
A third relative weights analysis was conducted using Lebreton's (2015) RWA
Web application with ten thousand bootstrapped replications and decreases in
composite trust scores as the DV. All discrete emotions were entered into the
equation along with Age and trust propensity as covariates. Change in upset scores
were again found to have the highest rescaled relative weight (29.34), followed by
trust propensity (27.50), change in hostile (16.44), change in afraid (13.93),
change in nervous (8.10), change in ashamed (3.50), and age (1.18). However,
change in upset was not found to be a significantly better predictor than any of the
others included in the model. Together, the series of predictors accounted for
approximately 16% of the variance observed in trust change scores.
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Table 30 – Summary of Relative Weights Analysis on Change in Trust (Composite)
Raw Relative
Weight

Rescaled Relative
Weight

LLCL

ULCL

Change in Upset

0.047

29.34

-0.016

0.156

Trust Propensity

0.044

27.50

-0.016

0.171

Change in Hostile

0.026

16.44

-0.017

0.201

Change in Afraid

0.022

13.93

-0.012

0.081

Change in Nervous

0.013

8.10

-0.019

0.122

Change in Afraid

0.006

3.50

-0.023

0.070

Age

0.002

1.18

-0.058

0.046

Predictor

Note. Model R2 = .16
Taken together the relative weights analyses using data from Study 1 and both
single item and composite trust scores from Study 2 failed to provide direct
support for hypothesis 3d, as the relative weight of changes in upset emotion was
not found to be a better predictor of changes in trust than other discrete emotions.
It may be that people’s retrospective recollection of trust violation elicits stronger
memories of negative emotions other than feeling upset. However, feeling upset
was found to have the largest rescaled relative weight in both Study 2 analyses,
suggesting that feeling upset may be a more common emotional response to trust
violation when such responses are captured in the moment. The vast difference in
order of the relative weights of predictors in Study 1 and Study 2 may be
indicative of the types of violations between studies. Given that the types of
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violation, and the contexts they occurred in, were much more varied in Study 1
where participants had the freedom to choose the violation that they reflected on
may account for these observed differences in the orders of rescaled relative
weights.
Hypothesis 3e, Study 2. Two moderated multiple regression analyses were
conducted using data from Study 2 to test hypothesis 5e, which predicted that the
relationships between upset and hostile emotions and changes in trust would be
moderated by trait negative affect, such that the relationship will be significantly
stronger when trait negative affect is high.
The first moderated regression analysis was conducted to test for significant
interactions between trait negative affect scores (M = 2.45, SD = 0.60) and
increases in upset (M = 0.93, SD = 0.94) and hostile (M = 0.36, SD = 0.86) discrete
emotions on changes in single-item trust scores (M = -1.22, SD = 1.07),
controlling for age (M = 20.53, SD = 3.80) and trust propensity scores (M = 2.62,
SD = 0.47). The model was found to be statistically significant, R2 = .16, F(7,83) =
2.29, p = .035. However, the results showed that trait negative affect did not have
a significant moderating effect on relationships between decreases in single-item
trust and decreases in upset (β = 0.11, p = .310), or hostile emotions (β = 0.01, p =
.900).
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Table 31 – Summary of Moderated Regression Analysis on Change in Trust (Single-Item)

R

Model 1

.40

R2

.16

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

0.06

Change in Upset

-0.29

0.11

-2.72**

Change in Hostile

-0.09

0.11

-0.79

Trait Negative Affect

-0.10

0.11

-0.94

Trust Propensity

0.18

0.10

0.09

Age

-0.16

0.10

-1.55

Change in Upset*Trait
Negative Affect

0.11

0.11

1.01

Change in Hostile*Trait
Negative Affect

0.01

0.11

0.12

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
A second, similar moderated regression analysis was conducted to test for
significant interactions between trait negative affect scores (M = 2.45, SD = 0.60)
and increases in upset (M = 0.94, SD = 0.94) and hostile (M = 0.41, SD = 0.73)
discrete emotions on changes in composite trust scores (M = -1.01, SD = 0.91),
controlling for age (M = 20.55, SD = 3.82) and trust propensity scores (M = 2.61,
SD = 0.46). One participant was excluded from the analysis due to being an
extreme outlier on the change in composite trust score. The model was found to be
marginally significant, R2 = .15, F(7,82) = 2.09, p = .053, although the results
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showed that trait negative affect did not have a significant moderating effect on
relationships between decreases in composite trust scores and decreases in upset (β
= 0.11, p = .350), or hostile emotions (β = 0.05, p = .690).
Table 32 – Summary of Moderated Regression Analysis on Change in Trust (Composite)

R

Model 1

.40

R2

.16

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

0.06

Change in Upset

-0.29

0.11

-2.72**

Change in Hostile

-0.09

0.11

-0.79

Trait Negative Affect

-0.10

0.11

-0.94

Trust Propensity

0.18

0.10

0.09

Age

-0.16

0.10

-1.55

Change in Upset*Trait
Negative Affect

0.11

0.11

1.01

Change in Hostile*Trait
Negative Affect

0.01

0.11

0.12

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Taken together the moderated regression analyses using both single-item and
composite trust scores from Study 2 failed to provide support for hypothesis 3e, as
trait negative affect did not appear to have a moderating effect on the relationships
between increases in discrete negative emotions and decreases in trust.
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Hypothesis 4 analyses
Hypothesis 4a, Study 2. A multiple regression was conducted using change in
primary appraisal scores from Study 2 to test hypothesis 4a, that following a trust
violation, individuals with higher levels of honor logic would have significantly
greater decreases in primary appraisal of trustees. Decreases in primary cognitive
appraisal (M = -1.21, SD = 1.08) was included as the DV, with endorsement of
honor (M = 2.89, SD = 0.56), face (M = 3.52, SD = 0.53), and dignity (M = 3.85,
SD = 0.49) logic as predictors. One participant was excluded from the analysis for
being an extreme outlier on the honor logic index. The model was found to be
statistically significant, R2 = .11, F(3,83) = 3.52, p = .019. Endorsement of face
logic was found to be the only significant predictor of decreases in primary
appraisal following a violation, β = -0.59, p = .007. However, endorsement of
honor (β = 0.06, p = .750) and dignity logics (β = -0.30, p = .202) did not
demonstrate significant relationships with decreases in primary appraisal.
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Table 33 – Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Change in Primary Appraisal

R

Model 1

.34

R2

.11

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

1.029

Honor

0.06

0.20

0.32

Face

-0.59

0.22

-2.74**

Dignity

-0.30

0.23

-1.29

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
The results failed to provide support for hypothesis 4a, that endorsement of honor
logic would be a stronger predictor of changes in primary appraisal than
endorsement of face or dignity. However, the significant relationship between
endorsement of face logic and decreases in primary appraisal after a violation
have important implications for understanding the influence of cultural attributes
on responses to trust violation. These implications are further discussed in the
following section.
Hypothesis 4b, Study 2. A similar multiple regression was conducted using
change in hostile emotion scores from Study 2 to test hypothesis 4b, that following
a trust violation, individuals with higher levels of honor logic will experience
significantly greater increases in hostile affect. Increases in hostile emotion (M =
0.42, SD = 0.74) was included as the DV, with endorsement of honor (M = 2.90,
SD = 0.56), face (M = 3.53, SD = 0.53), and dignity logic (M = 3.83, SD = 0.49) as
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predictors. Two participants were excluded from the analysis for being extreme
outliers on the change in hostile emotion and honor logic indices. The final model
was not found to be statistically significant, R2 = .06, F(3,82) = 1.67, p = .180.
Endorsement of honor logic was found to be the only marginally significant
predictor of decreases in primary appraisal following a violation, β = 0.27, p =
.063. Endorsement of face (β = 0.12, p = .433) and dignity logics (β = 0.02, p =
.912) did not demonstrate significant relationships with increases in hostile
emotion. The results provide partial support for hypothesis 4b, that endorsement of
honor logic would be a stronger predictor of increases in hostile emotion than
endorsement of face or dignity.
Table 34 – Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Change in Hostile Emotion

R

Model 1

.24

R2

.06

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

0.73

Honor

0.27

0.14

1.88

Face

0.12

0.15

0.79

Dignity

0.02

0.17

0.11

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Hypothesis 4c. Two multiple regression analyses were conducted to test
hypothesis 4c, which predicted that following a trust violation, individuals with
higher levels of face logic would experience significantly greater increases in
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shame. One analysis was conducted using post-violation ashamed scores from
Study 1 and the other used changes in ashamed scores from Study 2.
Hypothesis 4c, Study 1. The first multiple regression was conducted to test the
predictive value of cultural logic on post-violation ashamed emotion after a trust
violation. Ashamed emotion (M = 2.02, SD = 1.31) was included as the DV, with
endorsement of honor (M = 2.92, SD = 0.66), face (M = 3.49, SD = 0.52), and
dignity logic (M = 3.84, SD = 0.54) as predictors. Six participants were excluded
from the analysis for being extreme outliers on the honor and dignity logic indices.
The final model was found to be statistically significant, R2 = .12, F(3,190) = 8.27,
p < .001. Endorsement of face logic was found to be the strongest significant
predictor of ashamed emotion following a violation, β = 0.70, p < .001.
Endorsement of dignity logic was also a significant predictor of feeling ashamed
(β = -0.43, p = .012) and honor logic was marginally significant (β = 0.26, p =
.055).
Table 35 – Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Post-Violation Ashamed Emotion

R

Model 1

.34

R2

.12

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

1.24

Honor

0.26

0.14

1.93

Face

0.70

0.17

4.07***
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Dignity

-0.43

0.17

-2.53*

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Hypothesis 4c, Study 2. A similar multiple regression was conducted to test the
predictive value of cultural logic on changes in ashamed emotion after a trust
violation. Increases in ashamed emotion (M = 0.144, SD = 0.79) was included as
the DV, with endorsement of honor (M = 2.89, SD = 0.56), face (M = 3.52, SD =
0.53), and dignity logic (M = 3.85, SD = 0.49) as predictors. One participant was
excluded from the analysis for being an extreme outlier on the honor logic index.
The final model was not found to be statistically significant, R2 = .01, F(3,83) =
0.15, p = .927. None of the cultural logic indices, honor (β = 0.06, p = .687), face
(β = -0.01, p = .966), or dignity (β = -0.11, p = .549), were found to be significant
predictors of increases in ashamed emotion.
Table 36 – Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Change in Ashamed Emotion

R

Model 1

.07

R2

.01

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

0.80

Honor

0.06

0.16

0.41

Face

-0.01

0.17

-0.04

Dignity

-0.11

0.18

-0.60

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Taken together the results provide partial support for hypothesis 4c, that
endorsement of face logic would be a stronger predictor of feeling ashamed
emotion in response to trust violation than endorsement of honor or dignity logics.
The effect may have been easier to detect in the Study 1 sample, as this group of
participants was intentionally drawn to maximize variance in cultural differences.
However, variances in honor and dignity logic were found to be only slightly
higher in the Study 1 sample (honor = 0.44, dignity = 0.29) than in Study 2 (honor
= 0.32, dignity = 0.29) and variance in face logic was virtually equal between
studies (Study 1 = 0.27, Study 2 = 0.28). On the other hand, variance in Study 1
ashamed ratings (1.70, M = 2.02, SD = 1.31) was found to be greater than variance
in changes in ashamed emotion in Study 2 (0.62, M = 0.14, SD = 0.79), indicating
that the trust violations described in Study 1 were more associated with ashamed
emotion than were the violation manipulations in Study 2.
Hypothesis 4d. Two multiple regression analyses were conducted to test
hypothesis 4d, which predicted that following a trust violation, individuals with
higher levels of dignity logic would experience smaller increases in negative
affect. One analysis was conducted using post-violation negative affect scores
from Study 1 and the other used changes in negative affect scores from Study 2.
Hypothesis 4d, Study 1. The first multiple regression was conducted to test the
predictive value of cultural logic on composite negative affect scores after a trust
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violation. Composite negative affect (M = 3.06, SD = 0.74) was included as the
DV, with endorsement of honor (M = 2.91, SD = 0.66), face (M = 3.94, SD =
0.52), and dignity logic (M = 3.84, SD = 0.54) as predictors. Seven participants
were excluded from the analysis for being extreme outliers on the honor logic,
dignity logic, and composite negative affect indices. The final model was found to
be statistically significant, R2 = .05, F(3,189) = 3.10, p = .028. Contrary to
prediction, only endorsement of face logic was found to significantly predict postviolation composite negative affect scores, β = .31, p = .003. Endorsement of
dignity (β = -0.03, p = .710) and honor logic (β = 0.02, p = .811) were not
predictive of composite negative affect scores. Together the cultural logic indices
accounted for approximately 5% of the variance observed in negative affect
following a trust violation.
Table 37 – Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Post-Violation Negative Affect

R

Model 1

.22

R2

.05

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

0.73

Honor

0.02

0.08

0.24

Face

0.31

0.10

3.00**

Dignity

-0.04

0.10

-0.37

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Hypothesis 4d, Study 2. A similar multiple regression was conducted to test the
predictive value of cultural logic on increases in negative affect following a trust
violation. Increases in negative affect (M = 0.33, SD = 0.38) was included as the
DV, with endorsement of honor (M = 2.90, SD = 0.56), face (M = 3.53, SD =
0.53), and dignity logic (M = 3.85, SD = 0.49) as predictors. Three participants
were excluded from the analysis for being extreme outliers on the change in
negative affect and honor logic indices. The final model was not found to be
statistically significant, R2 = .03, F(3,82) = 0.85, p = .469. Contrary to prediction,
none of the cultural logic indices predicted increases in negative affect: honor, β =
0.11, p = .138; face β = 0.03, p = .738, dignity, β = -0.01, p = .869.
Table 38 – Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Change in Negative Affect

R

R2

SE of the
Estimate

β

SE

t

Honor

0.11

0.08

1.50

Face

0.03

0.08

0.34

Dignity

-0.01

0.09

-0.17

Model 1

.17

.03

0.38

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Taken together the results do not provide support for hypothesis 4d. However, the
significant effect of face logic in predicting negative affect in Study 1 provides
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interesting implications for further research investigating response to trust
violation across cultures.

Hypothesis 5 analyses
Hypothesis 5a. Three logistic regression analyses were conducted to test
hypothesis 5a, which predicted that decreases in trust following a violation would
predict the trustor’s likelihood to engage in actual behaviors in direct response to
the trust violation. One analysis was conducted using binary do nothing (Yes, No)
scores and trust change scores from Study 1. The other two used a binary dummy
code from Study 2 behavioral responses (do nothing = 0, other responses = 1),
change in single-item trust scores, and change in composite trust scores.

Hypothesis 5a, Study 1. Drawing on data from Study 1 logistic regression was
conducted to predict the likelihood of people choosing to do nothing with change
in trust as a continuous predictor. There were 49 participants who reported doing
nothing in response to the trust violation they recollected while 151 reported
otherwise. The model was found to be statistically significant, χ2(1) = 6.297, p =
.012, with R2 of .031 (Cox & Snell) and .046 (Nagelkerke), respectively. The
model correctly classified 75.5% of the cases. Trust change (M = -2.065, SD =
1.07) was found to be a significant predictor of peoples' response to do nothing
following the violation, β = 0.394, z = 2.46, p = .014. The results indicate that as
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changes in trust increased the likelihood of doing nothing decreased, providing
support for hypothesis 5a.
Table 39 – Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis on Behavioral Response

Predictors

β(SE)

Odds Ratio

95% CI for Odds Ratio

-0.36(0.34)

0.70

(0.36, 1.37)

Change in Trust 0.39(0.16)

1.48

(1.08, 2.03)

Constant

Note. R2 = .031 (Cox & Snell), .046 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(1) = 6.297, p = .012.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Hypothesis 5a, Study 2. A second logistic regression was conducted to predict the
likelihood of people choosing to do nothing with decreases in single-item trust
scores as a continuous predictor. Propensity to trust and self-regulation were
included as covariates. Two cases were removed from the analysis due to being
extreme outliers on the self-regulation scale.
The model was not statistically significant, χ2(1) = 0.847, p = .357, with R2 of
.074(Cox & Snell) and .106 (Nagelkerke), respectively. The model correctly
classified 73.3% of the cases. After controlling for propensity to trust (M = 2.62,
SD = 0.47, β = -0.834, p = .133) and trait self-regulation (M = 3.683, SD = 0.659,
β = -0.842, p = .039), change in single-item trust scores (M = -2.065, SD = 1.07)
was not found to be a significant predictor of peoples' response to do nothing
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following the violation, failing to support the hypothesis, β = 0.211, z = 0.918, p =
.359.
Table 40 – Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis on Behavioral Response

Predictors

β(SE)

Odds Ratio

95% CI for Odds Ratio

6.63(2.16)**

758.77

(11.08, 51963.50)

Change in Trust
(Single-Item)

0.21(0.23)

1.23

(0.79, 1.94)

Trust Propensity

-0.83(0.56)

0.43

(0.15, 1.29)

Self-Regulation

-0.84(0.41)*

0.43

(0.19, 0.96)

Constant

Note. R2 = .074 (Cox & Snell), .106 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(1) = 0.847, p = .357.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
A third logistic regression was conducted to predict the likelihood of people
choosing to do nothing with change in composite trust scores as a continuous
predictor. Propensity to trust and self-regulation were included as covariates.
Three cases were removed from the analysis due to being extreme outliers on the
distributions of self-regulation ratings and change in trust ratings.
The model was not statistically significant, χ2(1) = 0.642, p = .423, with R2 of
.072(Cox & Snell) and .103 (Nagelkerke), respectively. The model correctly
classified 73.3% of the cases. After controlling for propensity to trust (M = 2.605,
SD = 0.463, β = -0.957, p = .094) and trait self-regulation (M = 3.668, SD = 0.647,
β = -0.980, p = .022), change in composite trust scores (M = -1.241, SD = 1.09)
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was not found to be a significant predictor of peoples' decision to engage in a
behavior other than doing nothing following the violation, failing to support the
hypothesis, β = 0.049, z = 0.172, p = .862.
Table 41 – Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis on Behavioral Response

Predictors

β(SE)

Odds Ratio

95% CI for Odds Ratio

7.23(2.30)**

1386.48

(15.33, 125376.42)

Change in Trust
(Composite)

0.05(0.28)

1.05

(0.60, 1.83)

Trust Propensity

-0.96(0.57)

0.38

(0.13, 1.18)

Self-Regulation

-0.98(0.43)*

0.38

(0.16, 0.87)

Constant

Note. R2 = .072 (Cox & Snell), .103 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(1) = 0.642, p = .423.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Taken together the results from study 1 and Study 2 provide partial support for
hypothesis 5a, that changes in trust predict people's likelihood to engage in a
behavioral response.
Hypothesis 5b, Study 2. Two parallel mediated regression analyses (Hayes, 2018)
were conducted to test hypothesis 5b, which predicted that individuals who
experience an integrity-based violation, followed by high changes in feelings of
hostility and decreases in trust, would be more likely to engage in retaliatory
behavior. One analysis was conducted using change in single-item trust scores,
and the other used change in composite trust scores, as mediators.
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First, a parallel mediated regression model with retaliation as the DV, violation
type as the IV, and changes in hostile emotion (M = 0.36, SD = 0.86) and single
item trust (M = -1.22, SD = 1.07) as mediators was conducted with 5000
bootstrapped iterations using the PROCESS macro for SPSS statistical software.
Propensity to trust (M = 2.62, SD = 0.47), age (M = 20.53, SD = 3.80), gender, and
self-regulation (M = 3.64, SD = 0.71) were also included in the model as
covariates.
Table 42 – Summary of Parallel Mediated Regression Analysis on Retaliation as Response

Indirect Pathway

Effect

Boot SE

Boot
LLCI

Boot
ULCI

Violation Type → Change in Hostile Emotion
→ Retaliation

.21

187801.06

-28.57

16.76

Violation Type → Single-Item Trust Change
→ Retaliation

-.02

42126.92

-14.83

7.19

The model resulted in no significant direct or indirect effects. However, the data
revealed that only three individuals from the sample actually chose to retaliate in
response to the trust violation manipulation. Whereas in Study 1 a greater
proportion of respondents (24 participants) recalled engaging in retaliatory
behavior (175 did not) following their trust violation examples. A follow-up
logistic regression including retaliation as the DV and change in trust as the IV
showed a positive relationship that was trending toward significance, β = 0.308, z
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= 1.50, p = .134, indicating that as decreases in trust became more substantial,
people may have been more likely to engage in retaliatory behavior.
Table 43 – Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis on Retaliation as Response

Predictors

Constant
Change in Trust

β(SE)

Odds Ratio

95% CI for Odds Ratio

-1.39(0.43)**

0.25

(0.10, 0.58)

0.31(0.21)

1.36

(0.91, 2.04)

Note. R2 = .011 (Cox & Snell), .022 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(1) = 2.26, p = .133.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
This could be a limitation of the single item trust measure, though change in trust
showed adequate variance (1.19) with scores falling between one and negative
three. It could also be a limitation of the experimental manipulation not being
severe enough, or not carrying enough weight, to justify retaliation. It could also
be that people remember engaging in more retaliatory behavior than actually
occurred. Alternatively, it could be because retaliation is simply much less
common than literature on revenge behavior leads us to believe, as evidence by the
relatively small number of participants in both studies who endorsed retaliation in
response to trust violation.
A similar mediation model was conducted with changes in the composite trust
scale as the mediator. The direct effect of violation type (LLCL = -1.696, ULCL =
105.498) and indirect effect of change in hostile emotion (LlCL = -12.9433,
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ULCL = 7.377) were not significant. However, the bootstrapped confidence
intervals for the indirect effect of change in trust on the relationship between
violation type and likelihood to engage in retaliatory behavior indicated that the
mediating effect was statistically significant, 69.254, LLCL = 1.163, ULCL =
103.641.
Table 44 – Summary of Parallel Mediated Regression Analysis on Retaliation as Response

Indirect Pathway

Effect

Boot SE

Boot
LLCI

Boot
ULCI

Violation Type → Change in Hostile Emotion
→ Retaliation

2.37

62117.64

-12.94

7.38

Violation Type → Composite Trust Change →
Retaliation

69.25 123721.36

1.16

103.64

The results from Study 2 provide partial support for hypothesis 5b, as change in
trust scores partially mediated the relationship between type of trust violation and
likelihood to engage in retaliatory behavior.
Hypothesis 5c, Study 2. A mediated logistic regression including a polynomial
transformation of change in primary appraisal scores, was conducted to test
hypothesis 5c, which predicted that individuals who experience a competencebased trust violation, followed by a moderately negative primary cognitive
appraisal of the trustee and higher levels of determination, would be more likely to
engage in proactive behaviors (i.e, picking up slack or confronting the trustee).
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Participants who chose to engage in proactive behaviors (41) were slightly fewer
than those who did not (50). A visual analysis of the change in cognitive appraisal
scores and binary proactive behavior variable (see Figure 10) indicated that the
cognitive appraisal ratings may be a better fit for a quadratic model (R2 = .045)
than a linear model (R2 < .001). Therefore, change in cognitive appraisal scores
were mean centered and then squared to create the quadratic predictor term.

Figure 10. Linear (R2 = .0001; y = 0.5 + 0.22x + 0.08x 2) and quadratic (R2 = .045; y = 0.46 +
0.544x2) fit lines for primary appraisal change and proactive behaviors.

A parallel mediated regression model with proactive behaviors as the DV,
violation type as the IV, and quadratic changes in cognitive appraisal and
determined emotion as mediators was conducted with 5000 bootstrapped iterations
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using the PROCESS macro for SPSS statistical software. Mean centered change in
cognitive appraisal scores, propensity to trust, age, gender, and self-regulation
were also included in the model as covariates. The model resulted in no significant
direct or indirect effects with ranges of estimated bootstrapped confidence
intervals including zero in all cases.
Table 45 – Summary of Parallel Mediated Regression Analysis on Proactive Behaviors as
Response

Effect

Boot SE

Boot
LLCI

Boot
ULCI

Violation Type → Determined Emotion→
Proactive Behaviors

-.03

0.13

-0.28

0.25

Violation Type → Change in Primary
Appraisal2 → Proactive Behaviors

.11

.17

-0.11

0.53

Indirect Pathway

A follow up hierarchical logistic regression was conducted to test the quadratic
relationship between change in cognitive appraisal following trust violation and
likelihood to engage in proactive behaviors in response. The model included the
binary proactive behaviors variable as the DV with mean centered change in
cognitive appraisal as the predictor in the first step and the quadratic term in the
second step and was run with 10000 bootstrapped iterations. The results of the
final model were statistically significant, χ2(1) = 4.12, p = .042, with R2 of .04
(Cox & Snell) and .06 (Nagelkerke), respectively. The model correctly classified
57.1% of the cases. The first order term was not a significant predictor (β = .097, p
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= .629) though the second order quadratic term was a significant predictor of
likelihood to engage in proactive behavior (β = .349, p = .033) providing some
support for the idea that small decreases in cognitive appraisal are more predictive
of likelihood to engage in proactive behaviors than no change, but as cognitive
appraisal continued to decrease participants were more likely to choose a
behavioral response that was not proactive (retaliate, involve 3rd party, or do
nothing).
Table 46 – Summary of Polynomial Logistic Regression Analysis on Proactive Behaviors as
Response

β(SE)

Odds Ratio

95% CI for Odds Ratio

Constant

Predictors

-0.59(0.30)*

0.55

(-1.18, -0.04)

Change in Primary
Appraisal

0.10(0.22)

1.10

(-0.38, 0.53)

Change in Primary
Appraisal2

0.35(0.07)*

1.42

(-0.02, 0.74)

Note. R2 = .044 (Cox & Snell), .059 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(1) = 4.12, p = .042.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Chapter 5
Discussion
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Summary of findings
The results of the analyses from Study 1 and Study 2 provide support for some,
though not all, of the hypotheses. Additionally, some of the primary and
supplemental analyses provided partial support, or other unintuitive findings that
may serve as impetus for future research. A summary of these findings is
presented in sequential order and offers possible explanations for the observed
effects and statistical relationships, or in some cases lack thereof. In sum, the
present findings offer interesting answers to the overarching research questions:
(a) what internal responses to trust violation drive decreases in trust? and, (b) how
do changes in trust influence individual behaviors prior to attempts at trust repair?
In attempt to replicate previous findings in the current studies, Hypotheses 1a and
1b predicted that changes in trust following a violation would be differentially
affected by the type of violation and by gender, respectively. These predictions
were largely based on previous findings demonstrating how trust can fluctuate as a
function of different types of violation (Bottom et al., 2002; Croson et al., 2003,
Kim et al., 2004; Lount et al., 2008) and between genders (Haselhuhn et al., 2015).
The present research attempted to replicate these effects in a diverse sample of

173
workers (Study 1) and a controlled experimental paradigm (Study 2). However,
evidence was not found to support either effect through a combination of nonparametric tests, ANOVAs, and mixed effects discontinuous growth models.
Furthermore, in the case of composite trust scores in Study 2, participants who
experienced the competence violation reported significantly greater changes in
trust than those who experienced the integrity violation, contrary to the predicted
direction of the difference. However, by reducing the composite trust scores to
their subfacets (competence-based and integrity-based trust), the follow up nonparametric analyses found significantly lower decreases in competence-based trust
in the competence violation condition, though the difference in integrity-based
trust was not significantly different between conditions.
The absence of support for Hypothesis 1a speaks to the experimental limitations of
Study 2 and previous studies that have found evidence of differences in trust
perceptions between competence and integrity violations, while simultaneously
underscoring the importance of considering context when conducting research on
trust violation in work settings. Specifically, the mixed results observed in Study 2
may best be explained by the nature of the task that participants engaged in being
more collaborative than transactional. The effects observed in previous studies
using economic bargaining paradigms (e.g., Bottom et al., 2002) may reflect that
perceptions of integrity matter more than perceptions of competence, whereas in
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more collaborative tasks perceptions of competence matter more than perceptions
of integrity. Based on this logic it is possible that competence violations are more
detrimental to collaborative working relationships while integrity violations are
more detrimental in transactional working relationships. The lack of significant
effects of violation type on decreases in single-item trust and integrity-based based
trust, combined with the significant effect observed on decreases in competencebased trust provide some support for this rationale. Although trust decreased in
both violation conditions these findings together suggest that the type of violation
did not differentially impact people’s overall perception of trust (single-item
measure), but given the importance of competence for realizing success in the
collaborative task, competency violations were perceived as more detrimental than
integrity violations. Therefore, future research may benefit by incorporating
multivariate measures of trust (e.g., Wildman et al., 2012) and carefully
considering the nature of the working relationship to better understand how
violations of trust impact the relationship on more granular levels.
It could also be the case that levels of trust in more transactional relationships,
such as those in previous experimental paradigms (modified prisoner’s dilemma
and bargaining games) are more sensitive to the type of violation experienced than
trust in more collaborative relationships where violation is perceived to result in
the same level of negative consequence regardless of how it manifests. For
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instance, in a high stakes collaboration such as space exploration, high risk
medical operations, or military combat where room for error is minimal, a
violation of any type that affects the trustor’s ability to effectively reach their goals
might be expected to have a negative impact on the relationship. Of course, future
research would be needed to explore this possibility by studying trust violations
across a broad variety of work contexts and professional relationships. This would
be an ample opportunity for qualitative studies or high frequency experiential
sampling studies to further probe the numerous effects of trust violation over time
to foster a better understanding of the psychological and contextual factors that are
taken into account by trustors and how that modifies trust attitudes.
Mean trust change scores from Study 1 and Study 2 (both single-item and
composite measures) were greater for males than females, generally aligning with
previous theory suggesting that women may be more trusting than men due to a
proclivity to maintain relationships (Amanatullah et al., 2008; Haselhuhn et al.,
2015). However, no analyses found the difference in trust decreases between
genders to be statistically significant. The lack of support for Hypothesis 1b in
both Study 1 and Study 2 contradicts the recent findings of Haselhuhn and
colleagues (2015) who found that men were more susceptible to decreases in trust
following a transgression than women. While Haselhuhn and colleagues (2015)
used a controlled bargaining game as their experimental paradigm to demonstrate
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gender differences, it is possible that gender effects on trust following a
transgression may be more salient in such transactional exchanges than in more
collaborative circumstances. It is also possible that gender may have a stronger
impact on people’s willingness to engage in trust repair than on direct attitudinal
responses to trust violation. As gender effects are an area of trust violation
research that has received very limited attention, future research is needed to
further explore potential gender differences. Because gender is a commonly
reported demographic variable, this may be a ripe opportunity for metanalytic
inquiry.
Results of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 provide insights to the first overarching
research question: what internal responses to the trust violation drive decreases in
trust? Additionally, Hypotheses 2a through 2c provide an empirical response to
previous calls for research to investigate broader cognitive attributions in the trust
process (Guo et al., 2011) by exploring how trust violation influenced people’s
primary appraisal perceptions, and subsequent effects on trust attitudes.
Ultimately, data from Study 2 showed strong support for all three hypotheses.
First, Study 2 participants were found to report significantly lower primary
appraisal ratings following trust violation (time four) than ratings prior (time three;
paired Wilcoxon rank sum test and repeated measures ANCOVA), indicating that
experiencing a trust violation resulted in substantive reductions in primary
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appraisal ratings. In other words, participants’ perceptions of their partners became
substantially more negative following the violation. This finding aligns with the
previous work of Ferrin and Dirks (2003) who found that trust levels can fluctuate
based inferences made about the trustee following trust violation. Furthermore, the
significant difference in pre-post violation primary appraisal ratings provide
support for future research to incorporate measures of primary appraisal (Lazarus,
2006) to further explore how trustor perceptions of costs and responsibility are tied
to the transgression.
Results of a latent change score analysis supported Hypothesis 2b, and built on the
findings of Hypothesis 2a, by demonstrating that decreases in primary appraisal
were a significant predictor of decreases in trust. This finding provides support for
the seminal work of Bies and Tripp (1996) who proposed that trust violation
incorporates a two-step cognitive process and suggests that initial cognitions are
systematically tied to perceptions of trust following a violation. Given that Study 2
was lab-based and did not incorporate measures of retrospective cognitions, nor a
long enough timeline to allow for them, future research is needed to incorporate
prolonged experimental timelines in order to explore the potential interactions
between initial and retrospective cognitions on changes in trust following
violation.
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The results of moderated regression analyses with trust violation type as a
moderator of the relationship between change in primary appraisal and change in
trust (single-item and composite measures) supported Hypothesis 2c, that the
predictive strength of the relationship depends on the nature of the trust violation
experienced. Though a stronger contrast was observed for the composite measure
of trust than the single-item measure, both analyses revealed a similar pattern of
results where the relationship between decreases in trust and decreases in primary
appraisal ratings were stronger in the competence violation condition. This
supports the recent work of Lewicki and Brinsfield’s (2017) who suggested that
changes in cognitive appraisal may be more salient in the case of competency
violations. Given that this hypothesis was supported, but Hypothesis 1a was not,
suggests that the type of violation may have a more proximal effect on appraisals
of the trustee, and that cognitive effect may be the catalyst for subsequent changes
in trust attitudes (Hypothesis 2b), rather than changes in trust attitudes being
driven by the type of violation directly. Again, future research is needed to further
probe the boundary conditions for these effects and to truly begin unraveling the
sequence of external events and internal cognitive responses in the context of trust
violation.
Next, Hypotheses 3a through 3e were developed to explore the affective aspect of
experiencing trust violation in collaborative settings. Hypothesis 3a predicted that
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increases in negative affect would be greater for individuals who experience an
integrity-based violation of trust compared to competence-based. Although the
mean increases in negative affect were slightly greater for participants in the
integrity violation condition, results of a Wilcoxon rank sum test, ANCOVA, and
mixed effects discontinuous growth model with violation type as the predictor all
showed a non-significant difference in negative affect scores between Study 2
violation conditions. This finding contradicts previously published findings which
have suggested that negative emotional responses are more likely in the event of
integrity-based violations (Kim et al., 2006, Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017;
Trafimow et al., 2005). Results of the present study suggest that people experience
increases in negative affect to a similar degree, regardless of what type of violation
occurred. It is possible that the integrity violation manipulated in Study 2 was not
severe enough to invoke more serious emotional responses (Lewicki & Brinsfield,
2017), or it could be that the nature of the Study 2 simulation did not allow for a
strong enough emotional investment to develop between participants and their
fictitious partners (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2006). The latter explanation appears to
be more likely given the challenge of designing an experiment to provoke strong
negative emotions while protecting participants from unnecessary harm
(Lopatovska, 2011; Siedlecka & Denson, 2019). Another explanation could be that
the context of the working relationship is more meaningful than merely the type of
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violation (Ortmann & Gigerenzer, 2000), such that competence is more important
than integrity in short-term collaborative tasks compared to transactional tasks.
Future research focused on types of trust violation and emotional reactions, while
incorporating the type and strength of trust in the relationship, may aid in
providing a more concrete understanding of how types of trust violation
differentially influence peoples’ affective responses to the violation.
The results of three latent change score analyses with negative affect (Study 1) and
increases in negative affect (Study 2) included as predictors of changes in trust
provided partial support for Hypothesis 3b. In Study 1, retrospective negative
affect scores were found to significantly predict decreases in reported pre-post
violation trust levels. However, results from Study 2 using changes in negative
affect as the predictor and both single-item and composite trust scores as criterion
were not found to be significant. This may be because of the retrospective nature
of Study 1, where participants presumably had ample time to explore their
retrospective cognitions surrounding the trust violation experienced (i.e., Bies &
Tripp, 1996). It could also be that participants in Study 1, who provided their own
examples of trust violation, chose to reflect on experiences that were more severe
than the trust violation manipulations included in Study 2, and therefore
participants reported greater levels of negative affect regarding the violation
(Lewicki and Brinsfield, 2017). Future experimental research that employs more
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severe trust violation manipulations may find evidence to support previous
research and the results of Study 1, though this may be difficult to achieve given
the ethical responsibility of researchers to protect the well-being of participants in
the lab (Wright & Wright, 1999). An alternative explanation may be that specific
negative emotions, opposed to overall negative affect, are the true drivers of
changes in trust following a violation; a notion that was partly supported by the
results of Hypothesis 3c.
Using data from Study 2, Hypothesis 3c was supported by evidence of discrete
emotions as predictors of changes in trust in two multiple regression analyses
(single-item and composite trust as criterion variables). Specifically, both
regression analyses revealed that increases in feeling upset was the only significant
predictor of changes in trust, while the hostile, ashamed, and afraid emotions were
not statistically significant predictors. Changes in feeling nervous was also found
to be a significant predictor, though the relationship was positive, such that
increases in feeling nervous correlated with increases in trust. This was
counterintuitive to the expected direction of relationships between negative
emotions and trust change. Though, it is possible that given the task-oriented
nature of the experiment participants who felt more nervous after the violation also
felt an increased need to continue trusting their partner to achieve their goals. This
can be explained through affect as information theory, where participants who felt
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an increase in nervous emotion may have been more motivated to focus on their
task objectives (Seo, Bartunek, & Barrett, 2010), and in turn continued to express
trust in their partner to avoid failure in the task.
Overall, these findings support the argument that feeling upset is a common
affective response to trust violation (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Elangovan et al., 2007,
Tomlinson et al., 2004). The lack of a significant relationship between change in
hostile emotion and changes in trust may again speak to the boundary conditions
of Study 2 in manipulating trust violations that were severe enough to elicit this
more extreme negative emotional response (Tripp et al., 2007). Because the
experiment was designed to reflect day-to-day collaboration in a relatively shortterm task with a novel partner, a side effect could be that the relationships and
quality of the task were not extreme enough to elicit such intense emotion. Again,
future research would likely benefit by effectively manipulating and exploring
trust violations that range in scope and intensity without violating the ethical
principles of psychological research.
To further explore the importance of specific discrete negative emotional
responses to trust violation (Hypothesis 3d), relative weights analyses (Lebreton,
2015) were conducted using data from Studies 1 and 2. Results from Study 1
showed that feeling upset had a smaller relative weight than several other discrete
emotions measured (e.g., disappointed, betrayed, sad, critical, fearful, guilty,
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angry, and confused). However, given that each participant in Study 1 provided a
unique example of having their trust violated it is difficult to make inferences
regarding the effects of discrete emotions on trust following violation in this
sample.
Feeling upset was found to have the highest relative weight predicting changes in
both single-item and composite trust scores from Study 2, however, the results
failed to provide hypothetical support because the relative weight of feeling upset
was not found to be significantly higher than other discrete negative emotions.
Because Study 2 used the short form version of the PANAS (Thompson, 2007)
which included only five discrete negative emotions, future experimental studies
may find value in measuring a more comprehensive selection of discrete emotions
to test for significant differences in the relative weights of those emotions as
predictors of trust erosion.
Results from two moderated regression analyses from Study 2 also failed to
provide support for Hypothesis 3e, which predicted that trait negative affect would
moderate the relationships between changes in discrete emotions (upset and
hostile) and changes in trust (single-item and composite). While the relationship
between changes in hostile emotion and changes in trust were not significant to
begin with (Hypothesis 3c), the significant relationship between change in upset
and changes in trust were not found to be moderated by trait negative affect. This
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was contrary to expectations based on previous work that has demonstrated people
higher in trait negative affect are more susceptible to changes in state affect
(Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008). However, based on the logic included in affective
events theory (AET; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), there may be individual
differences other than trait negative affect that influence changes in trust attitudes
following a violation event in the workplace, and future research would benefit
from exploring the potential direct and interaction effects of other individual
difference attributes on this relationship.
Next, Hypotheses 4a through 4d tested how cultural attributes of individuals might
impact peoples’ experience of trust violation, specifically the extent that
individuals endorse the logics of honor, face, and dignity cultures (Leung &
Cohen, 2011). Multiple regression results from Study 2 did not support Hypothesis
4a and provide partial support for Hypothesis 4b. Hypothesis 4a predicted that
endorsement of honor logic would significantly predict decreases in primary
appraisal ratings of trustees following a violation. Contrary to the prediction, it
was found that endorsement of face logic significantly predicted decreases in
primary appraisal ratings while endorsement of honor and dignity logics were not
significant predictors. This finding suggests that individuals who harbor a strong
sense of reciprocity while recognizing the importance of cooperation (face logic)
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are more prone to changes in primary appraisal of others following a trust-related
transgression.
In a similar vein, Hypothesis 4b predicted that endorsement of honor logic would
predict increases in hostile affect to a greater degree than endorsement of face and
dignity logic. This was partially supported as endorsement of honor logic was
found to be a marginally significant predictor of increases in hostile emotion
following the violation manipulation in Study 2. Taken together, the results of
testing Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggest that the extent to which individuals endorse
particular cultural logics can differentially impact the internal mechanisms of
response to trust violation. Specifically, the findings imply that individuals who
endorse dignity logic to a greater degree may be more insulated from the negative
affective and attitudinal responses to having their trust violated in a collaborative
context than individuals who endorse honor and face values to a greater extent.
Future research is warranted to further explore how, and under what conditions,
individuals’ endorsement of cultural attributes may have a direct influence on how
they respond to having trust violated in the workplace.
Two comparable multiple regressions drawing on data from Studies 1 and 2
offered partial support for Hypothesis 4c, that endorsement of face logic would
significantly predict feelings of shame following a violation. Specifically, results
from Study 1 showed that the extent people endorsed face logic significantly
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predicted the degree of shame they recalled following their trust violation incident.
However, Study 2 results did not find endorsement of any of the cultural logics to
significantly predict increases in shame. These mixed findings require further
research to relate cultural viewpoints with feelings of shame following trust
violation.
A similar pattern of results was found testing Hypothesis 4d in both studies, which
predicted that endorsement of dignity logic would predict smaller changes in
negative affect than endorsement of honor or face logic. However, contrary to
prediction the only form of cultural logic found to significantly predict changes in
negative affect was endorsement of face logic, suggesting that individuals who
advocate the logic of face cultures are more susceptible to increases in negative
affect following a violation. Again, no significant effects were observed in Study
2.
The lack of support for Hypotheses 4c and 4d could be due to experimental
limitations, such that the nature of the integrity and competence violation
manipulations in the lab-setting (Study 2) did not invoke enough variance in
feeling ashamed. Similarly, the lack of an observed effects in Study 2 could be due
to limited variance in endorsement of the cultural logics (i.e., sampling error),
where the Study 1 sample was drawn specifically to maximize cultural variance.
Future studies leveraging diverse samples may provide more insight into the
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effects of cultural logics on perceptions of trust and trust violation in the
workplace.
Lastly, Hypotheses 5a through 5c incorporated sequences of various
measurements to predict how people behaviorally respond to having their trust
violated, providing insight to the second research question: how do changes in
trust influence individual behaviors prior to attempts at trust repair? First,
Hypothesis 5a was tested using logistic regression models with reported
behavioral responses to violation in Study 1 and observed behavioral responses in
Study 2 as criterion. Specifically, whether people chose to do nothing in response
to violation was regressed onto changes in trust scores. Results from Study 1
revealed a significant effect of changes in trust on the likelihood people chose to
do nothing in response to the violation they experienced. Providing support for
Hypothesis 5a, as reductions in trust strengthened the likelihood to do nothing in
response decreased, meaning that people were more likely to respond to the trust
violation when it had a greater impact on their trust attitudes toward the violator.
In contrast, the logistic regressions conducted using single-item and composite
trust scores from Study 2 were not found to be significant, failing to support
Hypothesis 5a. This could be due to the artificial nature of the Study 2 experiment,
such that people may be more likely to respond to violations of trust when it is
perceived to have a detrimental impact their actual working relationships. Future
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studies may shed more light on people’s likelihood to engage in actual behaviors
by conducting more field research where violations are highly salient and postviolation behaviors can be observed, opposed to highly controlled lab designs
where trust and related behaviors are unlikely to influence a research participant’s
daily work life.
Two parallel logistic mediation analyses were conducted to test Hypothesis 5b
using single-item and composite trust scores as a mediator (Study 2), respectively.
Both models included violation type as the predictor with changes in hostile
emotion as another mediator, and decision to engage in retaliation as the criterion.
No indirect effect of change in the single-item trust scores was observed, nor was
increase in hostile emotion found to have an indirect effect in either model.
However, decreases in composite trust scores were found to be a significant
mediator of the relationship between violation type and likelihood to engage in
retaliatory behavior. These results show promise of a potential mediating effect of
changes in trust on people’s decision to seek revenge following a trust violation.
To reiterate, it must be recognized that only three participants in Study 2 chose to
retaliate following the violation manipulation. This finding alone suggests that
revenge behavior may be a less common response to trust violation than some of
the previous literature has lead researchers to believe (Aquino et al., 2006; Bies &
Tripp, 1996; Bies et al., 1997; Finkel et al., 2002). It is likely that in real-world
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scenarios rational individuals would take into account the probable costs and
benefits of getting revenge as part of the sensemaking process (Robinson &
Morrison, 2000), which may be a critical factor to consider for conducting future
research on revenge behavior.
Finally, Hypothesis 5c was similarly tested using a parallel mediation model to
predict likelihood to engage in proactive behaviors (picking up slack and
confronting the trustee) including violation type as the predictor with determined
affect and the nonlinear change in primary appraisal as mediators. Although no
direct or indirect effects were found to be significant, a follow up logistic
regression revealed that a quadratic transformation of the change in primary
appraisal scores was a significant predictor of likelihood to engage in proactive
behaviors. This finding provides limited support for Hypothesis 5c as small
decreases in primary appraisal were associated with decisions to engage in
proactive behavior, and larger decreases were associated with other non-proactive
behaviors (doing nothing, involving a third party, and retaliation). This is a
relatively simple yet profound finding that indicates when small decreases in
perceptions of a trustee occur following the experience of trust violation, it may be
substantial enough for a trustor to recognize it and choose to take a proactive
approach to dealing with it, though not substantial enough to provoke a trustor to
engage in less proactive behaviors.

190
Given the transient nature of trust in the workplace (e.g., Vanneste, Puranam, &
Kretschmer, 2015), future studies may benefit from testing more non-linear effects
of responses to trust violation in collaborative settings. Furthermore, the lack of
empirical support for the predicted impact of feeling determined on likelihood to
engage in proactive behaviors contradicts some of the previous research that has
found measures of positive affect to be positively related to proactive workplace
behaviors (George, 1990) such as greater cooperation, conflict management, and
team performance (Barsade, 2002). Future studies could be designed to explore the
potential influence of other discrete positive emotions on decisions to engage in
proactive behaviors following a workplace trust violation.
Altogether these results can be synthesized into a handful of broad patterns of
findings that future research may consider in further testing hypotheses that could
continue unpacking the theoretical black box that is trust violation. First, the lack
of support for significant differences in trust decreases between violation types and
gender stress the importance for future research to consider broader contextual
factors surrounding trust violation and explore how individual differences such as
gender may interact with some contextual factors to systematically exacerbate
differences in trust decreases. Second, the present findings support inclusion of
primary appraisal ratings as a predictor of variance in trust changes following
violation and other trust researchers may benefit by acknowledging nonlinear
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relationships between fundamental cognitive processes and trust change in future
empirical studies. Third, the mixed results regarding affective responses to
violation suggest that this aspect of the trust violation process is complicated and
requires careful consideration of how researchers operationalize emotions to
predict changes in trust attitudes. Future researchers should be advised to consider
the timing, intensity, and patterns of discrete emotional responses to violation
when studying trust in collaborative relationships. Fourth, the findings also show
support for forthcoming research on collaborative trust violation to explore the
role of cultural perspectives, particularly those that can be modeled as individual
attributes such as the logics of honor, dignity, and face. Finally, these findings
provide some support for the predictions that the experience of trust violation and
responses to it would drive behavioral responses in systematic ways. Although
further research is needed to gain a better understanding of the patterns of
violation types and psychological processes that are predictive of workplace
behaviors.

Theoretical Implications
Primarily, these findings provide valuable contributions to recent efforts aimed at
developing an integrative model of trust development, trust violation, and trust
repair (Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017; Wildman et al., 2018), by illuminating some
of the intricate differences in the experience of trust violation. Namely, this
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research provides preliminary insights into the combinations of internal
mechanisms for processing trust violation experiences in the workplace, and the
subsequent behaviors that result prior to attempts at reconciliation. For instance,
the identification of primary appraisal and feeling upset as predictors of trust
decreases helps to develop a fuller understanding of the trust violation process and
provides direction for the focus of future research working to further integrate the
distinct phases of the collaborative trust lifecycle.
Although a unified theory of trust has yet to be accepted, the findings of the
present study provide several contributions to the scientific study of trust in
collaborative work contexts. In total, the present research provides general support
for previous theory regarding trust violation in the workplace while some of the
results extend and challenge the existing literature. Notably, the findings extend
quantitative support for the earlier study of Bies and Tripp (1996) who outlined a
range of cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to trust violation in work
settings. However, while the present study confirms that people experience
variance in initial cognitions (i.e., cognitive and affective responses), the results
contradict the notion that these responses motivate revenge seeking. Additionally,
participants’ endorsement of behavioral responses such as picking up slack and
involving third parties in both studies adds to Bies and Tripp’s (1996) taxonomy
of responses to trust violation.
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Consequently, the lack of support for a direct effect of violation type on changes in
trust following violation contradict the findings of previous experimental studies
using bargaining games, modified prisoner’s dilemma, and vignette designs
(Bottom et al., 2002; Croson et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2004; Lount et al., 2008). It is
possible that more transactional relationships, such as those in previous
experiments, are more sensitive to types of violation than in more collaborative
relationships. For instance, in working relationships where individuals recognize
the importance of relying on their counterparts to effectively achieve their goals,
the extent that violations of trust impede on the process of pursuing those goals
may be more salient to trustors than the way the violation was manifested.
These findings also extend on theory put forth by previous trust violation
researchers (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Elangovan et al., 2007) who proposed that trust
violation occurs as a two-step process; a trigger event followed by appraisal of the
event. However, results from the present studies suggest that a more prolonged
multiphasic process may be involved between the experience of having trust
violated and attempts at restoring that trust. This can be best explained by
combining the trust violation propositions (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Elangovan et al.,
2007) with presumptions of affective events theory, that workplace events are
followed by a sequence of affective response, formation of attitudes, and
subsequent behaviors (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Therefore, I contend that the
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present findings extend support for conceptualizing trust violation as a four-step
process where (a) the violation of trust expectations serves as a trigger event, (b)
that event is then evaluated through a combination of cognitive and affective
reactions, (c) the result of which drives changes in trust attitudes, and (d) the
combination of these previous three steps catalyze unique behavioral responses.
Additionally, finding that the relationship between changes in primary appraisal
and changes in trust were significantly stronger for competency violations than
integrity violations serves as a significant step forward in terms of theoretical
precision. Indicating that cognition may be the true causal precursor of changes in
trust following a competence violation, these findings also support Lewicki and
Brinsfield’s (2017) recent argument that cognitive responses are more salient in
competence-based violations of trust.
Furthermore, it should be noted that trust propensity showed to be a significant
covariate in many of the Study 2 analyses that included trust measures as the DV
replicating and extending support to past research (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995;
Elangovan et al., 2007; Schweitzer et al., 2006). In fact, the relative weights
analyses conducted in Study 2 found trust propensity to have the second and third
largest relative weights in the models including composite and single-item trust
measures as DVs, respectively. Together those results support past propositions
that trust propensity is a critical antecedent of responses to trust violation and help
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to reiterate the importance of considering this individual difference as a
confounding factor that should be controlled for in future investigations of trust
violation in the workplace.

Practical Implications
Two overarching practical implications can also be gleaned from these findings.
First, human resource managers may be able to better mediate conflicts between
coworkers that stem from trust transgressions by offering points of self-reflection
that encourage them to recognize and process how their cognitive and affective
responses to a violation event effect their workplace attitudes and behaviors.
Helping employees to actively process their internal responses to trust violation
may aid in promoting active conflict management, such as having an open
discussion about the transgression, and finding mutually beneficial solutions
(DeChurch & Marks, 2001).
Another way in which the present findings can be of practical benefit is to
incorporate trust-related modules in organizational teamwork training (e.g., Ellis et
al., 2005) aimed at educating employees on the importance of trust in the
workplace and how to recognize and proactively respond to perceptions of trust
violation. Previous research has recognized mutual trust is a critical underlying
influence on development of core teamwork skills (Salas, Sims, & Burke, 2005).
By cultivating a more comprehensive understanding of the trust process and the
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detrimental effect of trust violation through teamwork training interventions,
organizations may find success in reducing the severity of trust violation
perceptions in the workplace and improving the quality of collaborative
relationship development.

Limitations
While the findings of the present research are interesting and provide impetus for a
range of future enquiry, Studies 1 and 2 are not without limitations. For instance,
as an anonymous online survey that asked participants to provide their own critical
incident example of experiencing trust violation, the results drawn from Study 1
data are limited by the retrospective nature of the study design and participants’
having varying durations of time to reflect on the experience (retrospective
cognitions; Bies & Tripp, 1996). In other words, it is possible that people may
have recalled their experience and responses to the experience differently than
how it actually occurred. Although participants were instructed to reflect on an
experience of trust violation that occurred in a work context, by not restricting
participants to particular types of violation events they inevitably reported a wide
range of experiences that were perceived as trust violation, and the vagueness of
many of the open-ended responses did not allow for a clear delineation of violation
types. Additionally, the limitations of self-report measures are well established as
the influence of social desirability can confound results and has long been a
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common concern among researchers (Arnold & Feldman, 1981; Taylor, 1961). For
instance, it is possible that the influence of socially desirable responses on the
survey could be a source of over- or underestimation of observed statistical
relationships.
The primary limitations of Study 2 include the nature of highly controlled lab
experiments, a college sample, and artificiality of the violation manipulation. First,
lab experiments are inherently limited to the extent that inferences of external
validity can be made (Highhouse, 2009). Also, the narrative behind the MARS
simulation was chosen to ensure the collaborative task was a novel experience for
participants, however, delivering resources to outposts on Mars with no means of
communicating with a partner is an unlikely scenario for many generations to
come. Because the study was conducted using college students, the hypotheses
should be tested in other types of populations to determine the extent that results
may be generalizable. The highly controlled nature of using a computer agent
confederate as the participants’ partner also limit generalizability of the Study 2
results. To extend the generalizability of the present findings, future research is
needed to replicate these results in field samples across various industries where
interdependent collaboration can be observed.

Conclusion
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In conclusion these results provide three key takeaways in addressing the primary
research questions: (a) what internal responses to the trust violation drive
decreases in trust? and, (b) how do changes in trust influence individual behaviors
prior to attempts at trust repair? First, primary appraisal of the trustee was found to
decrease following trust violation and predicted subsequent changes in trust
attitudes. Second, feeling upset was also found to be a strong predictor of the
extent that trust eroded following a violation. Third, the findings shed light on the
complexity of behavioral responses to violation by exposing a four-step process
where violation events are following by cognitive-affective reactions, decreases in
trust, and behavioral reactions. Together, these findings extend previous research
on the process of, and responses to, trust violation in the workplace (Bies & Tripp,
1996; Elangovan et al., 2007), and provide numerous suggestions for future
research.

References

199

Ahadi, B. (2009). Situational determinants of forgiveness. Research Journal of
Biological Sciences, 4(6), 651-655.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 179-211.
Ajzen, I. (2005). Attitudes, personality, and behavior. McGraw-Hill Education
(UK).
Ajzen, I., & Driver, B. L. (1992). Application of the theory of planned behavior to
leisure choice. Journal of Leisure Research, 24(3), 207-224.
Ajzen, I., & Madden, T. J. (1986). Prediction of goal-directed behavior: Attitudes,
intentions, and perceived behavioral control. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 22(5), 453-474.
Amanatullah, E. T., Morris, M. W., & Curhan, J. R. (2008). Negotiators who give
too much: unmitigated communion, relational anxieties, and economic
costs in distributive and integrative bargaining. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 95(3), 723-738.

200
Aquino, K., Tripp, T. M., & Bies, R. J. (2001). How employees respond to
personal offense: the effects of blame attribution, victim status, and
offender status on revenge and reconciliation in the workplace. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 86(1), 52-59.
Aquino, K., Tripp, T. M., & Bies, R. J. (2006). Getting even or moving on?
Power, procedural justice, and types of offense as predictors of revenge,
forgiveness, reconciliation, and avoidance in organizations. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 91(3), 653-668.
Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (2001). Efficacy of the theory of planned
behaviour: A meta‐analytic review. British Journal of Social Psychology,
40(4), 471-499.
Askew, K., Buckner, J. E., Taing, M. U., Ilie, A., Bauer, J. A., & Coovert, M. D.
(2014). Explaining cyberloafing: The role of the theory of planned
behavior. Computers in Human Behavior, 36, 510-519.
Aslani, S., Ramirez‐Marin, J., Brett, J., Yao, J., Semnani‐Azad, Z., Zhang, Z. X.,
Tinsley, C., Weingart, L., & Adair, W. (2016). Dignity, face, and honor
cultures: A study of negotiation strategy and outcomes in three cultures.
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 37(8), 1178-1201.

201
Ayers, E. L. (1984). Vengeance and justice: Crime and punishment in the 19th
century American South (pp. 185-222). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Bakker, A. B., & Oerlemans, W. G. (2019). Daily job crafting and momentary
work engagement: A self-determination and self-regulation
perspective. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 112, 417-430.
Barrett, L. F. (1998). Discrete emotions or dimensions? The role of valence focus
and arousal focus. Cognition & Emotion, 12(4), 579-599.
Barsade, S. G. (2002). The ripple effect: Emotional contagion and its influence on
group behavior. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(4), 644-675.
Barsade & Gibson (2007). Why does affect matter in organizations? Academy of
Management Perspectives, 21(1), 36-59.
Beck, A. T. (1999). Prisoners of hate: The cognitive basis of anger, hostility, and
violence. HarperCollins Publishers.
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history.
Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122-142.
Berry, L. L. (1999). Discovering the soul of service: The nine drivers of
sustainable business success. Simon and Schuster.

202
Bies, R. J., Barclay, L. J., Tripp, T. M., & Aquino, K. (2016). A systems
perspective on forgiveness in organizations. The Academy of Management
Annals, 10(1), 245-318.
Bies, R. J., & Tripp, T. M. (1996). Beyond distrust. Trust in organizations, 246260.
Bies, R. J., & Tripp, T. M. (2002). Hot flashes, open wounds”: Injustice and the
tyranny of its emotions. Emerging Perspectives on Managing
Organizational Justice, 203-224.
Bies, R. J., Tripp, T. M., & Kramer, R. M. (1997). At the breaking point:
Cognitive and social dynamics of revenge in organizations. In R. A.
Giacalone & J. Greenberg (Eds.), Antisocial behavior in organizations (pp.
18-36). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc.
Bindl, U. K., & Parker, S. K. (2010). Proactive work behavior: Forward-thinking
and change-oriented action in organizations. APA Handbook of Industrial
and Organizational Psychology, 2, 567-598.
Blau, P. (2017). Exchange and power in social life. Routledge.
Bliese, P. (2013). Multilevel modeling in R (2.5): A brief introduction to R, the
multilevel package and the nlme package. Retrieved online:
http://rsync.udc.es/CRAN/doc/contrib/Bliese_Multilevel.pdf

203
Bliese, P. (2016). multilevel: Multilevel Functions. R package version 2.6.
Retrieved online: https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=multilevel
Bliese, P. D., & Lang, J. W. (2016). Understanding relative and absolute change in
discontinuous growth models: Coding alternatives and implications for
hypothesis testing. Organizational Research Methods, 19(4), 562-592.
Bliese, P. D., & Ployhart, R. E. (2002). Growth modeling using random coefficient
models: Model building, testing, and illustrations. Organizational
Research Methods, 5(4), 362-387.
Boon, S. D., & Holmes, J. G. (1999). Interpersonal risk and the evaluation of
transgressions in close relationships. Personal Relationships 6, (2), 151168.
Bottom, W. P., Gibson, K., Daniels, S. E., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002). When talk
is not cheap: Substantive penance and expressions of intent in rebuilding
cooperation. Organization Science, 13(5), 497-513.
Bowles, H. R., Babcock, L., & Lai, L. (2007). Social incentives for gender
differences in the propensity to initiate negotiations: Sometimes it does
hurt to ask. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
103(1), 84-103.

204
Brans, K., & Verduyn, P. (2014). Intensity and duration of negative emotions:
Comparing the role of appraisals and regulation strategies. PLoS One, 9(3),
1-13.
Brown, R. P. (2016). Honor bound: How a cultural ideal has shaped the American
psyche. Oxford University Press.
Brühl, R., Basel, J. S., & Kury, M. F. (2018). Communication after an integritybased trust violation: How organizational account giving affects trust.
European Management Journal, 36(2), 161-170.
Butler Jr, J. K. (1991). Toward understanding and measuring conditions of trust:
Evolution of a conditions of trust inventory. Journal of Management,
17(3), 643-663.
Butler Jr, J. K., & Cantrell, R. S. (1984). A behavioral decision theory approach to
modeling dyadic trust in superiors and subordinates. Psychological
Reports, 55(1), 19-28.
Cianci, A., Reichert, B. E., Sedatole, K., & Tsakumis, G. T. (2018). Trusting
behavior following a violation of trust: The immunization effect of control
system transparency. Available at SSRN:
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3022154

205
Clore, G. L., Schwarz, N., & Conway, M. (1994). Affective causes and
consequences of social information processing. Handbook of Social
Cognition, 1, 323-417.
Codreanu, A. (2016). A VUCA action framework for a VUCA environment.
Leadership challenges and solutions. Journal of Defense Resources
Management, 7(2), 31-38.
Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., & LePine, J. A. (2007). Trust, trustworthiness, and
trust propensity: a meta-analytic test of their unique relationships with risk
taking and job performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(4), 909.
Costa, A. C., Fulmer, C. A., & Anderson, N. R. (2017). Trust in work teams: An
integrative review, multilevel model, and future directions. Journal of
Organizational Behavior, 39(2), 169-184.
Costa, A. C., Roe, R. A., & Taillieu, T. (2001). Trust within teams: The relation
with performance effectiveness. European Journal of Work and
Organizational Psychology, 10(3), 225-244.
Courneya, K. S. (1995). Understanding readiness for regular physical activity in
older individuals: An application of the theory of planned behavior. Health
Psychology, 14(1), 80.
Covey, S. M., & Link, G. (2013). Smart trust: The defining skill that transforms
managers into leaders. Simon and Schuster.

206
Cropanzano, R., & Mitchell, M. S. (2005). Social exchange theory: An
interdisciplinary review. Journal of Management, 31(6), 874-900.
Croson, R., Boles, T., & Murnighan, J. K. (2003). Cheap talk in bargaining
experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 51(2), 143-159.
Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2008). Warmth and competence as
universal dimensions of social perception: The stereotype content model
and the BIAS map. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 61149.
Currao, T. J. (2009). A new role for emergency management: fostering trust to
enhance collaboration in complex adaptive emergency response systems
(Doctoral dissertation, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School).
Davis, L. E., Ajzen, I., Saunders, J., & Williams, T. (2002). The decision of
African American students to complete high school: An application of the
theory of planned behavior. Journal of Educational Psychology, 94(4),
810.
De Jong, B. A., Dirks, K. T., & Gillespie, N. (2016). Trust and team performance:
A meta-analysis of main effects, moderators, and covariates. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 101(8), 1134.

207
De Jong, B. A., & Elfring, T. (2010). How does trust affect the performance of
ongoing teams? The mediating role of reflexivity, monitoring, and effort.
Academy of Management Journal, 53(3), 535-549.
De Leersnyder, J., Boiger, M., & Mesquita, B. (2013). Cultural regulation of
emotion: Individual, relational, and structural sources. Frontiers in
Psychology, 4, 55.
DeChurch, L. A., & Marks, M. A. (2001). Maximizing the benefits of task
conflict: The role of conflict management. International Journal of
Conflict Management, 12(1), 4-22.
Deutsch, M. (1977). The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive
processes. Yale University Press.
Dietz, G., Gillespie, N., & Chao, G. T. (2010). Unravelling the complexities of
trust and culture. In M. N. K. Saunders, D. Skinner, G., Dietz, N Gillespie,
& R. Lewicki (Eds.) Organizational trust: A cultural perspective, 3-41.
Direnfeld, G. (2016). How long does it take to rebuild trust? Retrieved from
www.yoursocialworker.com/p-articles/rebuilding_trust.doc
Dirks, K. T. (1999). The effects of interpersonal trust on work group performance.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(3), 445.

208
Dirks, K. T., Kim, P. H., Ferrin, D. L., & Cooper, C. D. (2011). Understanding the
effects of substantive responses on trust following a transgression.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 114(2), 87-103.
Doney, P. M., Cannon, J. P., & Mullen, M. R. (1998). Understanding the influence
of national culture on the development of trust. Academy of Management
Review, 23(3), 601-620.
Driskell, T., Salas, E., & Driskell, J. E. (2018). Teams in extreme environments:
Alterations in team development and teamwork. Human Resource
Management Review, 28(4), 434-449.
East, R. (1993). Investment decisions and the theory of planned behaviour.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 14(2), 337-375.
Elangovan, A. R., Auer-Rizzi, W., & Szabo, E. (2007). Why don't I trust you now?
An attributional approach to erosion of trust. Journal of Managerial
Psychology, 22(1), 4-24.
Ellis, A. P., Bell, B. S., Ployhart, R. E., Hollenbeck, J. R., & Ilgen, D. R. (2005).
An evaluation of generic teamwork skills training with action teams:
Effects on cognitive and skill‐based outcomes. Personnel
Psychology, 58(3), 641-672.

209
Ferrin, D. L., & Dirks, K. T. (2003). The use of rewards to increase and decrease
trust: Mediating processes and differential effects. Organization Science,
14(1), 18-31.
Ferrin, D. L., Kim, P. H., Cooper, C. D., & Dirks, K. T. (2007). Silence speaks
volumes: the effectiveness of reticence in comparison to apology and
denial for responding to integrity-and competence-based trust violations.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(4), 893.
Finkel, E. J., Rusbult, C. E., Kumashiro, M., & Hannon, P. A. (2002). Dealing
with betrayal in close relationships: Does commitment promote
forgiveness?. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(6), 956.
Fiore, S. M., Salas, E., Cuevas, H. M., & Bowers, C. A. (2003). Distributed
coordination space: toward a theory of distributed team process and
performance. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 4(3-4), 340-364.
Folger, R., Cropanzano, R., & Goldman, B. (2005). What is the relationship
between justice and morality. Handbook of Organizational Justice, 215,
215-245.
Ford, M. B., & Collins, N. L. (2013). Self-esteem moderates the effects of daily
rejection on health and well-being. Self and Identity, 12(1), 16-38.

210
Fulmer, C. A., & Gelfand, M. J. (2012). At what level (and in whom) we trust:
Trust across multiple organizational levels. Journal of Management, 38(4),
1167-1230.
George, J. M. (1990). Personality, affect, and behavior in groups. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 75(2), 107-116.
Giffin, K. (1967). The contribution of studies of source credibility to a theory of
interpersonal trust in the communication process. Psychological Bulletin,
68(2), 104.
Gill, R., Thompson, M. M., & Febbraro, A. R. (2011). Trust repair in an
international mission: Violations of trust and strategies for repair. Trust in
Military Teams, 107-126.
Greguras, G. J., & Diefendorff, J. M. (2010). Why does proactive personality
predict employee life satisfaction and work behaviors? A field
investigation of the mediating role of the self-concordance model.
Personnel Psychology, 63(3), 539-560.
Grosz, C., Kraus, S., Talman, S., Stossel, B., Havlin, M., Grosz, B. J., & Kraus, S.
(2004). The influence of social dependencies on decision-making: Initial
investigations with a new game. In Proceedings of the Third International
Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (pp.
782–789). New York, NY: ACM Press. doi: 10.1109/AAMAS.2004.264

211
Günsoy, C., Cross, S. E., Uskul, A. K., & Gercek‐Swing, B. (2019). The role of
culture in appraisals, emotions and helplessness in response to threats.
International Journal of Psychology. doi: 10.1002/ijop.12589
Guo, J., Rupp, D. E., Weiss, H. M., & Trougakos, J. P. (2011). Justice in
organizations: A person-centric perspective. In S. W. Gilliland, D. D.
Steiner, & D. P. Skarlicki (Eds.), Research in social issues in management.
Emerging perspectives on organizational justice and ethics (pp. 3-32).
Charlotte, NC, US: IAP Information Age Publishing.
Hadfield, C. (2015). An astronaut's guide to life on Earth: Life lessons from space.
London: Pan Books.
Hamamura, T., Meijer, Z., Heine, S. J., Kamaya, K., & Hori, I. (2009).
Approach—Avoidance motivation and information processing: A crosscultural analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(4), 454462.
Harmon-Jones, C., Schmeichel, B. J., Mennitt, E., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2011).
The expression of determination: Similarities between anger and approachrelated positive affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
100(1), 172-211.
Hasel, M. C., & Grover, S. L. (2017). An integrative model of trust and leadership.
Leadership & Organization Development Journal, 38(6), 849-867.

212
Haselhuhn, M. P., Kennedy, J. A., Kray, L. J., Van Zant, A. B., & Schweitzer, M.
E. (2015). Gender differences in trust dynamics: Women trust more than
men following a trust violation. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 56, 104-109.
Hayes, A. F. (2018). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional
process analysis: A regression-based approach. Guilford Publications.
Highhouse, S. (2009). Designing experiments that generalize. Organizational
Research Methods, 12, 554-566
Hilbe, J. M. (2009). Logistic regression models. Chapman and Hall/CRC.
Hovland, C.I., Janis, I.L., & Kelley, H.H. (1953). Communication and persuasion.
New Haven, CT, US: Yale University Press.
Hui, C. H., Lau, F. L., Tsang, K. L., & Pak, S. T. (2011). The Impact of Post‐
Apology Behavioral Consistency on Victim's Forgiveness Intention: A
Study of Trust Violation Among Coworkers1. Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, 41(5), 1214-1236.
Jones, G. R., & George, J. M. (1998). The experience and evolution of trust:
Implications for cooperation and teamwork. Academy of Management
Review, 23(3), 531-546.

213
Kaplan, S., Bradley, J. C., Luchman, J. N., & Haynes, D. (2009). On the role of
positive and negative affectivity in job performance: A meta-analytic
investigation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(1), 162–176.
Kapucu, N., Augustin, M. E., & Garayev, V. (2009). Interstate partnerships in
emergency management: Emergency management assistance compact in
response to catastrophic disasters. Public Administration Review, 69(2),
297-313.
Keith, T. Z. (2014). Multiple regression and beyond: An introduction to multiple
regression and structural equation modeling. Routledge.
Kelley, H. H. (1983). Love and commitment. In H. H. Kelley, E. Berscheid, A.
Christensen, J. H. Harvey, T. L. Huston, G. Levinger, E. McQintock, L. A.
Peplau, & D. R. Peterson (Eds.), Close relationships. New York: Freeman
Publishing Company.
Kenny, D. A. (2013). Change score analysis. Retrieved online at
http://www.davidakenny.net/cm/long.htm
Ketelaar, T., & Tung Au, W. (2003). The effects of feelings of guilt on the
behaviour of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining
games: An affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in
social interaction. Cognition and Emotion, 17(3), 429-453.

214
Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., Cooper, C. D., & Ferrin, D. L. (2006). When more blame
is better than less: The implications of internal vs. external attributions for
the repair of trust after a competence-vs. integrity-based trust violation.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99(1), 49-65.
Kim, P. H., Ferrin, D. L., Cooper, C. D., & Dirks, K. T. (2004). Removing the
shadow of suspicion: the effects of apology versus denial for repairing
competence-versus integrity-based trust violations. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 89(1), 104.
Koutsos, P., Wertheim, E. H., & Kornblum, J. (2008). Paths to interpersonal
forgiveness: The roles of personality, disposition to forgive and contextual
factors in predicting forgiveness following a specific offence. Personality
and Individual Differences, 44(2), 337-348.
Kramer, R. M. (1994). The sinister attribution error: Paranoid cognition and
collective distrust in organizations. Motivation and Emotion, 18(2), 199230.
Kramer, R. M., & Tyler, T. R. (1995). Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory
and research. Sage Publications.
Kraus, M. W., Horberg, E. J., Goetz, J. L., & Keltner, D. (2011). Social class rank,
threat vigilance, and hostile reactivity. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 37(10), 1376-1388.

215
Kuwabara, K., Vogt, S., Watabe, M., & Komiya, A. (2014). Trust, cohesion, and
cooperation after early versus late trust violations in two-person exchange:
The role of generalized trust in the United States and Japan. Social
Psychology Quarterly, 77(4), 344-360.
Larzelere, R. E., & Huston, T. L. (1980). The dyadic trust scale: Toward
understanding interpersonal trust in close relationships. Journal of
Marriage and the Family, 595-604.
Lazarus, R. S. (2006). Stress and emotion: A new synthesis. Springer Publishing
Company.
Leung, A. K. Y., & Cohen, D. (2011). Within-and between-culture variation:
individual differences and the cultural logics of honor, face, and dignity
cultures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(3), 507-526.
Lewicki, R. J., & Brinsfield, C. (2017). Trust repair. Annual Review of
Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 4, 287-313.
Lewicki, R. J., & Bunker, B. B. (1996). Developing and maintaining trust in work
relationships. In R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.) Trust in organizations:
Frontiers of theory and research, 114-139.
Lewicki, R. J., Tomlinson, E. C., & Gillespie, N. (2006). Models of interpersonal
trust development: Theoretical approaches, empirical evidence, and future
directions. Journal of Management, 32(6), 991-1022.

216
Lewicki, R. J., & Wiethoff, C. (2006). Trust, trust development, and trust repair.
In M. Deutsch & P. T. Coleman (Eds.), The handbook of conflict
resolution: Theory and Practice. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Lewis, J. D., & Weigert, A. (1985). Trust as a social reality. Social Forces, 63(4),
967-985.
Lopatovska, I. (2011). Researching emotion: challenges and solutions.
In Proceedings of the 2011 iConference (pp. 225-229). ACM.
Lount Jr, R. B., Zhong, C. B., Sivanathan, N., & Murnighan, J. K. (2008). Getting
off on the wrong foot: The timing of a breach and the restoration of trust.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(12), 1601-1612.
Lu, Y., Zhou, T., & Wang, B. (2009). Exploring Chinese users’ acceptance of
instant messaging using the theory of planned behavior, the technology
acceptance model, and the flow theory. Computers in Human Behavior,
25(1), 29-39.
Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (1999). The effect of the performance appraisal
system on trust for management: A field quasi-experiment. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 84(1), 123.
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of
organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709-734.

217
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect-and cognition-based trust as foundations for
interpersonal cooperation in organizations. Academy of Management
Journal, 38(1), 24-59.
McKnight, D. H., Cummings, L. L., & Chervany, N. L. (1998). Initial trust
formation in new organizational relationships. Academy of Management
Review, 23(3), 473-490.
Miller, W. (1993). Humiliation. Cornell University Press.
Mishra, A. K. (1996). Organizational responses to crisis. In R.M Kramer & T.
Tyler (Eds.), Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research (pp.
261-287). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Morrison, E. W., & Robinson, S. L. (1997). When employees feel betrayed: A
model of how psychological contract violation develops. Academy of
Management Review, 22(1), 226-256.
Ortmann, A., & Gigerenzer, G. (2000). Reasoning in economics and psychology:
Why social context matters. In Cognition, rationality, and institutions (pp.
131-145). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Parker, S. K., Bindl, U. K., & Strauss, K. (2010). Making things happen: A model
of proactive motivation. Journal of Management, 36(4), 827-856.

218
Pelling, E. L., & White, K. M. (2009). The theory of planned behavior applied to
young people's use of social networking web sites. CyberPsychology &
Behavior, 12(6), 755-759.
Pinheiro, J., Bates, D., DebRoy, S., Sarkar, D., R Core Team (2018). nlme: Linear
and nonlinear mixed effects models. R package version 3.1-137. Retrieved
online: https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=nlme.
Power, N. (2018). Extreme teams: Toward a greater understanding of multiagency
teamwork during major emergencies and disasters. American Psychologist,
73(4), 478.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, L.L.C. (2016). 19th annual global CEO survey.
Retrieved online: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-survey/2016/landingpage/pwc-19th-annual-global-ceo-survey.pdf
R Core Team (2019). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. Retrieved online:
https://www.R-project.org/
Raghuram, S., Garud, R., Wiesenfeld, B., & Gupta, V. (2001). Factors
contributing to virtual work adjustment. Journal of Management, 27(3),
383-405.

219
Raghuram, S., & Wiesenfeld, B. (2004). Work‐nonwork conflict and job stress
among virtual workers. Human Resource Management: Published in
Cooperation with the School of Business Administration, The University of
Michigan and in alliance with the Society of Human Resources
Management, 43(2‐3), 259-277.
Rider, K. V. (2011). Using a metaphor to help couples rebuild trust after an affair.
Journal of Family Psychotherapy, 22(4), 344-348.
Robinson, S. L. (1996). Trust and breach of the psychological contract.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(4).
Robinson, S. L., & Wolfe Morrison, E. (2000). The development of psychological
contract breach and violation: A longitudinal study. Journal of
Organizational Behavior, 21(5), 525-546.
Rousseau, D. M. (1989). Psychological and implied contracts in organizations.
Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 2(2), 121-139.
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different
after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review,
23(3), 393-404.
RStudio Team (2016). RStudio: Integrated development for R. Boston, MA:
RStudio, Inc. Retrieved at http://www.rstudio.com/

220
Salas, E., Sims, D. E., & Burke, C. S. (2005). Is there a “big five” in
teamwork?. Small Group Research, 36(5), 555-599.
Saucier, D. A., Miller, S. S., Martens, A. L., O'Dea, C. J., & Jones, T. L. (2018).
Individual differences explain regional differences in honor-related
outcomes. Personality and Individual Differences, 124, 91-97.
Schoorman, F. D., Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (2007). An integrative model of
organizational trust: Past, present, and future. Academy of Management
Review, 32(2), 344-354.
Schwartz, S. H., & Bardi, A. (2001). Value hierarchies across cultures: Taking a
similarities perspective. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32(3), 268290.
Schwarz, N. (2011). Feelings-as-information theory. Handbook of theories of
social psychology, 1, 289-308.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (2003). Mood as information: 20 years later.
Psychological Inquiry, 14(3-4), 296-303.
Schweitzer, M. E., Hershey, J. C., & Bradlow, E. T. (2006). Promises and lies:
Restoring violated trust. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 101(1), 1-19.

221
Sels, L., Janssens, M., & Van Den Brande, I. (2004). Assessing the nature of
psychological contracts: A validation of six dimensions. Journal of
Organizational Behavior, 25(4), 461-488.
Sensky, T. (1997). Causal attributions of physical illness. Journal of
Psychosomatic Research, 43(6), 565-573.
Seo, M., Bartunek, J. M., & Barrett, L. F. (2010). The role of affective experience
in work motivation: Test of a conceptual model. Journal of Organizational
Behavior, 31(7), 951-968.
Serva, M. A., Fuller, M. A., & Mayer, R. C. (2005). The reciprocal nature of trust:
A longitudinal study of interacting teams. Journal of Organizational
Behavior: The International Journal of Industrial, Occupational and
Organizational Psychology and Behavior, 26(6), 625-648.
Shapiro, D. L., Sheppard, B. H., & Cheraskin, L. (1992). Business on a handshake.
Negotiation Journal, 8(4), 365-377.
Siedlecka, E., & Denson, T. F. (2019). Experimental methods for inducing basic
emotions: A qualitative review. Emotion Review, 11(1), 87-97.
Simons, T. L., & Peterson, R. S. (2000). Task conflict and relationship conflict in
top management teams: the pivotal role of intragroup trust. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 85(1), 102-111.

222
Smith, P. B., Easterbrook, M. J., Blount, J., Koc, Y., Harb, C., Torres, C., Ahmad,
A. H., Ping, H., Celikkol, G. C., Loving, R. D., & Rizwan, M. (2017).
Culture as perceived context: An exploration of the distinction between
dignity, face and honor cultures. Acta de Investigación Psicológica, 7(1),
2568-2576.
Solomon, L. (1960). The influence of some types of power relationships and game
strategies upon the development of interpersonal trust. The Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61(2), 223.
Spector, M. D., & Jones, G. E. (2004). Trust in the workplace: Factors affecting
trust formation between team members. The Journal of Social Psychology,
144(3), 311-321.
Strauss, K., & Parker, S. K. (2014). Effective and sustained proactivity in the
workplace: A self-determination theory perspective. The Oxford Handbook
of Work Engagement, Motivation, and Self-Determination Theory, 50-71.
Strickland, L. H. (1958). Surveillance and trust. Journal of Personality, 26(2),
200-215.
Tan, H. H., & Lim, A. K. (2009). Trust in coworkers and trust in organizations.
The Journal of Psychology, 143(1), 45-66.

223
Tangney, J., Fee, R., Reinsmith, C., Boone, A. L., & Lee, N. (1999). Assessing
individual differences in the propensity to forgive. In Annual Meeting of
the American Psychological Association, Boston, MA.
Thompson, E. R. (2007). Development and validation of an internationally reliable
short-form of the positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS). Journal
of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 38(2), 227-242.
Tomlinson, E. C., Dineen, B. R., & Lewicki, R. J. (2004). The road to
reconciliation: Antecedents of victim willingness to reconcile following a
broken promise. Journal of Management, 30(2), 165-187.
Tomlinson, E. C., & Mayer, R. C. (2009). The role of causal attribution
dimensions in trust repair. Academy of Management Review, 34(1), 85104.
Tonidandel, S., & LeBreton, J. M. (2015). RWA web: A free, comprehensive,
web-based, and user-friendly tool for relative weight analyses. Journal of
Business and Psychology, 30(2), 207-216.
Trafimow, D., Bromgard, I. K., Finlay, K. A., & Ketelaar, T. (2005). The role of
affect in determining the attributional weight of immoral behaviors.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(7), 935-948.

224
Tripp, T. M., Bies, R. J., & Aquino, K. (2007). A vigilante model of justice:
Revenge, reconciliation, forgiveness, and avoidance. Social Justice
Research, 20(1), 10-34.
Vandello, J. A., Cohen, D., & Ransom, S. (2008). US Southern and Northern
differences in perceptions of norms about aggression: Mechanisms for the
perpetuation of a culture of honor. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,
39(2), 162-177.
Vanneste, B. S., Puranam, P., & Kretschmer, T. (2014). Trust over time in
exchange relationships: Meta‐analysis and theory. Strategic Management
Journal, 35(12), 1891-1902.
Watson, D., & Walker, L. M. (1996). The long-term stability and predictive
validity of trait measures of affect. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 70(3), 567-577.
Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2011). Managing the unexpected: Resilient
performance in an age of uncertainty (Vol. 8). San Francisco, CA: JosseyBass.
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and
emotion. Psychological Review, 92(4), 548.

225
Weiss, H., & Cropanzano, R. (1996). Affective events theory: A theoretical
discussion of the structure, causes, and consequences of affective
experiences at work. Research in Organizational Behavior, 18, 1-74.
Weiss, J. W., Mouttapa, M., Chou, C. P., Nezami, E., Johnson, C. A., Palmer, P.
H., Cen, S. Y., Gallaher, P., Ritt-Olson, A., Azen, S. P., & Unger, J. B.
(2005). Hostility, depressive symptoms, and smoking in early
adolescence. Journal of Adolescence, 28(1), 49-62.
Wildman, J. L., Fiore, S. M., & Salas. E. (2009). Development of trust and distrust
measures. Unpublished Working Draft. Institute for Simulation and
Training, University of Central Florida.
Wildman, J. L., Pagan, A. D., Fry, T. N., & Nyein, K. P. (2018). Trust
development, violation, and repair across cultures. Poster presented at the
third biennial Cross Cultural Management Summit, Orlando, FL.
Wildman, J. L., Shuffler, M. L., Lazzara, E. H., Fiore, S. M., Burke, C. S., Salas,
E., & Garven, S. (2012). Trust development in swift starting action teams:
A multilevel framework. Group & Organization Management, 37(2), 137170.
Wilkowski, B. M., & Robinson, M. D. (2008). The cognitive basis of trait anger
and reactive aggression: An integrative analysis. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 12(1), 3-21.

226
Williams, M., & Belkin, L. Y. (2016). Maintaining trust through active meaning
construction. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2016(1). Retrieved
from https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2016.286
Wright, T. A., & Wright, V. P. (1999). Ethical responsibility and the
organizational researcher: A committed-to-participant research perspective.
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 1107-1112.
Yan, S., & Zhu, Y. (2013). Impact of psychological contract violation on
interpersonal trust during mergers and acquisitions. Social Behavior and
Personality: An International Journal, 41(3), 487-495.
Yang, J., & Diefendorff, J. M. (2009). The relations of daily counterproductive
workplace behavior with emotions, situational antecedents, and personality
moderators: A diary study in Hong Kong. Personnel Psychology, 62, 259–
295.
Zak, P. J. (2017). The neuroscience of trust. Harvard Business Review, 95(1), 8490.
Zand, D. E. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 229-239.

Appendix A

227

Honor, Dignity, Face Scale
From Smith et al. (2017)
Response format: 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”)
For the following questions, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree
with the listed statements.
Honor
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

People must always be ready to defend their honor.
It is important to promote oneself to others.
People always need to show off their power in front of their competitors.
Men need to protect their women’s reputation at all costs.
You must punish people who insult you.
If a person gets insulted and they don’t respond, he or she will look weak.

Dignity
7. How much a person respects themselves is far more important than how
much others respect them.
8. People should NOT care what others around them think.
9. People should say what they are thinking.
10. People should make decisions based on their own opinions and not based
on what others think.
11. People should stand up for what they believe in even when others disagree.
12. People should be true to themselves regardless of what others think.
Face
13. People should minimize conflict in social relationships at all costs.
14. It is important to maintain harmony within one's group.
15. People should be very humble to maintain good relationships.
16. People should control their behavior in front of others.
17. People should be extremely careful not to embarrass other people.
18. People should never criticize others in public.

Appendix B
Post-violation Cognitive and Affective Responses

Response format: 1 (“Not at all”) to 5 (“A great deal”)
To what extent did him/her violating your trust make you feel…
1. Upset
2. Angry
3. Frustrated
4. Disappointed
5. Sad
6. Fearful
7. Guilty
8. Ashamed
9. Regretful
10. Betrayed
11. Confused
12. Helpless
13. Stressed
14. Apathetic
15. Worried
16. Critical of the violator
17. A sense of injustice
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Propensity to Trust Scale
From Mayer and Tomlinson (1999)

Response format: 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly agree”)
For the following statements, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree
with the listed statements.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

One should be very cautious with strangers.
Most experts tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge.
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.
These days, you must be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of
you.
Most salespeople are honest in describing their products.
Most repair technicians will not overcharge people who are ignorant of
their specialty.
Most people answer public opinion polls honestly.
Most adults are competent at their jobs.
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Trait Self-Regulation Measure
From Ford and Collins (2013)

Response format: 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly agree”)
For the following statements, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree
with the listed statements.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Overall I felt like I had a lot of willpower today.
I had difficulty controlling my behavior today.
I found it difficult to focus or concentrate today.
I found it easy to work toward meeting my goals today.

Appendix E
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule Short Form (PANAS SF)
From Thompson (2007)
Trait PANA
Response format: 1 (“Never”) to 5 (“Always”)
Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you
generally feel:
1. Upset
2. Hostile
3. Alert
4. Ashamed
5. Inspired
6. Nervous
7. Determined
8. Attentive
9. Afraid
10. Active
State PANA
Response format: 1 (“Not at all”) to 5 (“A great deal”)
During the previous round of the game, to what extent did you feel:
1. Upset
2. Hostile
3. Alert
4. Ashamed
5. Inspired
6. Nervous
7. Determined
8. Attentive
9. Afraid
10. Active
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Trust-Distrust Scale
From Wildman, Fiore, and Salas (2009)

Response format: 1 (“Not at all”) to 5 (“A great deal”)
During the previous round of the game, to what extent did you feel:
1. Assured that your partner will make intelligent decisions?
2. Confident that your partner will try to do things that benefit the team?
3. Afraid that your partner will purposefully do something that isn't helpful?
4. Faith that your partner can do the task at hand?
5. Suspicious about your partner's reasons behind certain decisions?
6. Convinced that you can rely on your partner to try their hardest?
7. Confident in your partner's ability to complete a task?
8. Nervous that your partner will betray you?
9. Afraid that your partner will make a mistake?
10. Confident that your partner will do as they say?
11. Positive that your partner will try and do what is best for the team?
12. Compelled to keep tabs on your partner to be sure things get done?
13. Certain that your partner will perform well?
14. Cautious about your partner's intentions for the team?
15. Paranoid that your partner will fail?
16. Worried that your partner will do something wrong?

